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As cities in the U.S. continue to experience increases in unsheltered houselessness, houseless 
encampments are becoming far more common throughout urban landscapes. Along with the 
increase of encampments there has been new rights-claims by houseless communities, claims for 
rights to organize communities on public and private properties. As a result, cities are beginning 
to sanction organized encampments as a strategy for managing the current crisis of 
houselessness. Based on a combination of qualitative methods, this dissertation analyzes the 
ways in which property affects the lives of houseless people residing in self-governing 
encampments in Portland, Oregon. It does so by drawing from ethnographic research with self-
governing communities to examine the benefits and limitations of encampments. The 
experiences from Portland’s encampments are assessed by way of liberal-democratic procedures 
more generally to better understand the realm of justice available within democracy. What the 
dissertation seeks to show is that houseless encampment residents cannot have their rights of 
citizenship fully protected due to how property rights and relations are prioritized in the liberal 
model of propertied-citizenship. For, the dialectical relationship between property and 
citizenship, which liberal-democracy is premised upon, leave the houseless in a peculiar bind. 
And that is, while houseless people hold equal political citizenship to that of the housed, the very 
means by which property is prioritized through social, economic, legal, and political relations all 
but assures that houseless people hold only the appearance of citizenship. The dissertation ends 
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On Tuesday, August 15, 2017, Portland, Oregon’s Overlook Neighborhood Association (OKNA) 
convened for their monthly general meeting. At the top of the list for this OKNA meeting was a 
vote to amend its bylaws. The proposed amendment to the bylaws delineated who could and 
could not be members within the association. As one of two bylaw amendment votes scheduled 
for the meeting, “Revision B” laid out for neighbors what was at stake in the vote. The summary 
for the proposed amendment read: 
The second bylaws amendment for consideration on Tuesday clarifies who 
qualifies for membership in OKNA and therefore may vote and hold office. 
Under a city Office of Neighborhood Involvement interpretation of neighborhood 
bylaws, it is possible that anyone who happens to be in the neighborhood on the 
day of a meeting could be eligible to vote. This includes houseless individuals 
camping illegally in Overlook or squatters occupying a vacant building. 
This revision reflects the view that a greater commitment to the neighborhood 
should be necessary to vote and serve on the board. To that end, this amendment 
would require residents to provide a legal home address to qualify for 
membership. That would exclude houseless campers and squatters in vacant 
buildings. However, it would not preclude a houseless village that has [city-
sanctioning] from receiving full membership privileges. A city-sanctioned and 
permitted houseless village would have a legal address, and its residents therefore 
would qualify for OKNA membership. Alternatively, a houseless village with a 
nonprofit component could have a designated representative member in OKNA. 
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Businesses and non-profits in the neighborhood would continue to be eligible to 
have a designated member in OKNA (OKNA 2017). 
Cloaked in broad language, the amendment proposed denying membership for most 
houseless persons wanting to participate in the neighborhood organization.1 But for anyone who 
had been following OKNA’s politics regarding houselessness during the two years prior to the 
meeting knew to what this membership-restriction was specifically referring: Portland’s then-
newest self-governing houseless encampment, Hazelnut Grove (HG). HG was an encampment 
that was never officially permitted by the City to operate. While the City’s government never 
issued an official land use permit to the encampment, HG was officially tolerated by the City. 
For OKNA members, this was the problem. HG was there, in the Overlook neighborhood 
“illegally,” and the City was supporting the encampment.  
To attempt to get around the City’s support of HG’s occupation of the site, OKNA’s 
proposed bylaw amendment required that neighbors would need “to provide a legal home 
address to qualify for membership.” Given that “a city-sanctioned and permitted houseless 
village encampment would have a legal address” the amendment stated, HG residents would not 
be allowed to participate in neighborhood association affairs because the encampment was 
unsanctioned.  
 
1 Throughout this dissertation I use the term houseless and houselessness rather than homeless or homelessness. 
Following the language used by encampment residents to describe themselves, I also have adopted the term. As 
the general sentiment goes, home is where the heart is. For those without a “home,” the implication is not only 
that there is no heart left, but that the physical nature of housing itself constitutes “home.” Clearly this is not 
always true. Home, as geographers know well, is where meaning is imbued within a space. To use the term 
houseless, therefore, prioritizes what houseless individuals need most: housing.   
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 The OKNA proposed bylaw amendment was posted to its website one week prior to the 
day of the vote. The proposed amendment elicited reaction from local media, who honed in on 
the bylaw’s language seeking to exclude houseless people. In one local news report, the OKNA 
chair, attempting to explain why OKNA would require a legal address for its members to 
participate, stated “if you're an undocumented immigrant and you rent here you're welcome on 
the board, but if you happen to plop down on a city park bench for the night, that's not sufficient 
to say you have a commitment to Overlook. So, in some sense, yes, we're going to exclude some 
people, and it's those without an address” (Hewitt 2017). This statement made clear that it was 
particularly the houseless that were seen to not be responsible enough to satisfactorily meet the 
obligations of citizenship desired by the neighborhood association.    
That OKNA intended to exclude houseless people did not resonate with the City. In 
response to the move by OKNA, the City’s Office of Neighborhood Involvement (ONI), the 
office responsible for overseeing and funding each of Portland’s neighborhood associations like 
that of OKNA, stepped in and argued against the proposed bylaw amendment. In a letter to the 
OKNA, ONI stated that “if the Overlook Neighborhood Association were to move forward with 
adoption of such a restriction, ONI would have to consider exercising its authority to suspend, 
and perhaps eventually terminate, the Overlook Neighborhood Association's benefits of formal 
recognition” (Hewitt 2017). For, the City saw a repression of rights for houseless people that was 
going to be unduly enforced. 
 On the night of the vote around 130 people were in attendance, no small feat for a 
neighborhood general meeting. The contentious amendment was the main order of business. 
Perhaps with the City’s condemnation in mind, the OKNA board unanimously voted to remove 
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language of houseless exclusion from the bylaws (OKNA 2017). There would be no change to 
the bylaw which restricted membership for houseless people. Yet, the fate of houseless people’s 
acceptance within the neighborhood did not end there.  
After the proposed bylaw amendment was dropped from the meeting’s agenda a 
resolution was introduced. Rather than using neutral language like the proposed bylaw had done, 
the new motion directly implicated HG, mandating that the encampment be removed from its site 
in the Overlook neighborhood. The resolution proposed that if no good neighbor agreement was 
reached within six weeks, HG would need to relocate within the next two and half months 
(OKNA 2017).2 The resolution had a good chance of passing. For, after the bylaw amendment 
was dropped from the meeting’s agenda, HG residents and some of its supporters had left. When 
the new motion to remove HG was proposed, a supporter of the encampment who was still in 
attendance called HG members to have them come back for the vote. HG members and a few of 
its supporters made it back in time to cast a vote against the proposed resolution. When the 
motion was finally put to a vote, it failed, with 49 voting against and 38 in favor (Hewitt 2017). 
Once again, OKNA’s attempt to exclude HG from participating within the association had failed.  
Although OKNA lacked the authority to remove HG from its site, the very pursuit of this 
resolution affirmed a broader commitment from many OKNA members and neighborhood 
residents that something needed to be done about houselessness in the neighborhood and as well 
as throughout the city. Particularly, something needed to be done about the rise of organized 
 
2 At that time, there had been ongoing good neighbor agreement discussions. Good neighbor agreements are non-
binding agreements between, say a neighborhood association and another neighborhood entity, which lays out 
the concerns and expectations around a particular issue. In the case of OKNA and HG, the good neighbor 
agreement wanted to set expectations about when the encampment would leave the neighborhood, along with 
other regulatory criteria for how the encampment could operate.  
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houseless encampments. For, the City was now supporting organized encampments in their 
operations.   
Reflecting on the events of the general meeting, OKNA’s chair indicated that there had 
taken place a spirited debate about houselessness the night of the meeting. “Neighbors and 
homeless advocates offered passionate arguments for and against the measure [to remove HG]” 
he stated. “A handful of disruptive attendees were not able to prevent an excellent show of local 
democracy and civil debate in action” (OKNA 2017). The implication was that despite houseless 
people “disrupting” the otherwise usual “civility” of debate, OKNA was stronger for the event 
because it had engaged in proper democratic practice. But its support was not strong enough to 
exclude the encampment it had been trying to force out of the neighborhood for the past two 
years.  
Portland and the Rise of Organized Houseless Encampments  
The events of the OKNA general meeting offer a glimpse into the contested politics of 
houselessness in Portland today. Like many U.S. west coast cities, Portland has experienced 
increases in unsheltered houselessness in recent years. More than half of Portland’s estimated 
4,000 houseless people on any given night are unsheltered (AFHE 2019), a nearly 42% increase 
in the city’s unsheltered population since 2007 (Smock 2015). Given the increases in the 
houseless population, coupled with steadily increasing rents and lack of affordable housing 
options in the city, Portland’s government declared a State of Emergency on Housing and 
Homelessness (S.O.E.) in October, 2015. Declaring the S.O.E. allowed the City to reallocate 
funding for extra shelter spaces and provide increased financial support for low-income renters. 
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The S.O.E. also eased zoning restrictions which paved the way for houseless encampments to 
proliferate.    
In February, 2016, the City announced its “Safe Sleep” policies as part of the S.O.E. Safe 
Sleep was an official recognition from City Government that houseless people had nowhere to go 
at night as the city’s shelters were full. In response to this, Safe Sleep allowed for camping on 
public property overnight as well as the establishment of organized, sanctioned encampments on 
City-owned property (VanderHart 2016). The result was chaotic. There was no clarity about 
what was and was not public property exactly, or how long one could camp overnight.  
Many unorganized and unsanctioned encampments proliferated at this time, although 
small, informal encampments had existed before then. Unorganized encampments are often 
small in number, usually with only three to ten people, and they generally have no central 
organizing code of conduct. It is often the unorganized encampments that capture the attention of 
media and the public. Even today, unorganized and unsanctioned encampments are ubiquitous 
throughout the urban landscape. On an average week in Portland during winter 2020, around 235 
active unorganized campsites were reported to the City (City of Portland 2020).3 Compared with 
the number of organized and sanctioned encampments, therefore, unorganized encampments 
remain abundant.  
In this dissertation, however, I focus solely on sanctioned and organized encampments. 
Portland currently has five City-sanctioned or City-supported self-organized houseless 
 
3 The true number of houseless campsites throughout Portland is almost impossible to calculate. The City 
calculates the number of campsites in its “One Point of Contact” system. There Portland residents may identify 
active or abandoned campsites. Unfortunately, the data does not identify how many unique campsites—those not 
counted multiple times—exist throughout the city. As houseless people will often come back to sites after they are 
cleared, it is nearly impossible to find an accurate count of unorganized camps.  
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encampments, four of which are the encampments with which I conducted this research: Dignity 
Village (DV), Right 2 Dream Too (R2DT), Hazelnut Grove (HG), and Kenton Women’s Village 
(KWV).4 The encampments range in size and in setting. DV is the largest encampment. It holds 
roughly 60 tiny houses on site, with an extra 10-12 beds that can accommodate more people 
during emergency weather. The encampment is located far from the city center, about seven 
miles north of the downtown core. Although it is adjacent to a composting facility owned by the 
City, a minimum-security correctional facility, and Portland’s International Airport, there is a lot 
of open space surrounding the site. On a clear day, one can see Mt. Hood, which lies 60 miles to 
the east. And one-half mile to the north lies the Columbia River. Because of its location, DV is 
somewhat removed from the politics that newer encampments within the central city are dealing 
with. 
 
Figure 1. Dignity Village facing the municipal composting facility. The site hosts a commons and 
restrooms (center of picture) in additon to its many tiny houses. 
 
R2DT, the second oldest encampment, is quite different than DV. R2DT began in the 
downtown business district, operating on a small corner lot of about 50 by 100 feet. The original 
location which lasted from 2011-2017 had no tiny houses; it had only single tents for its 
members and open-air tents for guest sleepers. The encampment has since moved about a mile 
out from its original downtown location, where it now sits adjacent to the east bank of the 
 
4 The fifth sanctioned encampment in the City was just beginning to develop as I was ending my fieldwork. As the 
encampment was not a protest site, and thus had much pre-planning, I did not meet anyone who will be staying 
there. I only attended a few early meetings about the encampment. See the methodological appendix for more. 
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Willamette River. The site is hosted on City of Portland property. It is wedged between a grain-
mill which loads cargo ships and a parking lot for the Moda Center, where the city’s professional 
basketball team plays, which is located directly across the street from the encampment (Figure 
2). The encampment site is also directly adjacent to the Rose Quarter Transit Hub, one of the 
city’s main transportation connections, where five of the city’s light rail lines and many bus 
routes meet. Today the encampment has about 15 tiny houses where its members stay as well as 
three shelter spaces which accommodate more than 60 guest sleepers every night.  
 
Figure 2. Second location of Right 2 Dream Too, pictured in exact center of photo highlighted by blue 
tarp.  
 
About one mile north of R2DT sits HG. HG is situated at the precipice of where the 
central eastside industrial part of Portland meets residential North Portland. The encampment is 
isolated by two major thoroughfares, a railyard, and the Willamette River. Although isolated by 
roadways and the topography of the landscape, just a minute north of the encampment begins the 
heart of the Overlook neighborhood. Overlook was once home to a majority of the City’s black 
population, primarily from the 1960s to the 1990s. Along with urban renewal and the I-5 
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highway expansion in the late 1960s, and City-led planning agendas facilitating gentrification on 
Mississippi and Williams Avenues in the 1990s and 2000s, the neighborhood today is like many 
other middle-to-upper class, predominantly white, neighborhoods throughout Portland’s central 
city.  
 
Figure 3. Front entrance of Hazelnut Grove, which is bound by a biking path and fencing. 
The most recently opened encampment (opened in 2017), KWV, is also located in North 
Portland but is miles away from the downtown core. Approximately six miles north of 
downtown, the encampment resides in the part of the Kenton neighborhood where the industrial 
areas meet the residential parts. Originally hosted on City-owned property, KWV moved in 2019 
to another municipal property adjacent to its original site. The site is fenced in and borders the 
busy Columbia Boulevard, an east-west thoroughfare connecting Portland’s primarily industrial 
neighborhoods (Figure 4). The encampment hosts about 20 tiny houses all recently designed by 




Figure 4. New Kenton Women's Village, with Columbia Boulevard. at top of picture (Source: Kenton 
Women’s Village Facebook page). 
As a result of the increase in encampments, Portland’s government and its residents are 
navigating new rights-claims from houseless groups, forcing local government, neighborhood 
groups, houseless groups, and activists into complex dialogues about what rights houseless 
encampments ought to hold. These City-wide discussions address common topical concerns with 
houselessness: public sleeping, substance use, fear, crime, health, and so much more. But they 
also highlight broader rifts in political values in society, values regarding the meaning of 




Figure 5. Houseless Encampment Field Sites. 
This dissertation engages with these political themes by examining the socio-political and 
legal interactions surrounding houseless encampments in Portland, Oregon. In response to 
municipal oversight of organized houseless encampments, scholars have articulated concerns 
over the means by which encampments are managed by urban governments. Herring and Lutz 
(2015) argue, for instance, that because organized encampments are now sanctioned, 
municipalities are simply advancing neoliberal approaches to policy-making, with encampments 
“becoming appendages of a growing shadow state,” (p. 697), by containing houseless 
populations in shelter-like settings. Organized encampments are seen to function as “a spatial 
tool of containment for the local state” (Herring 2014, 306), a tool used by governments to lessen 
the “threat” of houselessness throughout urban landscapes. At their most extreme, Speer (2018) 
12 
 
argues that some encampments function more akin to “tent wards,” or as spaces of carcerality, 
whereby surveillance and discipline of the state are extended into the sanctioning of 
encampments. From these perspectives, urban governments are implicated in extending the 
paternalizing and pathologizing aspects of contemporary approaches to poverty management 
more generally.  
In that organized houseless encampments are spaces of social and economic marginality, 
scholars have also examined the ways in which encampments produce themselves socially. 
Mitchell states that organized encampments are not only interstitial spaces for houseless peoples’ 
survival; encampments also facilitate political organization, and with that, individual and 
collective autonomy (2013, 82). As many houseless encampments are self-governing, individuals 
residing within these encampments are being recognized for their active role in political 
organizing. Sparks (2017), for example, highlights the ways in which houseless individuals 
residing in organized encampments resist their social and economic marginality. He argues that, 
although self-governed encampments are semi-autonomous spaces, individual citizenship is 
practiced “not as a formal relationship between sovereign individual and state, but as a set of 
practices of agency, belonging, and governance within the informal terrain of the camp itself" (p. 
8). He suggests that as self-governed encampments are limited by the sovereignty of municipal 
and state government control, encampments advance political interests informally. So too are 
encampments challenging the very ways in which these types of shelter are understood more 
broadly. As Speer (2016) has shown, organized encampments make transparent houseless 
people’s claims and need for the security of a domestic space, or “home,” claims that undermine 
the privatized function of urban housing markets. Such scholarship suggests that encampments 
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provide needed safety and security for houseless individuals, and from this, a sense of dignity 
and autonomy when there is otherwise little control over one’s self.  
Houselessness and the Model of Propertied-Citizenship 
Critical scholarship on houseless encampments has centered on the role of the state in managing 
houselessness as well as on how houseless people informally organize themselves against and 
within the neoliberal state. Although sharing these concerns about urban governance generally, 
this dissertation will argue something different. At the heart of my analysis throughout the 
following chapters is a concern with the role of property in shaping the experiences of houseless 
people living in encampments. It is property, I argue, that requires sustained attention. For, 
property is the primary political and economic relation affecting houseless people lives, 
particularly for how it limits citizenship benefits for those residing within self-governing 
houseless encampments.   
Liberal citizenship is often understood as a legal status. If one is a citizen, they are 
member of a polity with rights-protections and privileges of citizenship which is conferred on 
them by the sovereignty of a nation-state. The way in which liberal citizenship has been 
understood has changed throughout the last three centuries. But formal citizenship today is 
predominantly recognized through government protection of an individual’s liberty rights. 
Essential to this idealized citizenship, I argue, is an individuals’ access to or ownership of 
property. While property ownership once constituted citizenship itself, the values of property and 
the rights which protect property owners continue to shape the ideal liberal citizen. Throughout 
the dissertation, therefore, I am critical of liberal citizenship as form of “propertied-citizenship” 
so as to underscore the durable relationship between property and citizenship.  
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What follows from the notion that property is indispensable to liberal citizenship is that 
one cannot have their citizenship rights and privileges protected without ownership or access to 
property. The ownership of, and ability to access, land is a relationship with property that is 
particularly fraught for houseless people. Without a secure interest in property, specifically by 
holding rights to exclude others from land, houseless people are denied citizenship protections 
essential to their livelihoods. The model of propertied-citizenship has detrimental effects for 
houseless people, therefore, because it is a model of citizenship actively maintaining the ability 
for those with secure interests in property to leverage their power against those without secure 
interests in land through economic, political, and legal means. To be a propertied-citizen is to 
have one’s citizenship benefits protected, if not promoted, over those lacking an interest in 
property as most houseless people do.   
While acknowledging propertied-citizenship as a status helps us see how power can be 
enhanced for those with security in property, we ought not to think of propertied-citizenship as 
only a legal status. Such a definition restricts our ability to see how those without secure interests 
in property must navigate the relations of property and how these actions shape citizenship more 
substantively. Helping to move beyond the confines of a citizenship binary of “legal” or “not 
legal,” a more “substantive” approach to citizenship suggests that citizenship must also be seen 
as a practice that is “enacted” (Isin 2008), a process unfolding in different ways over time and in 
space. Such a perspective urges that we can better understand what citizenship means when we 
examine how it is that individuals make claims to rights, are denied protection from them, and 
rework the different ways in which law regulates and orders citizens within a given polity 
(Staeheli et al. 2012, Neveu 2015). A substantive approach to citizenship is more relational in its 
analysis, taking as a starting point the relationship between how law regulates and orders citizens 
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by examining how this legal regulation becomes normalized within social space. But it also 
attends to the ways in which individuals struggle for rights or resources beyond the law by 
asserting claims to the benefits and privileges of citizenship that are promised within democratic 
politics. 
Throughout the dissertation I draw from a relational approach to critique the ways in 
which propertied-citizenship is normalized within liberalism and how this citizenship 
demarcation is actively reproduced through democratic politics. My particular focus within these 
property-citizenship relations is on houseless people, or those who are without secure interests in 
land. It illustrates the ways in which houseless people are limited in their citizenship privileges 
because of their precarious relationship with property. Even within Portland’s self-governing 
houseless encampments, which are allowed access to municipal properties, houseless people still 
must navigate dominant relations of property in attempt to realize key aspects of democratic 
citizenship that are meant to be protected for all citizens. 
While the literature on houseless encampments has not addressed property relations, 
other houselessness scholars have been critical in bringing to light the manner in which houseless 
people are rendered marginal in society, through social stigmatization and from being physically 
excluded from space. Following from legal scholars of property like Waldron (1993), much of 
the geographic work examining the nexus between property and houselessness has emphasized 
the power of property as a right to exclude. Given the real exclusions of houseless people from 
private and public spaces, scholars have demonstrated the power of a property right in shaping 
houseless peoples’ lives. The emphasis on exclusion tells us much about the workings of law and 
how houseless people are often at the “negative end” of liberal property rights.  
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Perhaps due to this legal focus, the emphasis on exclusion has overlooked certain aspects 
about property that help us understand how houseless people are denied citizenship within liberal 
democracies. I argue this in Chapter 1, where after reviewing legal and geographic scholarship 
on property, I advocate embracing a relational approach to property scholarship. When we see 
property dialectically, we are better able to make sense of how property exceeds the domain of 
law, shaping everyday interactions. An approach that takes law and social relations surrounding 
property seriously, I suggest, shows us how property relations reside at the core of houseless 
peoples’ inequities.    
Chapter 2 develops an historical understanding of how property has been closely 
intertwined with citizenship. It details how the model of “propertied-citizenship” is rooted within 
liberalism and how that has shaped democratic citizenship up to the present moment. Examining 
the historical and dialectical relations of property with citizenship shows us how those without 
secure interests in property have always been remaindered from “proper” citizenship. But this 
history is not linear. As the values of property have changed through time, the political values 
connecting property with citizenship have shifted. Thus while property is still resolutely political, 
houseless citizens today are affected by relations of property in distinct ways from those of the 
property-insecure in the early American republic. The chapter shows how houseless citizenship 
represents well the liberal paradox of holding political citizenship while lacking the privileges of 
propertied-citizenship rooted in property rights protections.  
After making the case that property maintains distinct political values which limit 
citizenship for houseless people, I return to Portland, where I seek to demonstrate how the liberal 
model of propertied-citizenship effects houseless people residing in encampments. In doing so, I 
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emphasize the unique relations of property through which self-governing houseless 
encampments operate, encampments where residents are positioned as rights-bearing propertied-
citizens while still being property-insecure in their citizenship. Chapters 3 and 4 each 
demonstrate how these tensions are lived out on the ground. Chapter 3 picks up the case of 
Hazelnut Grove once again to show how the long-held values of property continue to shape the 
politics of houselessness within the city. Chapter 4 examines the benefits of self-governing 
encampments and how semi-rights to property leave certain privileges of citizenship vulnerable 
for encampment residents. Together, the chapters provide answers to a core question driving this 
research: What potential and what limitations do Portland’s self-governing houseless 
encampments hold for realizing more substantive modes of citizenship for the houseless?  
    In recognizing that property plays a fundamental role in shaping democratic 
citizenship, and that self-governing encampments both benefit and are limited by semi-property 
rights, a series of conceptual challenges arise for encampment residents. These challenges center 
around matters of equity as they relate to democratic equality and of justice within liberal-
democracies. Chapter 5 takes up core themes of democratic theory and justice to help make sense 
of what is at stake for self-governing encampments at a time when urban governments are 
continuing to sanction houseless encampments. After reviewing core ideas within these 
literatures, and how geographers have contributed to these debates, the chapter analyzes whether 
the process of democracy in Portland functions as a means of equity-making for houseless 
encampment resident. In doing so, the chapter focuses less on defining what justice looks like 
absolutely for houseless encampments. Instead, it addresses how democratic procedures may 




My goal throughout the following chapters is to keep sustained and critical attention on how 
liberalism as an ideology and as set of institutional parameters for organizing political life 
delimits citizenship boundaries through property relations and to identify the contradictions in 
the construction of those boundaries. As a political ideology, liberalism provides the very source 
of ideas from which the model of propertied-citizenship was developed and is maintained. The 
enhancement of individual liberty is the core value promoted within this thinking. As a set of 
institutional parameters guiding political practice, liberal-democracy tightly-protects the rights of 
property as the means of realizing liberty. For, liberal democracy assumes citizenship to be equal 
among all people. Therefore, it is necessary to follow the logic of liberalism as a systemic 
ordering of social relations to illustrate how it assumes universality and therefore erases the 
differences of liberal citizens that such a mode of organizing itself produces through its 
implementation. By examining liberalism on its own terms, it becomes clearer how the promise 
of liberal citizenship is an unattainable type of citizenship for those without secure interests and 
thus access to property.  
Given my focus on how houseless people fare within the model of propertied-citizenship, 
the dissertation is limited in its attention to how liberal-democratic citizenship is unevenly 
experienced more broadly. It does not address at length how houseless people’s race or gender, 
for instance, specifically shape their experiences with property. Certainly these aspects of 
identity matter for how citizenship is uniquely realized, as one’s identity differently shapes how 
Portland’s houseless residents experience the self-governing encampments. That encampment 
residents I spoke with reflected little on these particular issues may be a reflection of how the 
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encampments are comprised, majority male and primarily white (excepting KWV). Similarly, 
this study does not address the history of how liberalism and liberal-democracy were ideological 
and legal tools facilitating settler-colonial expansion and how the legal production of property 
erased indigenous relations to land. The development of settler cities like Portland, which sits on 
the traditional lands of the Multnomah and Clackamas bands of the Chinook people, eradicated 
secure and fruitful interests in land for indigenous people which continues today. The “legal” 
exclusion of indigenous people from property was thus not so much the erasure of indigenous 
people from legitimate citizenship, but one means by which liberal citizenship defined itself as 
the absence of indigeneity (Bhandar 2018).          
In many ways, liberal-democratic citizenship remains neutral to these differences. So too 
does liberal citizenship appear not to mark a distinction between houseless people as an 
economic class. That is, liberal citizenship assumes equality between those with and without 
secure interests in property. Liberal, capitalist democracy, however, necessitates exchange for 
one to have security in property. In this way, the model of propertied-citizenship differentiates 
citizens—property-secure from the property-insecure—through economic status, which then has 
the effect of mediating political standing within liberal-democracy. It is my intent first and 
foremost to illustrate why those who lack secure interest in property experience diminished 
citizenship privileges. Rather than looking only at the exclusions of liberal-democracy, therefore, 
this study analyzes the problematic effects of how such a system of political organization 





Chapter 1: Property’s Relations: Beyond the Right to Exclude  
Property can be just about anything. Property can be nearly any material thing, such as resources 
in land, or property can be intangible resources, such as intellectual content. A general definition 
of property is simply the entitlement of an individual or group to some resource for the benefit it 
provides them. What makes something “property” is that property is owned.5 For the purposes 
herein, I mean property ownership to signify that someone or some entity has exclusive control 
over some thing. Ownership is significant because it nearly always necessitates legal 
enforcement; someone or something must intervene to secure or maintain that ownership. Most 
often, the work of maintaining property as a system is done through the sovereignty and thus the 
force of states. A state protects the power of property owners by extending and reinforcing their 
rights of ownership. But merely the fact that property is owned is not in itself meaningful. How 
ownership affects others in relationship to a property is what makes it a matter of significant 
political and social interest.  
Perhaps no idea has been more discussed than property being a right of exclusion. The 
“right to exclude” plays a fundamental role in property ownership and has been well-covered in 
property scholarship (Alexander and Peñalver 2014). In the first section of this chapter I review 
this powerful idea, drawing from political and legal discourse on property rights primarily from 
the latter half of the twentieth century. I also focus on how legal scholars have extended property 
conceptually beyond the single “right to exclude” to that of a set of entitlements and obligations 
to society broadly. In reviewing this relational turn in property scholarship, I suggest that 
examining property “relationally” is valuable for socio-political analysis. Yet, what we mean by 
 
5 There is much debate over what constitutes ownership within property scholarship, but that discussion is well 
beyond the scope of this research (see Merrill and Smith, 2010). 
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relationality is understood in many different ways. I suggest a relational analysis that looks 
historically at property’s effects on citizenship is useful for understanding how houselessness has 
been produced within liberal-democracies.    
As a legal system of forms, as well as a set of social relations, property necessarily affects 
all people. But houseless people are acutely affected by the legal and social relations of property. 
Violating land use ordinances as well as social norms surrounding use of property brings a 
multitude of penalties for the property-less, from legal sanctions to social and political 
stigmatizing. Without access to or ownership of property, property-less people struggle to adhere 
to such legal regulations and to normative socio-political values surrounding property. In this 
way, how property is legally and socially produced and how it is regulated matters enormously, 
as the property-less are enveloped within highly uneven relations of legal and socio-economic 
power.     
The regulation of property affects people uniquely, at specific times and in specific 
spaces. Geographers examining property have been critical in showing the ways in which 
property is practiced in places. The second main section of the chapter addresses geographers’ 
contributions to property scholarship. There I focus particularly on how the scholarship on 
geographies of houselessness have analyzed property in relation to houseless people. Central to 
this scholarship has been an emphasis on how rights of exclusion affect houseless bodies, by 
spatializing the effects of land use ordinances and the interests of capital in shaping such 
exclusionary spaces. By focusing on exclusion as the dominant relation to property, however, I 
suggest that we miss critical aspects of property’s relationship to houseless peoples’ lives.   
The purpose of this chapter is to show that although property is most apparently affected 
by law, it is important to see property as thoroughly socialized. The normative values associated 
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with property shape social life tremendously, establishing dominant forms of property uses and 
the legal regulations of those uses, which determine where and when people are able to be in 
certain places. In ending, I suggest that property matters most to and for those without secure 
interests in property and urge that property analyses take the material relations around property 
and citizenship for houseless people seriously.  
Property and the Right to Exclude 
Property can most simply be defined as "enforceable claims to the benefit of resources” 
(Blackmar 2006, 51). This definition suggests that property is an entitlement of individuals or 
groups to make use of some given resource. When one has a “right” to property one has an 
individualized, often legal, entitlement to a given resource, an “enforceable claim” to benefit 
from or use that resource. A more encompassing definition suggests that property “is a set of 
claims that people have in resources that correspond to duties of respect in others generally" 
(Merrill and Smith, 2010, 9). As typified by Hohfeld (1919), rights have correlative duties as 
well. That is, property rights require that other owners and non-owners obey the legal regulations 
of an individuals’ property. Property rights thus place certain duties or obligations on society 
more broadly.  
Rights of property differ from other personal rights in that they give individuals power to 
control how a given resource is used. That is, property rights give individuals a right over and to 
a thing. An individual’s right to a thing, or their right to a property, is called a right “in rem.” If 
property rights in personam create a contract between two people, in rem property rights 
establish exclusive ownership over a thing by an individual (Merrill and Smith, 2010). That in 
rem property rights establish exclusive control over a thing is significant. A property right is 
attached to the property-object, rather than between particular people, thus “universally binding 
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[the right] on all who encounter the object” (Merrill and Smith, 2010, 9). Put another way, 
property rights affect people not simply based on the entitlement of right in a property-object 
itself, but through the wider effect of an owner having control over a given property-object as 
well. In this sense, property “binds the world,” (ibid) in that rights to property delineate 
individual control over a given resource for all of those who encounter the resource. 
The action of having control over property has long been a focus of property rights 
rhetoric. Writing about common law property and rights in the late eighteenth century, for 
example, William Blackstone put forth the idea that ownership is one’s absolute right to exclude. 
Blackstone’s well-cited definition stated that property was the “sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of 
the right of any other individual in the universe” (Blackstone 1803, 1). Following Blackstone’s 
thought to its most extreme, then, a right to property is an absolute right to exclude all others 
from one’s personal property6. The extent of the right “to exclude” is perhaps the most discussed 
aspect of property within property scholarship. Merrill (1998) argues, for instance, that exclusion 
is essential to the very definition of property. The right to exclude others, he states, “is more than 
just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property— it is the sine qua non. Give someone 
the right to exclude others from a valued resource… and you give them property. Deny someone 
the exclusion right, and you do not have property” (p. 730). While Merrill recognizes that 
property ownership comprises more than the right to exclude, he is adamant that the essential 
component of property should not be overlooked: exclusion. For, the right to exclude has had, 
and continues to have, an enormous effect in the functioning of property systems. 
 
6 Merrill and Smith (2010) suggest that Blackstone was “engaging in some self-conscious hyperbole” with this 
specific definition of property. For, later on in his Commentaries, Blackstone spoke of exceptions to this absolute 
right to exclude.   
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The right to exclude is especially apparent in private rights to landed property. Private 
property, in relation to public (collective) or common property in land, is owned by individuals 
or co-owned by private entities. Critical property scholars make much of how private rights to 
landed property affect society. Legal scholar Jeremy Waldron, for instance, argues that private 
(and public) rights to landed property are a means of ordering society within space. For Waldron 
(1993), one of the primary functions of property is to determine which people are allowed to be 
where within certain spaces. Applying this logic to the situations that houseless people generally 
face in urban spaces, Waldron argues that “there is no place governed by a private property rule 
where he is allowed to be whenever he chooses, no place governed by a private property rule 
from which he may not at any time be excluded as a result of someone else's say-so" (1993, 313). 
Waldron’s larger point about private rights to landed property is that such rights afford owners a 
certain freedom that others (the houseless) do not have, in that private rights allow for 
individuals and entities to restrict individuals’ right to be somewhere (p. 315). Rights to exclude, 
therefore, establish legal boundaries for landed property which must be respected by all others 
encountering the property.  
The legal boundaries defining landed property reinforce a system of social exclusion 
within space. Land use restrictions tied into the use of public spaces, for example, often mandate 
that certain behaviors do not take place there. A person laying down their sleeping bag on a busy 
downtown sidewalk, for instance, is regularly disrupted by police on account of use of space 
ordinances. Being physically excluded from a property directly maintains inequities within 
society. And in doing so, spatial exclusions reinforce larger social and political stigmatizations 
about certain groups of people (Sibley, 1995). The houseless are a common example, but so too 
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are racialized or ethnicized people who are treated as other and thereby deemed out of place in 
certain spaces.   
Exclusion remains a powerful component of property given that ownership rights to 
property afford control over the access to and benefits from property. But the right to exclude 
does not constitute property rights in their entirety. Property scholars have also articulated the 
ways in which property is more than an individuals’ exclusive right of control over a resource, a 
bundle of rights that helps us see the social aspects of property.  
Bundle of Rights 
The traditional ownership model of private landed property is the most commonly understood 
form of property. The traditional ownership model is one premised on a single, identifiable 
owner having absolute control through their right to a property. By assuming the owner holds 
absolute control over a property, the model reinforces a notion that property ownership is 
bounded, which protects the property owner from nonowners (Singer 2000a, 4-5). Such a model 
of ownership is commonly realized through a legal title which defines the spatial boundaries of a 
given property.  
The power of control vested in private rights to landed property is not absolute, however, 
despite the certainty of Blackstone’s formulation. Property scholars have corrected for the 
assumption that private rights afford owners absolute control over property. Influenced by the 
work of the “legal realists” in the early twentieth century, critical property scholars deny that 
property can be understood only through absolute rights of exclusion (Cohen 1927; Merrill and 
Smith 2010, 5). Rather, realists suggest that rights to property afford a set of entitlements, 
entitlements such as one’s privilege to use the property and the power to transfer the property 
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rights to others; to immunize oneself from harm to, or loss of, the property; in addition to the 
right to exclude non-owners from using the property (Singer 2000a, 3). Beyond a singular right 
to exclude, therefore, private rights to property offer individuals different options about the use 
of a property and varying degrees of control over that property.  
This expanded view of property rights is often referred to as a “bundle of rights” 
approach to property. The idea behind the bundle of rights analogy is relatively straightforward. 
Here property rights are conceived of as a bundle of sticks, whereby each stick represents some 
privilege or entitlement associated with property rights. If sticks are added or removed from the 
bundle, the overall composition of the pile still remains “property” (Merrill and Smith 2010, 5). 
Put into the language of rights, then, property is understood as an aggregation of equally 
important rights. The bundle metaphor allows a definition of property that is more than a right to 
exclude; property can also be the ability to allow others to use a property, for instance. Property 
rights are far more nuanced in this sense than those depicted in the traditional ownership model.  
The bundle of rights metaphor visualizes a more complex understanding of property 
rights in legal terms. But the metaphor also shows how thoroughly integrated property rights are 
within society more broadly. The bundle metaphor insists that property needs to be thought of as 
a system needing careful attention to the unique powers and responsibilities of each right in the 
bundle. As such, what legal realists emphasize through this concept is that property rights are not 
simply a power over a thing by a property owner. Instead, property rights are realized through 
and upon their application in the world, affecting the relationships among people and institutions 
which are subject to the different rights of property.  
While those adhering to the bundle metaphor of property are critical of the traditional 
ownership model, they too have their critics. Singer (2000b), for example, argues that the bundle 
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of rights metaphor recognizes only the formal aspects of property rights, and in doing so, it 
acknowledges only in abstraction that formal rights “impose duties on others and that liberties 
impose vulnerabilities on those affected by the exercise of those liberties” (p. 11). What, Singer 
suggests, this perspective overlooks is how those formal rights of property affect social relations 
beyond their institutional function. Legal realists like Singer suggest it is more useful to see how 
legal systems of property are justified given that they are socially produced and maintained. 
From this perspective, property is a legal system dependent on social interactions which 
interactively shape the larger legal institutionalization of property rights. It is in this interactive 
sense that property and rights scholars have been more recently arguing for a need to better 
understand the social relations producing and being affected by our socio-legal systems of 
property.  
Property as Relations 
What legal realists seek to bring forth through their critiques of property is the seemingly 
intractable control vested in traditional rights of property ownership. What comes out of their 
critiques is an understanding that the socio-legal system necessitates larger relationships for there 
even to exist entitlements to property in the first place (Cohen 1927). In other words, while 
control over property does come through owners’ rights, these rights are contingent upon a larger 
social system through which they can be realized. Such a relational approach to property rights 
has been articulated to better show how property is socialized beyond strictly legal 
understandings. 
 Central to the relational approach to property is an emphasis on how liberal citizenship 
rights themselves function. Jennifer Nedelsky has been influential in identifying why we ought to 
consider rights as relationships. Arguing against the traditional conception of liberal rights as 
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absolute powers, Nedelsky asks: from where is the underlying power of a private right originally 
developed? The standard conception of the liberal citizenship right, she states, is one where 
individual rights act as “barriers that protect the individual from intrusion by other individuals or 
by the state” (1993, 7). In this way, liberal rights are thought to “define boundaries others cannot 
cross and it is those boundaries, enforced by the law, that ensure individual freedom and 
autonomy” (ibid). Such an understanding of liberal citizenship rights, she argues, marks 
independence as the essence of autonomy. Private rights are thought to secure individuals from 
outside social influence, affording individuals their independence because of their isolation from 
society broadly defined.  
 Nedelsky argues that this traditional conception of private rights is unsound. Particularly 
of issue for her is from where autonomy is thought to derive. She argues that autonomy derives 
not from individuals’ separation from society, as is traditionally assumed with liberal rights, but 
through their relationship with society (p. 8). This is so, she argues, because autonomy, when 
defined as self-governance, “requires the capacity to participate in collective as well as 
individual governance” (ibid). If this is the case—that autonomy is collectively produced—then 
“the constitutional protection of autonomy is no longer an effort to carve out a sphere into which 
the collective cannot intrude, but a means of structuring the relations between individuals and the 
sources of collective power so that autonomy is fostered rather than undermined” (ibid). 
Nedelsky thus re-conceives of liberal rights not as something functioning to protect individuals 
from society, but rather, as a relationship which strengthens individuals’ autonomy through their 
social connections.    
 What is wrong with the traditional liberal isolationist conception of liberal citizenship 
rights, Nedelsky suggests, is that it does not account for how our “essential humanity is neither 
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possible nor comprehensible without the network of relationships of which it is a part” (1993, 
12). And it is this relational perspective on rights which has been expanded through critiques of 
the traditional ownership model of property. As Joseph Singer suggests, a relational approach to 
property suggests property rights are “socially situated, contingent on their effects on others, and 
therefore set within the context of relationships involving mutual obligations" (Singer 2000b, 
131). Similarly to citizenship rights, a relational approach to property views property rights not 
as absolute powers that enable property owners absolute freedom. Rather, the powers realized by 
individuals through property ownership are limited by others’ rights to livelihood as well as to 
their own rights of property. 
Singer sustains his critique of the traditional ownership model of property by 
emphasizing the incommensurability of property rights themselves. The traditional ownership 
model, Singer argues, “fails to incorporate an understanding of property rights as inherently 
limited both by the property rights of others and by public policies designed to ensure that 
property rights are exercised in a manner compatible with the public good" (2000a, 7). What the 
traditional model of property ownership does, therefore, is obscure “the fact that property rights 
exist on both sides: the right of the store owner to exclude and the right of members of the public 
to enter public accommodations and to engage in contractual relationships to purchase property" 
(2000a, 7-8). Singers point is that in practice, property rights, like personal rights of liberty, 
naturally conflict. And these points of conflict cannot be justly understood by resorting to rights 
analysis alone. Rather, a relational analysis is necessary to better identify the social imbalance of 
conflicts within property ownership.  
 What is more helpful for understanding property than the traditional model, Singer 
suggests, is one which examines property’s entitlements. Looking at property entitlements helps 
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identify "not simply the owner of the property right, but the conflicting interests 
of everyone with legitimate claims to rights in the property in question" (2000b, 91). Because he 
sees rights as correlative, in that property rights have duties or obligations attached to them, he 
suggests the purpose of relational approaches to property is to make transparent the tension 
between ownership and obligation (2000a, 17). In this way, we can better make sense of how 
property owners’ obligations to others are justified in relation to their right in property.  
Supplementing Singer’s relational perspective on property is Hanoch Dagan’s (2011) 
approach to property. Like Singer, Dagan critiques the traditional ownership model, suggesting it 
entrenches “an understanding of property as an exclusive right [which] might misrepresent 
owners’ social responsibility and nonowners' right to entry as suspicious intrusions to property, 
rather than necessary entailments of property" (p. 44). To better see the effects of property’s 
“entailments,” Dagan suggests we see the different types of property forms as “forms of 
institutions.” He considers forms of institutions to represent “default frameworks of interpersonal 
interaction that consolidate people’s expectations and express the law’s normative ideals for core 
types of human relationships” (2011, xii). As such, what property analyses critical of the 
traditional ownership model of property ought to examine is “the human values underlying the 
existing property forms… normative analysis [examining] property law’s material effect on 
people’s behavior, … its expressive and constitutive impact, and… the intricate interdependence 
of the two effects” (p. 29). As such Dagan believes, like Singer, that given that law shapes 
dominant “forms” of property, it is necessary to examine how the traditional model of property 
ownership implicates owners and non-owners within such forms or relationships of property.  
I agree with Singer and Dagan that we better understand property when seeing property’s 
relationships. Simply understanding the function of property and property rights through law—
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through institutional analysis of how property functions—avoids key aspects of social conditions 
related to property and its regulation. I suggest that Singer and Dagan’s legal realist approaches 
help move us in that direction, to re-conceptualize property, as Singer does, as a set of "relations 
among people—between owners and nonowners and among owners" (2000, 29). The two split 
on how to go about doing so. Examining their positions gets us closer to finding a working 
definition of what a “relational” analysis of property can look like.   
Dagan suggests that relational property analyses must stay close to the legal forms of 
property law. Naturally, as a law scholar, Dagan grounds his analysis within the forms of 
property that laws already recognizes. Dagan insists that, against the traditional ownership model 
of property, therefore, that the task for relational analysis is to see property as “forms of 
institutions.” Understanding property as forms of institutions, he argues, helps us to identify 
“unifying normative ideals for core categories of interpersonal relationships” (p. 30). In other 
words, for Dagan, what is necessary when examining property’s relationships is to develop 
categories of property representing discourses regarding the values of society. However, when 
such discursive analyses remain rooted within law’s forms of property, the manner in which 
property does or does not fit into property’s recognizable forms through law becomes the object 
of property analysis. In other words, while property’s material effects on society may be of 
concern, legal analysis is less apt for explaining how unjust forms of property came to exist in 
the first place. The object of legal analysis seeks to critique extant legal forms, and in doing so, 
to change property forms along legal metrics.       
Singer, although working within a legal realist framework, suggests that the very point of 
relational property analysis is about justifying the relationships of property within society. In 
other words, analyzing property and its material effects on society requires normative judgement 
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over what is just about property relations. Such exercises are largely overlooked within legal 
analyses of property, he suggests. For example, Singer notes how “rights” and “efficiency” 
theories of property may reinforce certain assumptions about the ownership model.7 When rights 
are assumed in a rights-based model, for instance, presumptions of natural ownership can place 
burden on non-owners to show how they are negatively affected by an owners’ rights of 
property, rather than a relational approach which incorporates the obligations of owners as well 
as non-owners (2000a, 10). Put another way, property law tends to assume certain constants 
about social life as it relates to property ownership, which inhibits a more relational 
understanding of how law and society iteratively shape one another.  
Some sense of what is meant by relationality is necessary to clarify why such an 
approach is necessary. I define what a relational approach looks like for my own work in the 
conclusion to the chapter. There I defend a materialist approach to property relations, one 
concerned less with identifying new legal forms of property and more focused on detailing how 
and when property as a socio-economic and political set of material relations establishes 
inequities. But to do so, I first review how geographers have contributed to property analysis. 
For, geographers provide useful analytical tools for grounding legal analyses through relational 
understandings of space and how property is produced in places over time. Particularly, I 
consider how geographers have examined houselessness in relation to property. I suggest there is 
more to be understood about property’s relations than the houselessness literature covers. 
 
7 “Rights-based” and “efficiency” theories of property are particular metrics through which to understand issues 
within property law. Rights-based theories identify property disputes by deferring to titles and deeds; that is, who 
holds which rights particularly.  Rather than evaluating property disputes through moral theories, rights-based 
theories stress obligation to adhere to legal definition in arbitrating such disputes. Similarly, efficiency theories 
look at property through a market-oriented lens, deriving decisions over property allocations based on economic 
utility, not morally-derived theories. 
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Geographies of Property 
Alongside a relational turn in property rights scholarship in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
geographers too were advancing analytical approaches to spatial phenomena as something 
comprised of or contingent upon social relations. A relational understanding of space, in its most 
general form, posits that space is not simply a physical object, a container for social interactions 
and human relations.8 Instead, space is understood as inherently socialized, whereby space 
expresses social, economic, political, or legal relationships, and, in turn, these social relations 
react back upon or within space, producing or constructing socialized spaces (Soja 1989, 81).9 
Such understandings of space inspired geographers to retheorize the implications of social 
relations being “stretched out” unevenly at different spatial scales and within places (Massey 
1994). What followed from these theoretical insights were analyses examining how space 
becomes imbued with power and how spatial relationships influence social and political-
economic relations themselves.  
 One result of this relational thinking about space is an attention by geographers to matters 
of landed property. Supplementing critical legal scholarship on the traditional ownership model 
of property, geographers have critiqued the ways that the private property model limits or 
inhibits the diversity of lived socio-spatial experiences. Of general concern is with how the 
private model of property ownership naturalizes the bounding of spaces by fixing legal 
regulations over them, thereby making property appear as a “finite” or objective thing designated 
 
8 I acknowledge that the term “relational space” is understood to mean something very specific by some. Harvey 
(2009) for instance defines relational space as space being “contained in objects in the sense that an object can be 
said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself relationships to other objects” (p. 12). Such a 
view of space is in distinction to “absolute” space, space as a thing in itself, or “relative” understandings of space, 
where space is the relationship between objects.  
9 I also acknowledge that the term “dialectical” connotes something distinct from that of the term “relational.” In 
Chapter 2, I develop a dialectical understanding of property and citizenship.   
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in space (Blomley 2004). What this naturalizing process does, argues Blomley, is reify for 
property owners that space is isolable as a legal thing, thus denying the spatial relationships 
between individual owners and other people in society more broadly. The notion that property is 
a finite space, that property is spatially-fixed by law, reinforces an understanding of private 
property as that which is “pre-political, obvious, and unproblematic” (Blomley 2004, 6). Landed 
property through this lens becomes territory-like, space which is individually-managed to control 
access to a property.    
Adopting Doreen Massey’s conception of how social relations stretch-out unevenly 
within space, Blomley argues that property’s territorializing of space reflects a “power-
geometry,” one in which “people are differently-placed in relation to spaces of property and the 
processes and social resources that they are constituted by” (2010, 208). In other words, the 
process of territorializing spaces through the production of property is a means of enhancing, if 
not sanctioning, uneven social relations within space. This territorializing process, then, through 
which private property is enacted, converts “a network of social relationships into a set of 
discrete, bounded things” (Blomley 2010, 205). Through such a conversion, the ownership 
model appears to “settle” the definition of what property is and thus what property is not 
(Blomley 2004, 14). Here property becomes naturalized as something privately-held, 
individually-controlled with identifiable legal boundaries to it. In this way, the traditional model 
of ownership expresses a set of relations over things, over bounded spaces, obscuring the ways in 
which property establishes relations among people about resources that are not necessarily 
spatially bounded.  
Geographic understandings of property show us that property is a process unraveling over 
space and through time. A system of private landed property does not exist on its own; it has 
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been created in practice over time. Property thus requires an active “doing,” it is a process 
“enacted upon material spaces and real people, including owners and those who are to be 
excluded” (Blomley 2003, 123). As such, landed property necessarily engages people in 
relationships concerning how specific material spaces are used; how those propertied-spaces are 
made and remade over time; and who has the ability to control these processes.     
How power is produced, enhanced, and leveraged against others, therefore, remains a 
core geographic concern for those examining the socio-spatial relations producing property. That 
dominant property forms maintain uneven social and economic relations in space has been 
central to geographic scholarship of houselessness, a body of literature particularly emphasizing 
the consequences of property owners’ right to exclude people from spaces on account of their 
condition.    
Geographies of Houselessness and Property 
Geographers have developed a rich body of work examining houselessness. Political economies 
of houselessness have examined the rise of houselessness in the 1980s in regard to processes of 
deinstitutionalization (Dear and Wolch, 1987), how economic restructuring and 
deindustrialization in the late twentieth century affected waged labor and access to affordable 
housing options (Wolch and Dear 1993; Mitchell 2011; von Mahs 2011), and how changing 
governance approaches to urban land use policies restructured and policed access to public 
spaces (Mitchell 1997; Beckett and Herbert 2010; Baker and Evans 2016). Alongside political 
economic analyses of houselessness, geographers have identified the social conditions for 
houseless people living through stigmatization as well as criminalization (Feldman 2004; 
Mitchell 2003; Takahashi 1996), many in this vein offering narrative depictions of how 
houseless people cope without stable access to shelter or housing (May and Cloke 2014; 
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Deveurteil et al. 2009; Wright 1997; Herring 2014; Herring and Lutz 2015; Sparks 2010, 2012; 
see Urban Geography Special Issue 2011 for non-liberal contexts). This diverse body of work 
acknowledges the production of houselessness as an economic condition, and in turn, how 
houseless individuals manage to stabilize themselves within such precarious situations.  
The role of property within the geographies of houselessness literature speaks to both the 
economic and the socio-political conditions of being houseless. Much of the research on 
houselessness together with property has been developed by Don Mitchell, whose work 
examining public space connects how rights of property function to exclude houseless people 
from space. In doing so, Mitchell’s work points to a paradox of being houseless: that in a world 
where private property relations are dominant, relying upon public space is often the means by 
which houseless people must survive. Yet, while public spaces often appear to be open to all, the 
way in which public spaces are regulated effectively works to exclude houseless people from 
public spaces and thus from social and political life more generally.   
Within the traditional ownership model of private property, property rights offer owners 
direct means of excluding unwanted people from their propertied-spaces. Mitchell and others 
show how public spaces when seen as a form of property ownership can be just as exclusionary 
to houseless people as that of private ownership. Mitchell and Staeheli (2006) note, for instance, 
how municipally-owned properties operate as “pseudo-private spaces,” spaces that are “formally 
owned by the state… but that are subject to control and regulation by private interests” (p. 153). 
Downtown business districts (BIDs) in many cities, for example, represent such semi-private 
spaces, where the public infrastructure is privately policed (Ward 2006). Here public property is 
not privatized in the sense that ownership is privately held; municipally-owned property is still 
publicly-owned property. But examples like BIDs reorient the way in which public space 
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becomes regulated, reflecting the values of private ownership which selectively regulates who 
can be where within publicly-accessible spaces.   
The traditional ownership model and how property is regulated through such a model 
therefore shapes the way in which both private and public spaces are ordered. Mitchell (1997) 
notes, for instance, how “anti-homeless laws” represent the very means by which private capital 
reconfigures public space. Laws denying houseless people access to space, denying people an 
ability to engage in acts of social reproduction (sleeping, urinating, etc), prohibit houseless 
people from doing what they must to survive. To the extent that they “annihilate space by law,” 
and therefore, people by law, anti-houseless laws serve to reconfigure public spaces for private 
gains. For, it seems, houseless people taking up public spaces reflects poorly on the socio-
economic and civic health of cities’ development strategies more broadly. Mitchell argues that 
anti-houseless laws have become “an important ingredient in not just expanding capital, but in 
either attracting it in the first place, or in protecting it once it is fixed in particular places” (p. 
313). Considering the use value of public space for houseless peoples’ lives, houseless people’s 
occupation of public space, therefore, threatens the exchange value of capital and its future 
creation (p. 316). In this sense, processes of redevelopment warrant the protection of propertied 
space from houseless people, whether that be directly protecting private property, or whether that 
means protecting public spaces by implementing land use ordinances.  
By enabling the tools for excluding houseless people from public space, property rights 
function by delineating a normative social order. As Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) suggest, 
property and public space is a “site of structuring, but also of unstructuring, social relations. It is 
both a means of sorting community and social norms, and of upsetting them" (p. 142). Most 
explicitly, this is done through legal exclusion rights which identify who can and cannot be 
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somewhere, in some particular space. In this sense, the exclusion of houseless people from the 
public marks houseless people as outside of the legitimate public sphere (Mitchell 1995), as 
houseless become “involuntarily public” without access to private property. The right to exclude 
invested in property owners, therefore, is "more often a means of differentiating and positioning 
members of the public than an act of total exclusion... [it] entails an ability to reorder the public" 
(Staeheli and Mitchell 2008, 143). From this perspective, when excluded from property, 
houseless people cannot be legitimate citizens when citizenship is understood through property 
access or ownership.   
Geographies of houselessness therefore supplement critiques of property and the right to 
exclude by illustrating the spatial consequences of such a powerful right. By exclusively 
focusing on the right to exclude, however, geographers examining houselessness have left other 
important aspects of property underexamined. By looking at exclusion alone, we cannot see how 
property “produces” or establishes certain kinds of subjects through its relations with property-
insecure people. As we’ve seen, property constitutes more than the right to exclude. Property 
establishes multiple relationships within society that illustrate how it is that property relations 
mark social, economic and political differences. As a socio-economic and political relationship, 
analyzing the production of property, and how this establishes uneven relationships with 
houseless people, can help us see how property is productive of houselessness more broadly. 
Producing Houselessness 
To better understand why examining property’s relationships is necessary for understanding 
houselessness more broadly, it is useful to think back to Jeremy Waldron’s thesis about the plight 
of houseless people. Waldron (1993) suggests that in a world of private property, houseless 
people remain unfree to be anywhere because property rights give owners the right to exclude. 
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No doubt Waldron’s general sentiment is right. Houseless people, as Mitchell and others have 
argued, are excluded from private and public spaces with frequency (NLCHP 2016). But by 
exclusively emphasizing that houseless people are excluded from property, we run the risk of 
placing houseless people outside of property. Nick Blomley (2009) suggests as much in his 
critique of Waldron, where Blomley accedes that although houseless people are perhaps most 
immediately affected by the regulations of law—houseless people are excluded from private 
space because of the rights of property ownership—houseless people are not actually precluded 
from property. Rather, Blomley argues houseless people are “thoroughly entangled with 
property,” as they are implicated in the very relations producing property in the first place (2009, 
581). Such a sentiment suggests that the very condition of being houseless is not only one of 
being excluded from particular spaces, but that houselessness is a condition whereby exclusions 
represent moments within property relations more broadly.    
Emphasizing ownership rights to exclude helps us see how a property right is executed 
against houseless people. But it does not help us understand how the production of the power 
within that right is developed and maintained prior to those instances of exclusion. Thus, rather 
than place houseless people “outside of property,” we ought to examine how it is that houseless 
people are implicated in the very relations producing property in the first place.  
Here I want to suggest what utility I see through a relational approach to property. 
Previously in the chapter, we heard relational property scholars suggest that we better see 
alternatives to the traditional ownership model when we examine the context of relations 
surrounding property. At its core, this sentiment is correct. What helps us see property’s effect on 
houseless people is detailing the context through which property is produced and implicated in 
particular places and times.  
40 
 
The aforementioned relational approaches struggle to reach outside of legal analyses, 
however. Remaining within legal frameworks alone may deemphasize that property relations are 
relations of material significance. That is, some relational approaches suggest that we think 
harder about what property is and ought to be legally, not about the ways in which property has 
been produced and maintained as a dominant value dependent on creating property insecurity 
itself.  It is my concern that discourses seeking new ideations of property lead us away from 
explaining how houseless people are necessarily imbricated within traditional property systems 
more broadly. Such relational approaches may also sidestep normative judgement about property 
inequities by adhering to legal models which bracket issues of justice.  
My approach in Chapter 2, then, attempts to stay close to the development of property 
within American liberal-democracy. It does so by examining property dialectically, by 
examining the conditions of property which have produced houselessness as a condition of 
property insecurity. In doing so, I argue that we can better see how it is that the traditional 
ownership model of property necessitates property insecurity for some, and thus remains the 
most significant set of material relations affecting houseless peoples’ lives.   
Property’s Production Processes 
This chapter has sought to show how property scholars have examined property and how this 
matters to studies of houselessness. I identified that the dominant form of property—the 
traditional ownership model—is a legal form of property representing the significant amount of 
power within ownership rights, none more so than the right to exclude. Geographers examining 
houselessness have adopted similar approaches to studies of property, showing how the right to 
exclude plays a critical role in disrupting houseless peoples’ lives. Although helpful, I have 
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suggested that focusing exclusively on the right to exclude overlooks important relations of 
property that are themselves productive of houselessness as a condition.  
The relational turn in property scholarship asks us to see such relations. To do so may 
help us see the role that property relations play in mediating houseless life beyond the right to 
exclude. The next chapter therefore takes up a relational, or dialectical as I prefer it, analysis of 
property within the context of liberal-democracy specifically, by examining how the liberal 
citizen became synonymous with the propertied citizen. It shows how the historical relations 
producing property within liberal-democracies has developed property into the very definition of 
citizenship. In tracing the conditions of citizenship as they relate to property throughout history, I 
suggest that property remains today the very entity which denies houseless people the right to 
enjoy their political citizenship, a notion I develop through case studies of houseless 










Chapter 2: Properties of Liberal-Democratic Citizenship 
Property has always been a fundamental component of liberal citizenship. For a period of time, 
landed property was indeed the primary means by which liberal citizenship was constituted in 
America. However, as democratic reforms extended formal rights of citizenship to groups 
previously excluded from them, the ways in which property connected to citizenship became less 
clear. The ways in which property influences citizenship today remains overlooked.  
 This chapter draws attention to property in this capacity. It examines how property rights 
and relations continue to be a critical component in shaping liberal citizenship today. Throughout 
the chapter, I seek to show how the political relations which produce property as a specific set of 
values are not relegated to the past. Rather, I suggest the social and political values historically 
associated with property linger on in contemporary discourse. The survival of long-held liberal 
values of property continue to mediate citizenship in significant ways. Property has been 
maintained as a necessary component of democratic life; a social, political, and economic 
relation that is “built-in” to the practices and institutions of liberal democracy. As I will argue in 
the chapter, then, the values upheld through the multiple relations producing landed property are 
essential in moderating “proper” citizenship practice. 
 In developing this set of arguments, I draw from a wide range of scholarship concerning 
property. Much writing on property’s connection to liberal citizenship emanated from classical 
political philosophy and liberal theory from the seventeenth through twentieth centuries. These 
property literatures were reinvigorated by the work of political and legal theorists as well as legal 
historians in the mid-to-late twentieth century.  
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This chapter draws broadly from key works within property scholarship to detail how 
property historically influenced citizenship and how citizenship is still affected by property 
relations. The first part of the chapter identifies how social and political values of property 
defined the liberal citizen as one premised on the ownership of property. It traces the ways in 
which property was used as means of defining the proper social order within U.S. democratic 
practice. The second part of the chapter suggests that property continues to demarcate a proper 
liberal ordering of social life. Yet, the ways in which property relations order social life have 
shifted over time. With the expansion of liberal democracy throughout the last two centuries 
political rights have been extended to all citizens regardless of their property holdings. This 
extension of rights ought to have strengthened citizenship for who did not possess property. Yet, 
the extension of liberal rights has maintained inequities particularly as they relate to class 
differences. This imbalance centers around property. As the political values of property were 
overridden by the growing economies of property, the way in which property came to moderate 
claims of citizenship became influenced more by economic values. Somewhat ironically, then, 
the process of “democratization” has established the very means by which citizenship has 
remained limited for property-insecure people in liberal-democratic states. 
 In bringing these arguments together, I end the chapter by focusing on how property 
shapes citizenship particularly for houseless people. Houseless people are intimately affected by 
property relations. While houseless peoples’ experiences vary wildly, property, I argue, is the 
common political and economic relation by which houseless people are primarily affected. 
Houseless people are confined by legal relations of property, which limits where individuals can 
or cannot be within space, and as a result, houseless individuals are regularly and forcefully 
excluded from places. But houseless people, I argue, also experience limited citizenship in more 
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substantive ways that reach beyond legal restrictions. As a result of the social and economic 
factors producing property that historically have shaped liberal-democratic values, property 
relations continue to define property insecurity as a condition aberrant or outside of the proper 
social order. Such values work to define the very limits of citizenship for houseless people.  
In making these arguments, I review key interventions in houselessness scholarship 
concerning property rights and citizenship. The houselessness literature examining citizenship 
and property has emphasized the logic of legal property exclusions. Such explanations provide a 
foundation that can be usefully expanded upon. What I call for in the conclusion is a renewed 
attention to how houseless people are limited by property in tandem with and beyond that of 
legal exclusion. I argue we ought to examine the active production of property as a social, legal, 
political, and economic relation to better understand how it is that houselessness as a limited 
citizenship standing is produced and maintained within liberal-democratic politics. I seek to go 
beyond identifying simply how law excludes houseless people from space. Rather, I wish to 
show the powerful, everyday ways in which property moderates peoples’ lives “pre-politically.” 
That is, how it is that property is valued socially and politically, and in turn, how these values are 
actualized in laws which maintain inequities among classes, particularly for property insecure 
people.  
I begin the chapter by setting up my methodological approach for examining the relations 
of citizenship and property. Property directly relates to how liberal citizenship is conceived and 
realized. As such, I explain this dialectical relation in order to set up a history of propertied-




The Dialectical Nature of Property and Citizenship 
Using a dialectical approach to describe the relationship between property and citizenship is 
merely one way to examine how these concepts affect houseless people. Certainly, examining 
phenomena dialectically can mean many different things. My intention is not to identify the 
“true” meaning of dialectical reasoning in abstraction. A description of the various ways in 
which dialectics has been applied in social research lies far beyond the scope of this project. 
Instead, and for my purposes hereafter, I understand that “propertied-citizenship” is dialectically 
related in that both of the two concepts are intertwined. The point of dialectics for me is that such 
an analytical framing brings forth how it is that certain processes (private property ownership, 
citizenship) are necessarily entwined with one another and how they produce or maintain 
themselves in the world because of this relationship. Liberal property systems rely on a citizenry 
for such a system to be realized. Yet because of property and liberalism’s many variations, 
property and citizenship are often contradictory to, or in tension with, one another. Therefore, my 
dialectical explanation of property and citizenship examines how citizenship has been 
“propertied” historically. But it also explains how citizenship remains propertied, despite the 
apparent lack of property qualifications for, much less restrictions upon, liberal citizenship for 
houseless people.  
 Modern propertied-citizenship presents a dilemma for houseless people. Property, on the 
one hand, is a legal system where houseless people are denied their full rights of citizenship. For, 
property rights exclude houseless people from access to spaces and resources necessary for 
survival, thereby denying houseless people freedom to pursue their means of social reproduction, 
means secured through liberal rights. To enjoy “full” citizenship in this sense, houseless people 
would need access to or ownership of property to fully realize their liberty rights. On the other 
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hand, rights of liberal citizenship are not contingent entirely upon property. In general, most 
houseless people hold rights of citizenship, regardless of whether they own or have access to 
property. Citizenship rights are “protected” by having legal status as citizen. In short: property 
limits liberal citizenship, but liberal citizenship is not dependent absolutely on property. 
The dialectical relation between property and citizenship matters for houseless and 
housed people alike. The tension between how property mediates citizenship is in one instance 
created by legal exclusion, but then is enhanced through extra-legal relations. Citizenship is 
limited for houseless people through legal exclusions; owners legally deny people needed access 
to private or public spaces, for instance. But citizenship can also be limited by more than just 
rights-based restrictions, or in the case of houseless people, rights-based exclusion from 
property. Property, as a set of social relations, limits citizenship in more ways than those 
recognized through narrow legal terms of exclusion and status. Homeowners surrounding 
houseless encampments, for example, actively promote the eradication of organized 
encampments for many reasons. The social values producing liberal systems of property, 
therefore, also limit houseless peoples’ citizenship in distinct ways (See Chapter 3).  
 One issue following from the notion that liberal property systems limit citizenship is that 
property can rarely be dissociated from citizenship realization even for houseless people who 
hold legal citizenship status. Another way of putting it, when houseless people experience 
limited senses of citizenship, property rights and relations are implicated in the very processes 
limiting one’s citizenship. A common example is when a houseless person cannot get a bank 
account or mail services due to not having a personal address.  
But property relations go deeper than simply a lack of address. Property’s deeply-
embedded values also project onto unhoused people, denying houseless people the opportunity to 
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speak for themselves at social and political engagements directly impacting their livelihoods, 
such as neighborhood meetings. Such values also are promoted in political discourse in attempt 
to deny houseless people opportunities for self-determination in choosing how to stabilize 
themselves. Conversely, because citizenship is connected to ownership or tenancy, houseless 
people can rarely realize “proper” liberal citizenship without first obtaining access to property. 
Houselessness within the liberal property system is therefore illiberal in the sense that lacking a 
secure interest in property exudes social and political impropriety; being houseless is a socio-
legal standing placing individuals outside of the proper social order. The problem with these 
marginalizing effects of liberal property systems is that houseless people can often experience a 
kind of “citizenship-in-waiting” as a result. As such, houseless people must continue to struggle 
for not just access to property but for citizenship at the same time.    
 The implications of the tensions between property and citizenship for property insecure 
people are usefully highlighted through a dialectical approach. By adopting such an approach, 
however, I am not seeking to promote dialectical modes of reasoning as a superior methodology 
of knowledge construction.10 Rather, I find such an approach useful for framing my analysis of 
how houseless people experience limited citizenship in modern democracies. Such an approach 
helps illustrate certain contradictions affecting houseless and housed people in everyday ways.  
But so too does dialectical reasoning aid in geographical analysis. Drawing from 
Harvey’s (1996) account of dialectics, a few key points follow regarding the purpose of this 
framework. Perhaps most usefully, as Harvey argues, dialectical analysis brings attention to “the 
 
10 Ollman’s (2003) Dance of the Dialectics thoroughly explores the nuances of dialectical thinking. Ollman 
particularly is focused on Marx’s dialectical method. Perhaps more useful for my research is Harvey’s (1996) fairly 
succinct explication of dialectical thinking. Harvey breaks down what he means by dialectics and how this mode of 
reasoning lends itself well to geographical analysis.  
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concrete material conditions of the world in which we find ourselves” (p. 8). Articulating why 
and how contradictions arise within society, as an epistemological exercise in itself, is thus not 
sufficient. Dialectical means of reasoning ought also to examine how certain processes construct 
types of “permanence” in specific places and at different times, permanences which shape 
“dominant social values to which most people willingly subscribe” (Harvey 1996, 11). 
Examining the dialectical relations of social life through historical-material conditions producing 
social and physical spaces not only affords us perspective into how social “values” are 
constructed (p. 12). So too do these modes of reasoning indicate potential pathways for change, 
changes that are rooted in the material geographies of social relations.  
 In using a dialectical approach I develop an understanding of how citizenship has come to 
be valued through the intermeshing of legal and social relations surrounding property use. As 
Harvey (1996) suggests, the theoretical and empirical task of dialectical reasoning is to “identify 
those characteristic ‘moments’ and ‘forms’ (i.e. ‘things’) embedded within continuous flows 
which can produce radical transformations or where, conversely ‘gatekeeping’ or other 
mechanisms might be constructed so as to give a ‘thing’ or system… qualities of identity, 
integrity, and relative stability” (p. 55). To put this in the context of propertied-citizenship, what 
requires explaining is the stability of liberal property values and how these values continue to 
shape citizenship. How social values of property were produced and how such values are 
reworked and maintained within contemporary liberal-democratic practice is thus my object of 
analysis.  
 My arguments about how property influences citizenship develop throughout the 
dissertation. This chapter provides a theoretical explanation of how propertied-citizenship 
developed historically and how those values have residually affected citizenship today, 
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particularly as it relates to houseless people. The following two chapters, then, draw from the 
insights developed here to empirically show the different ways in which property produces 
limited citizenship for houseless people living in self-governing encampments in Portland. The 
final chapter draws from theories of justice and democracy to offer a way forward in thinking 
through the contradictions of houselessness and propertied-citizenship within liberal-
democracies. Thus, each chapter of the dissertation develops upon the relations of property (as 
examined in Chapter 1) in distinct ways, showing us how the process of property relations 
produces a model of liberal citizenship which marginally incorporates houseless people. It shows 
us, that is, how houselessness is not only allowed for, but legitimated within the liberal model of 
citizenship.  I now turn to detail a historical understanding of the ways in which property has 
been implicated within liberalism and democracy.  
Property, Liberalism, and Citizenship 
Many analyses of property within liberal theory begin with the work of John Locke. Although 
property was certainly talked about prior to Locke’s writing in the late seventeenth century, it 
was Locke who grounded them within the liberal tradition. Locke’s writings on property are 
significant because of how they have come to influence modern liberal ideals and values about 
property, rights, and the role of government in mediating them. For good reason, then, his work 
is a good place to begin tracing how liberal thinking on property and rights has developed over 
centuries.  
 Property, for Locke, was something one acquires simply by cultivating some resource. 
That is, property becomes property the moment at which an individual invests their labor into a 
given resource. This position is laid out in Locke’s origin theory of property, where he states that  
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every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but 
himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has 
provided, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his property (2016, 135).  
From Locke’s perspective investing one’s labor into something gives one possession over that 
resource. In that one’s labor affords possession over a resource, possession of property is then 
realized when some resource is enclosed from the commons. Locke assumed no person would 
ever take more property than was necessary to preserve themselves and to satisfy their basic 
needs. In theory, then, property would only be acquired based on necessity, for an individual to 
meet their needs. The implications resulting from Locke’s assumption is that people could claim 
an unlimited amount of property as long as they were able to justify why extra resources directly 
contributed to their self-preservation. 
What Locke’s labor theory of property suggests is that property comes into an 
individuals’ possession naturally. That is, the possession of property is understood as one’s 
natural right. Obtaining property by investing one’s labor in a resource was seen as a natural 
right because all individuals were assumed to have “an equal natural right to one’s own labour 
and to the means of labour” (Macpherson 1978, 15). Investing one’s labor in resources, thereby 
establishing a property right, was a means of being in possession of, or “owning,” one’s self. 
Self-possession mattered to Locke because he thought that individuals best “preserved” 
themselves by owning property, given that cultivating property constituted the very process by 
which people owned their own labor. And owning one’s labor was understood to be an 
individuals’ natural right to self-preservation (Locke 2016, xxii). In this way, cultivating and 
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acquiring property was an individuals’ means of preserving themselves against and before others 
within society.  
Acquiring property for Locke was therefore an individualistic pursuit. In this way, 
Locke’s theory of property can be said to have inspired the classical liberal view that property 
ought to be a resource privately-held (Friedman 2001). Although Locke understood property 
ownership as natural, or pre-political, he suggested nonetheless that property would be better 
protected through the compact of a civil society. Government, in some form, was necessary. He 
believed the sovereignty of government was necessary to better protect individuals’ rights to 
property. Without the “neutrality” of government sovereignty, Locke believed an inevitable 
chaos would overcome individuals within a pre-political state, what he and others termed the 
“state of nature” (Locke 2016, 127). The very purpose of forming and consenting to government 
authority, from this perspective, was to uphold property contracts between individuals. Indeed, 
he thought that the very authority of the state ought to be used only to arbitrate between property 
conflicts and nothing else.  
The notion that institutions of government were necessary to maintain people’s property 
holdings resonated with the framers of the U.S. constitution. Particularly impacted by Locke’s 
central role for property within social relations were key Federalists who argued for a stronger 
national government. Several essays in the Federalist Papers, for example, underscored such a 
position on the role of government. 11 Madison, in particular, suggested the raison d’etre for 
creating a stronger federal government was premised on white male individuals’ ability to secure 
 
11 I focus here on Madison. But in the Federalist Papers, Hamilton made similar arguments to those of Madison’s. 
In his opening and closing statements for a stronger federal government, Hamilton states that by agreeing to adopt 
the Constitution, citizens were providing themselves, among other things, the “additional security which [the 
Constitution’s] adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and to property” 
(Hamilton et al. 1987, 90).    
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and acquire private property. His clearest statement connecting the use of government to secure 
property came in the Federalist Paper 10. There here stated that “the diversity in the faculties of 
men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a 
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From 
the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different 
degrees and kinds of property immediately results” (Madison et al. 1987, 123, emphasis added). 
For Madison, then, a stronger federal government would not only adjudicate property ownership 
disputes for citizens. A stronger federal government would enable and protect citizens’ pursuit of 
more property.  
Federalist arguments emphasizing constitutional protection for property was an essential 
element in constructing republican government beyond the mere possession of property in itself. 
Protecting property mattered to Federalists because property was seen as the means by which 
other related rights were generated. For Madison, a government’s protection of “different 
degrees and kinds of property” meant that republican government could secure nearly all of the 
individual liberties of citizens, not just those rights limited to real property. Like Locke, 
therefore, protecting property rights protected the “source” of an individual’s self-ownership and 
autonomy. 
Protecting property rights was thought to therefore establish other related personal rights. 
Foremost among these rights, or values in rights, was that of liberty. Liberty has long been 
recognized as a value attached to and deriving from property ownership (Merrill and Smith 
2010). For the Federalists, property was “seen as a safeguard of liberty because it set limits on 
the reach of legitimate government” (Ely 2008, 1). From this perspective, an individuals’ liberty 
was secured through property rights in a double sense. On the one hand, government could not 
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impinge on one’s private rights to property, thereby protecting individuals’ rights of liberty. And 
on the other hand, if conflicts over property arose between citizens, the government would step 
in to adjudicate between those conflicts. In this sense, securing private property rights protected 
individual autonomy, a security seen to strengthen the legal distance between autonomous 
individuals and the government as well as from other citizens.  
Alongside securing one’s liberty, protecting rights of property was understood as 
necessary for realizing a coveted component of democratic practice: self-government. Security in 
one’s property rights was thought to enable individuals to participate in the political process as 
well as provide the freedom to challenge governmental policy (Ely 2008, 1). Self-government 
was thought to be more viable when individuals were free to participate and effect the political 
process. But the political freedom of self-governance, because it was predicated on property 
ownership, was intimately related to an individuals’ economic freedom. Indeed, in classical 
republican thinking (ideas espoused by the Founders), political freedom was thought to derive 
from one’s economic freedoms in that “an economically independent people were best able to 
maintain their political independence” (Upham 1998, n.p.). As such, the economic freedom 
provided by property ownership enabled for citizens the independence thought to be necessary 
for practicing self-governance.   
The notion that political independence derived from the economic freedom of property 
ownership strongly shaped democratic citizenship in the 18th and 19th century. Voting rights are 
the most common example. As a hallmark right of formal citizenship, suffrage was restricted to 
only property-owning white men after the ratification of the federal Constitution. Restricting 
suffrage to only property-owning white men was particularly encouraged by Federalist framers 
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of the Constitution because they saw property as essential to realizing republican values, values 
of liberty and freedom.  
But the acceptance of property restrictions for suffrage in the Revolutionary Era 
emanated not just from the minds of the framers of the Constitution. There was widespread 
social backing for property restrictions on suffrage. As Robert Steinfeld suggests, writers during 
this period characterized those without possession of property as inept or unqualified for political 
participation. He states that “those who owned no property were powerless and dependent; they 
were nearly always subject to the will of those who commanded resources. Because they were 
not their own men, they lack[ed] political capacity” (1989, 340). What followed from this line of 
thinking, that suffrage rights ought to be based on property holdings, was that “those without 
property were thought to be far too dependent on those with it to be able to exercise an 
independent vote” (Upham 1998, n.p.). Property owners were seen to be fully governing of 
themselves in that their economic freedom provided them independence from corrupting 
influences particularly concerning voting. In contrast, those who lacked property were seen to be 
improperly influenced, not capable of making decisions for themselves. One’s citizenship, one’s 
right to vote, was predicated on owning property which only white men enjoyed.  
By the mid nineteenth century, property-owning requirements for white male suffrage 
were formally ending (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005). Despite the formal end of property 
requirements for male suffrage, property holdings continued to shape rights of citizenship. For, 
property-owning requirements qualifying citizens for suffrage were simply replaced by other 
financial mandates, such as taxpaying qualifications and even outright exclusions for the poor, or 
“pauper exclusions” (Steinfeld 1989). The use of these financial exclusions to restrict suffrage 
allowed many states to continue limiting political activity based on one’s economic standing. 
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Therefore, the mere ownership of real property was no longer the sole factor for extending 
suffrage, as formal voting rights were extended to some individuals who did not own property. 
The type of property that qualified one for citizenship was changing. Satisfying 
republican desires to maintain the political significance of property was a re-conceptualization of 
what it meant to have property. After the repeal of formal property requirements for suffrage, 
“property” could be understood to be more than just “real” or landed property. This meant that 
qualifications for citizenship could be satisfied by those earning wages, whether or not those 
wage-earners owned real property. The political identity long associated with property could 
now be realized by more people as the capacity to earn wages from one’s labor approximated the 
values of economic independence as the means of self-governance that was long associated with 
property ownership.   
The result of extending suffrage to white male wage-earners who did not own property, 
however, marked new socio-political distinctions between the working class and those receiving 
monetary relief. Now the political metric demarcating “the self-governing from the dependent 
was whether a person supported himself by earning wages or was dependent on poor relief” 
(Steinfeld 1989, 364). The mark of fitness for suffrage came down to whether or not individuals 
“owned their own labor,” whether individuals earned wages through their labor. Those 
individuals who remained without possession of property but owned their own labor through 
earning wages could now be included into the category of citizen. Wage-earners were seen as 
individuals capable of self-governing, while poorer individuals receiving economic relief were 





People as Property 
The end of formal suffrage restrictions based on property holdings in no way eradicated the 
relationship between property and citizenship realization for many Americans. Notably, African 
Americans and women were denied the privileges of citizenship even after property requirements 
for suffrage were repealed. For African Americans, citizenship was clearly denied as 
enslavement was a form of being property itself. After emancipation from enslavement, African 
Americans became equal citizens, in theory. Along with the promise of citizenship through the 
passing of the Fourtheenth Amendment, formerly enslaved individuals were able to own 
property as well. Under law, therefore, African Americans were closer to realizing the 
protections of not only legal citizenship, but of the ideals of propertied-citizenship.  
Despite the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment that all people born in the U.S. were 
equal as citizens, African Americans were routinely and violently denied the protections and 
privileges of citizenship. To take one example, there was a systemic deprivation of property 
ownership privileges for African Americans. As Kahrl (2019) notes, “whites undermined black 
property ownership… routinely [overvaluing] black-owned land, forcing black property owners 
to bear a heavier tax burden than whites (to pay for services they didn’t receive) and slowly 
draining families of earnings.” He continues, “if black-owned property became valuable or a 
black property owner challenged white supremacy, local officials could simply declare the 
property tax-delinquent and sell it at a tax sale.” Well into the 20th century, the white-controlled 
regulation of the property market regulated if, and when, African Americans could realize the 
privileges of property ownership. Thus even after African Americans became equal under the 
law, the privileges of citizenship were mediated by property rights and relations.  
57 
 
Despite the right to own property and to equal citizenship under the law, African 
Americans faced further citizenship struggles. Stemming from the 1790 Naturalization Act 
which recognized citizenship for only free whites (Bakken & Kindell, 2006), whiteness 
powerfully constituted the values of citizenship in practice post Reconstruction. As Cheryl Harris 
(1993) argues, whiteness itself was a form of property, a property naturally held by whites 
against those of African Americans, a property that disadvantaged African Americans through all 
legal, political, and economic relations. White values defining propertied-citizenship were 
structured into liberalism and its institutions. As such, white citizenship was a guiding metric for 
property relations. As Mills (2017) argues, liberal polities based on contractarian notions of 
justice—notions of liberalism embodying a polity of self-owning proprietors—naturally excluded 
African Americans from citizenship rights by denying them property rights. For, he argues, the 
liberal conception of propertied-citizenship was and remains one in which “the property rights of 
non-self-owning people of color are systematically violated… rights, liberties, opportunities, 
income, and wealth are continually being transferred from the nonwhite to the white population” 
(2017, 47, emphasis added). For African Americans, then, the struggle for citizenship was a 
process of becoming not-property in themselves by attempting to become propertied-citizens; 
self-owning citizenship that was structured through the liberal lens of white citizenship.   
So too was the struggle for women’s citizenship rooted in relations of property. Not only 
did women in the American republic not have the legal right to vote until the Nineteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1920. Women also lacked the right to own property until the mid-
nineteenth century, when many states followed New York’s passage of the Married Women’s 
Property law. It was then that some states began to piece together a set of legal rights for married 
women to have some control over their husband’s assets (Married Women’s Property Act, n.d.). 
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Thus, as Herzog and Adams (2018) note, women not only lacked ownership rights to landed 
property, but to ownership of themselves, because they lacked ownership over their own bodies. 
Such notions of women as property, as subject to their spouse’s will, were rooted in liberal 
understandings of the natural role and place of women within the private sphere, thus reserving 
the male-dominated public sphere as the natural space for political engagement (Marston 1990). 
Like African American struggles for self-ownership, then, so too did women struggle against a 
liberal-republican social order which placed non-self-owning women outside of the proper role 
of citizen.   
Today, suffrage and citizenship has been formally extended to these groups. However, 
this does not mean that people of color or women equally experience the privileges of 
citizenship. Property continues to be means of demarcating the “proper” citizen as a more recent 
history of U.S. housing policies show. 
Homeownership as Proper Citizenship 
Perhaps no aspect of American identity has been more closely connected to proper citizenship 
than with homeownership. While homeownership continued to increase throughout the 
nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, the period seeing the most rapid expansion of 
new homeowners in U.S. history was the period post-World War II. It was this particular period 
when metropolitan landscapes began to rapidly change through the expansion of suburban living 
and the consequent restructuring of inner-city neighborhoods. In doing so, post-War 
development entrenched the single-family home as the ideal American home. But the outcome of 
restructured metropolitan landscapes with a focus on suburban expansion also had the effect of 
further segregating populations by race, gender, and class. The promotion of the “American 
Dream” by way of single-family and suburban/private community homeownership represented 
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the very essence of the individualization of the traditional ownership model of property that 
continues to represent the liberal model of propertied-citizenship.  
Critical to the development of the single-family homeowner as the idealized propertied-
citizen was policy enacted by the federal government. In the early 1930s, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) was created through New Deal legislation. Against the downturn in the 
economy after the Great Depression, the FHA provided a new option for homeownership from 
which many Americans were previously excluded. The FHA facilitated new homeownership by 
insuring private mortgages for the first time, as well as by extending the length of mortgage 
repayments and allowing for smaller down payments (Knox and McCarthy 2005). This allowed 
for the average American for the first time to be able to afford a home and to have that mortgage 
be insured through government rather than the private market.  
The outcome of the FHA policies resulted in a post-War boom in homeownership. While 
pre-war levels of private homeownership starts averaged around 350,000 annually from the mid-
1930s to the early 1940s, by 1950, construction of new homes jumped to around 2 million 
annually (Knox 2005, 151). U.S. homeownership rates increased from 43% in 1940 to a high of 
around 68.5% in 2006-2007 (U.S. Census 2020). Today, post-2008 recession, the 
homeownership rates sit around 65%. Although less homeowners are insured by the FHA today, 
the FHA policy was critical for promoting ownership of single-family homes over those of multi-
family homes.    
The FHA policies laid the foundation for development of the modern American suburb. 
For, the development of traditional suburban areas was premised around the construction of 
single-family homes as the ideal form of housing. The suburban, as Kenneth Jackson (1985) has 
suggested, is “the quintessential physical achievement of the United States” (p. 4). The suburb, 
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he argues, is a “manifestation of such fundamental characteristics of American society as 
conspicuous consumption, a reliance upon the private automobile, upward mobility, the 
separation of the family into nuclear units, the widening division between work and leisure, and 
a tendency toward racial and economic exclusiveness” (ibid). But the core of the “suburban 
ideal,” Jackson notes, is the notion of a detached house, a private place away from the crudeness 
of urban life (1985, p. 288). Given that 52% of U.S. residents live in suburban neighborhoods 
today (U.S. HUD 2017), as opposed to urban or rural, the single-family home which comprises 
much of suburban housing stock remains preeminent within American culture.   
The revolution in suburban development had social implications beyond the spatially 
deconcentrating populations. It had social implications as well. Post-war metropolitan 
restructuring further divided Americans by race and class. A critical aspect of FHA-supported 
housing policy was the legally-enforced segregation of people of color from white 
neighborhoods. The FHA had race-coded policies mandating that only white Americans could 
benefit from federally-backed mortgages. It supported segregation by upholding the positions of 
the Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC), an entity which evaluated the risk for bankers of 
lending credit to homeowners based on the building and racial composition of neighborhoods 
(Stein 2019). The HOLC mapped zones of investment along risk-gradients, where a first order 
ranking represented an “in demand” neighborhood while a fourth and lowest-order ranking 
meant a neighborhood had already “declined” (Jackson 1985, 198). The HOLC investment maps 
were color-coded and the neighborhoods defined as already declined were shaded in the color 
red. These red-colored neighborhoods were highly-correlated with minority neighborhoods. 
Based on these maps, the government-supported process of “redlining” throughout the real estate 
industry marked areas where non-whites were unavailable for credit to buy homes. These 
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redlined areas signaled to banks and lenders that loans should not be given out to individuals 
looking to buy in these areas. In contrast, white neighborhoods, now predominantly suburban 
and even quite exclusive urban neighborhoods, were rated as prime for investment.  
To ensure that people of color would not buy properties in white areas, sellers used 
covenants to restrict people of color from buying property in white neighborhoods. Covenants 
were legal criteria written into property deeds requiring that, when buying a home, whites would 
not sell that home to any person of color (Jonas et al. 2015). The result of these practices was the 
segregation of people of color into few and specific neighborhoods mostly within metropolitan 
areas. Although segregation existed within inner cities prior to the post-War suburbanization 
boom, minorities were forced into residing in increasingly underserviced inner-city 
neighborhoods throughout the great suburban expansion while whites were isolating within 
suburban developments and privatized urban communities (Davis 1992). In this way, new 
opportunities for homeownership were restricted almost exclusively for whites.  
The practices of redlining and use of racially-restricted covenants that shaped home sales 
were legally enforced for over three decades. When congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 
1968, the legal segregation of people of color from certain neighborhoods and from 
homeownership more broadly was formally ended. Despite the end of the lawful practice of 
racial discrimination, however, the legacies of these practices remain today. In many ways such 
practices are represented within the built landscape of metropolitan America, where 
neighborhoods within cities and suburbs illustrate the bifurcation of population by race. Data 
from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey, for instance, shows that whites comprise 
68% of the total U.S. suburban population and only 44% of the total urban population (Parker et 
al. 2018). So too are there increasing disparities in homeownership rates when accounting for 
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race. As of 2017, homeownership rates for whites were 72.3%, in sharp contrast to the rate of 
black homeownership, which was at 43.1% (JCHS 2018). While the U.S. is becoming more 
demographically diverse, and the geographic distribution of non-whites throughout metropolitan 
areas is beginning to change after decades of racial and economic stasis, white homeownership 
remains predominant among American homeownership. 
These legacies influence the values embodied within the idealized propertied-citizen. For, 
the discriminatory FHA homeownership policies valorized the ownership of property through the 
means of segregation, by restricting non-whites from buying homes in suburban areas and gated 
communities within urban areas to maintain higher property values in white-dominant spaces. 
The FHA and real estate industry were complicit in these actions, with the rhetorical goal of 
promoting the American Dream of homeownership for everyone but also to maintain property 
values in white spaces. Thus to expand homeownership, McKenzie (1994, 61) suggests, “it was 
necessary to establish a sense of security about property values. The [real estate] industry used its 
resources and influence to eliminate or minimize factors that appeared to make the value of 
residential property unstable.” Given that race was the predominant factor to be “minimized,” 
argues McKenzie, it was “the black American [who] was treated as a threat to property values” 
(p. 58). Thus with the private sector shaping housing policy, which was backed by federal 
government regulations, the ownership of property was promoted as a value exclusive to white 
citizens.    
The traditional model of American homeownership forged through discriminatory 
practices of public and private entities has worked to shape the ideal liberal citizen. Just as 
propertied elites were virtuous citizens at the onset of the Revolutionary Era, there is an 
assumption today that homeowners are more apt local citizens than those who do not possess 
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property. As Stern (2011) argues, individuals owning homes are often understood to embody a 
“constellation of positive externalities, including local contribution and investment, political 
participation, neighboring, and collective action, as well as gains to prosperity and stability from 
industrious and content citizens” (pp. 101-102). That homeowners may realize these 
characteristics is not in dispute. Rather, what is of note is that the American belief in the “social 
efficacy of ownership, and the cultural sway around the owned home, have encouraged large 
scale subsidization of homebuying and buttressed ill-conceived policy initiatives,” initiatives led 
by government that have “reinforced a level of public enthusiasm and corresponding social 
norms for traditional home ownership that… appear to accept no substitute” (pp. 106-107). 
Within American homeownership, the proper citizen is the propertied-citizen. This citizenship is 
equally protected for all who have the privilege of owning homes or accessing property. But 
disparities between race and class continue to outline who able to realize the benefits of 
propertied-citizenship to this day.  
In detailing a history of citizenship exclusions, my intent has been to show how closely 
intertwined citizenship is with property, property either as landed assets or property as human 
bodies. In the process I have begun to show how property is a social system deriving its values 
from political relations. For, the values attached to property, that of liberty, independence, and 
the capacity for self-governance, reflect contemporary understandings of what it means to be a 
liberal citizen. Therefore, a legacy of citizenship exclusions has shaped and inflect contemporary 
understandings of citizenship, notions of citizenship I argue remain influential today, particularly 
when understood through citizenship’s relations with property. In the next part of the chapter, I 
focus on how these political values have stayed the course in liberal political thinking regarding 
property and its capacity to order socio-political life.  
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The Proper Social Order: Property as Propriety or Commodity 
Today property is predominantly valued as an asset within liberal-democratic states. Owning 
property is a primary way in which individuals accumulate wealth. From single-family 
homeowners to corporate property holders, property is valorized through and for its exchange 
potential. In turn, property undergirds much of contemporary economic relations. The 2008 
recession, caused by a housing market bubble, exemplifies the significance of property within 
free market economies. The housing bubble was largely predicated on increased subprime 
mortgage lending, where massive profits were generated by selling mortgage-backed securities, a 
financial trading scheme allowing investors to accumulate financial gains by buying packages of 
debt from homeowners’ asset values. People’s homes, their propertied-assets, were thus 
instrumental in leveraging further financial gains for the wealthy investor class.  
When property fundamentally is used to produce wealth, property’s economic values are 
prioritized over its use values. Put another way, when the exchange capacities of property create 
value as an asset (Christophers 2010), the exchange values of property become further distanced 
from its use values. The distinction between property’s exchange and use values is perhaps most 
readily seen through contemporary economic processes of urbanization. Urban developments 
around the world, both residential and commercial, precipitate the property market’s ability to 
absorb surplus capital (Harvey 2008). That is, global urbanization processes are predicated on 
developing property to further economic growth. Any use values realized by individuals from 
these economic developments is secondary in relation to property’s economic utility. This is not 
to say that property does not satisfy people’s social preferences, but, rather, that property simply 
cannot be divorced from its economic relations. The economic capacities of property always 
frame individuals’ relations with property.  
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It is in this sense that property contemporarily has come to be realized as a commodity or 
asset. Property has become more of a commodified “thing” in abstract terms, than as a set of 
entitlement privileges concerning the use of resources. This shift in perspective, Macpherson 
(1978) argues, is due to the spread of a free market economy, whereby property has now come to 
be viewed as “an absolute saleable right to things” (p. 8). Largely within the last two centuries, 
then, have the values of property transformed from a social and political ideal to one premised 
primarily on economic function, creating the era of “property-as-commodity.”    
But before property became primarily viewed as an asset, or an “absolute saleable right to 
things,” property was regarded as a primary means of ordering social and political life. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the framers of the Constitution prioritized the protection of 
property rights because these rights were thought to be the best means of guaranteeing 
individuals their liberty. So the argument goes, if liberty was secured through rights of property, 
individuals were thought to be able to more effectively govern themselves. Property thus 
provided the means by which individuals could realize formal citizenship within the early 
republican American polity. In this regard, property owners modeled proper political behavior as 
citizens. The ideal republican citizen was the propertied-citizen. 
Republicanism as a body of thought dominated socio-political perspectives of the 
Revolutionary era. Politicos and elites alike espoused the virtues of democratic republicanism. 
James Madison and other Federalists, for instance, embodied what may be termed “classical” 
republican thought. As Gordon Woods (1992) suggests, according to the classical republican 
tradition, “man was by nature a political being, a citizen who achieved his greatest moral 
fulfillment by participating in a self-governing republic” (p. 104). As such, classical republicans 
held that ideal citizens would seek to enhance the public good at the expense of private interests. 
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Later republican ideological iterations, such as those espoused by J.S. Mill, championed “civic” 
modes of republican political organization, or those adhering more closely to liberty as the 
highest order of democratic practice (Lovett 2018).12 Within these overlapping modes of 
republicanism, tensions existed over how democratic a republic ought to be, and how efforts 
toward socio-economic equality within a democratic polity challenged or impeded individuals’ 
liberty.  
At the center of these republican divisions was the issue of how changing property 
relations affected a burgeoning democratic republic. The founders of the Constitution, 
Federalists defending classical republican virtues, were resistant to an increasingly 
commercializing society. For, such changes in economy were making difficult the maintenance 
of the political values of citizens making decisions for the public good. As Woods (1992) argues, 
the Federalists "clung to the republican ideal of an autonomous public authority that was 
different from the many private interests of the society. They did not expect [the] public 
authority of the new federal government to be neutralized into inactivity by the competition 
of…numerous diverse interests" (p. 253). A diversity in interests meant that private interests 
were starting to influence political decision-making. Private interests were antithetical to 
classical republican’s adherence to the idea that public good is the highest political virtue. 
Woods notes that classical republican values were challenged by the increase in the "interested" 
positions of “ordinary individuals.” Rather than being disinterested leaders who made all 
political decisions based on what appeared to be for the public good, it was becoming more 
 
12 Classical and civic republicanism are not one in the same, argues Frank Lovett. Lovett (2018) draws a distinction 
between the two modes of thought. He suggests that, for civic republicans, “the paramount… value is political 
liberty, understood as non-domination or independence from arbitrary power” (n.p.). Classical republicans, 
conversely, “emphasize… the importance of civic virtue and political participation, the dangers of corruption, the 
benefits of a mixed constitution and the rule of law” (n.p.).  
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politically reasonable that "the public good [was] best promoted by the exertion of each 
individual seeking his own good in his own way" (1992, 296). Not only were private interests 
entering the political terrain, therefore, these interests were thought to be the very means by 
which greater democratic expansion could be realized in the republic after the Revolutionary 
period. 
That private interests were entering and shaping democratic discourse flew in the face of 
classical republican understandings about the purpose that property played in a republic. As 
Woods (1992) states, for classical republicans: 
Property had been considered in proprietary terms as part of a person's identity 
and the source of his authority. Such proprietary property was regarded not as the 
product of one's labor or as a material asset to be bought and sold in the market 
but as a means of maintaining one's gentility and independence from the caprices 
of the market. Landed property was the most important such guarantee of 
autonomy because it was the least transitory, the most permanent form, of 
property. Such proprietary property was designed to protect its holders from 
external influence or corruption, to free them from the scramble of buying and 
selling, and to allow them to make impartial political judgments (p. 269). 
Although classical republicans remained firm in their beliefs that property established the 
foundation for active and engaged citizenship, they nonetheless started to have reservations 
about property-ownership more widely. Alexander (1997) states that classical republicans feared 
that if property was to be more fully realized as a commodity then “individuals would relate to 
each other as abstract economic actors—buyers or sellers in the marketplace—rather than as 
concrete, multidimensional human beings” (p. 35). There was a fear in establishing a precedent 
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that property was better served as a means of creating economic value. Shifting property’s value 
in this sense could hinder the civic values upon which a robust citizenry depended within 
republican accounts of democracy. Certainly the Founders saw that property-ownership was 
good, for political reasons. But the values of free market society were bringing property into 
tensions with core classical republican ideals regarding virtuous, independent citizenship.  
Civic republican views, views becoming more widespread in the mid-1800s, differed 
regarding the utility of property in democracy. Like classical republicans, civic republicans also 
saw property as important to political life. Civic republicans, for instance, understood that a 
central function of property ownership was “to bestow independence on citizens so that they 
[could] completely practice self-government” (Alexander 1997, 338). However, self-governance 
for civic republicans meant something different than how classical republicans understood it. For 
civic republicans, self-governance meant that “all matters of political life [were] subject to the 
will of the citizenry” (ibid). With the nation increasing in small property owners, the citizenry 
was becoming larger in number, a democratic “threat” to an elite minority. Everyone who had 
property, not just Federalist elites, was able and encouraged to participate politically. Civic 
republicans were less concerned with maintaining a minority of propertied elites and calling for 
wider citizen participation from small property owners.  
 The two republican perspectives therefore presented conflicting understandings of how 
one’s properties shaped citizenship and democratic practice. For classical republicans, property 
was seen as the proper means of providing individuals the freedom to independently participate 
in civic life. Yet, as the economic utility of property ownership in a liberalizing capitalist 
economy became more appealing to American society en mass, classical republican virtues tied 
to property lost purchase. The dilemma for classical republicans was that property “needed to be 
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unencumbered for society to avoid privilege and inequality, but property also had to be stable to 
avoid being commodified and reduced to an object of acquisitive pursuit that would destroy 
republican virtue” (Alexander 1997, 40). The wider the democratic polity became, small 
property-owning citizens were less inclined to accept the classical republican idea of elite 
political leadership which was capable of divorcing its private interests for the greater public 
good.  
But so too did civic republican ideals concerning property illustrate non-reconcilable 
differences for an ideal democracy. Again, civic republican ideals regarding property suggested 
that not only should all citizens own property, but that politics was inherently about advancing 
individual interests, the collective good was secondary. Property became less useful in 
maintaining a properly republican socio-political order and became revered more for its 
economic utility. Defending individual interests in property was the civic republican democratic 
interest. If private interests dominated the practice of citizenship, concerns over equality for 
those without property were more likely to be dismissed.   
The balance between protecting individual liberties while advancing equality is the 
primary tension within democracies. The civic republican ideals represented a shift away from a 
republicanism rhetorically in support of the public good, to one more fully embracing the self-
interests of individuals. As Lovett (2008, n.p.) notes, “central to the contemporary civic 
republican program is the conception of political liberty as non-domination or independence 
from arbitrary power.” Such a view embodies a negative conception of freedom. Property was 
less an entree into democratic practice, providing citizens their independence. For civic 
republicans, property was something that protected citizens from the public. From this 
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perspective, the state is necessary to ensure that property is protected for individuals, not society 
at large.   
Arguably, neither republican understanding of how property suites the proper political 
order could be realized. The two perspectives—one seeing property as enabling individuals to 
make decisions for the public good, and the other seeing property as promoting the protection of 
individuals’ self-interests—are largely incommensurable. And this incommensurability comes 
down to how property is constitutionally protected.  
Formal rights enshrined in the Constitution do not literally prioritize property.13 But the 
logical duties or actions associated with property rights ensure that property was prioritized as a 
liberty right which often overrides other personal liberty rights. As Jennifer Nedelsky (1990) 
argues, if personal rights were actually meant to be equal to those of property rights within the 
Constitution, then both personal and property rights would not be protected as equal. She 
stipulates that while it is reasonable to assume that “the propertied could be relied upon to 
respect the rights of persons… the propertyless had no corresponding interest in property” 
(1990, 5, emphasis added). That is, property owners would have rights that secured their 
economic independence and would not politically interfere with personal rights of individuals. 
But the inverse was not true. Those without possession of property, although they held personal 
rights of liberty, were unable to reasonably respect the property rights of a minority of elite 
property owners. For, she argues, “the rights of property would be at risk whenever the sheer 
numerical advantage of the poor was translated into political power through equal rights” (ibid). 
Nedelsky argues then that the hierarchical ordering of property within U.S. legal relationships 
 
13 The Fifth Amendment does, of course, strongly protect individuals’ property from illegal seizure. This does not 
make property entirely untouchable, however.  
71 
 
“made it impossible for the propertyless to have the power within the government necessary 
either to secure their rights or to enjoy a full share of political liberty” (p. 66). Property 
represented power in republican government. And because of this, those without possession of 
property were less protected in their personal rights of liberty.  
 The “proper” political order in the early American republic was historically constituted 
by a nominal distribution of property-ownership. It was proper to own property as that property 
enabled one’s good citizenship standing. But property ownership was disproportionately low at 
that time. Propertied-citizenship thus was experienced by few owners, elites with the power to 
influence political relations, denying unpropertied individuals the capacity for self-governance. 
Many acknowledge the disparities between property owners and non-owners in the early 
American republic. Yet, it is assumed that, because property ownership became more prevalent 
through the 19th and 20th centuries, that such an imbalance between the propertied and non-
propertied has been resolved. On the contrary, I argue that the same issues of property and 
political power remains embedded within social relations today. Problematically, these political 
issues are subtler, and perhaps even more intractable today, than they were two centuries ago. 
For, the values surrounding property within liberal democracies derive not just from the realm of 
the political. The economic realm of social relations more broadly has come to influence the 
political more specifically. As such, the way in which the proper political order is constituted by 
property has shifted with property’s changing economic values, a shift in thinking about property 
to which I now turn. 
Liberal or Democratic Propertied-Citizenship? 
Thus far I have detailed how citizenship has been “propertied” throughout American political 
history as well as how the political values of proper citizenship were attached to property. I 
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looked at this particularly through the lens of republican ideology regarding property. For, the 
propertied-citizenship of the early American republic formally demarcated who had the capacity 
to hold and exercise political power, most notably through suffrage. But so too did property 
establish the “virtuousness” of proper citizenship, ostensibly allowing for individuals to 
independently participate within democratic life. Property ownership from this perspective 
defined the proper social order for civic fitness.   
Today, proprietary qualifications for citizenship are no longer formally upheld. 
Citizenship is no longer contingent upon formal property-owning requirements, nor other 
proprietary restrictions which impede an individual from realizing their rights of citizenship. Yet, 
despite this “freeing-up” of citizenship from its former propertied mandates, property remains a 
critical component of citizenship today. Contemporary liberal citizenship has been residually 
shaped by its propertied foundations. Liberalism—as a set of ideals or values realized through 
rights—has subsumed property within democratic citizenship. Just how liberal-democratic 
citizenship has maintained property as a value after the repeal of formal property restrictions is 
emphasized in this section.  
The more entrepreneurial perspective of civic republicans as discussed in the previous 
section underscored America’s burgeoning commercial society. Civic republicans increasingly 
supported “a dynamic and expanding capitalist economy, and a highly differentiated division of 
labor” (Jackson 2012, 35), a socio-economic order which classical republicans could not agree 
to. Such support for expanding capitalist relations influenced attitudes about the utility of 
property within political life. For instance, when the values attached to property-ownership no 
longer qualified individuals for citizenship, the values of “economic independence, of self-
directed ‘earning,’ as the ethical basis of democratic citizenship took the place of an outmoded 
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notion of public virtue” (Sklar 1991, 67). Along with changes in economy came changes in the 
meaning of citizenship. No longer did property-ownership define ideal citizenship. Citizenship 
came to be measured by an individuals’ ability to earn. Such changing economic circumstances 
in the early to mid-nineteenth century thus reshaped the political tenor of what was considered to 
be “proper” citizenship.   
Despite a civic republican embrace of market relations, property still held specific 
political value. Just what that value embodied, however, veered from earlier accounts. Older 
classical republican beliefs about property-as-propriety were now incorporated into the 
commercial spirit of entrepreneurial republicans (Alexander 1997). From this new perspective, 
property was still the means by which citizens were thought to secure their independence. 
However, it was becoming increasingly important that property’s exchange potential be realized. 
In other words, the ways in which property was required for developing a capitalist economy 
overshadowed antiquated understandings of a democracy based on elite property-owning 
citizens.  
By attempting to balance property’s economic and political values, republicans were re-
envisioning how property mattered to democratic practice. For instance, entrepreneurially-
minded republicans thought that the state could play a role in “distributing resources to all 
members of the community as a means of securing the material condition of their equal 
citizenship” (Jackson 2012, 35). It was thought that if the state was to formally extend material 
support for those lacking possession of property, then capitulating to property’s marketization 
was acceptable. To remain within the bounds of democratic “fairness,” however, marketizing 
property could only be acceptable if citizenship was formally extended to others without 
property. In this way, those without the economic privileges deriving from property ownership 
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could still have rights of citizenship. In theory, then, republican ideology allowed for property to 
become both commercialized and to remain as an anchor for democratic citizenship at the same 
time. 
Understanding this shift in thinking about property’s utility is critical for making sense of 
contemporary liberal citizenship. Modern citizenship is shaped by property’s political and 
economic values, both of which are upheld through democratic institutions and practices. Yet, 
the meanings behind the utility of property have changed along with those of liberal-democratic 
values. Such changes have made the property-citizenship connection less transparent as property 
has come to be understood as an apolitical commodity.   
From the Political to the Economic 
Property today still has political relevance. But the manner through which property becomes 
politicized often revolves around economic relations of property. Ellen Meiksins-Wood’s (2016) 
arguments are notable on the role property has played in the conceptual shift of property-as-
propriety to property-as-commodity. Broadly her work gives historical support to the ways in 
which the advance of capitalism two centuries or so ago made possible liberal democracy. The 
result of these influences, she argues, is a democracy that does not protect, but rather, maintains 
economic and political inequality among members of the polity. And such inequalities derive 
from relations of property.   
For Meiksins-Wood, property was central to how liberal citizenship came to be defined in 
capitalist democracy. Particularly, she was interested in the history of how citizenship has been 
affected because of the expanse of capitalist property relations. She notes that as feudal relations 
gave way to capitalism, property relations were central to that transformation. For instance, as 
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peasants were dispossessed of communal lands, landholding became increasingly concentrated. 
Through the spread of capitalist production and the dispossession of property, the “peasantry 
gave way to large land holders, on the one hand, and propertyless wage laborers, on the other” 
(2016, pp. 210-211). This process isolated individuals previously relying upon communal 
property, now finding themselves as non-property possessing laborers, a process whereby 
individuals became “interchangeable units of labor abstracted from any specific personal or 
social identity” (p. 211). Thus the process of land dispossessions stripped propertyless laborers 
from their political identities once rooted in communal labor.    
Politically, capitalism’s historical isolation of individuals from communal production was 
a means of liberating old political or “‘extra-economic’” identities of the laboring multitude” (p. 
211). The transition from peasant to wage laborer allowed propertyless individuals to become the 
idealized self-owning, liberal individual through their labor. As such, wage-laborers, for the first 
time, finally enter into a “community of citizens,” as wage-laborers came to be seen as free and 
equal, as they embodied liberal subjecthood by “freely” contributing to capitalist relations. 
Wage-laborers were now free to sell their labor in the market but would be left vulnerable 
without political rights to protect them.  
It is in this sense that the spread of capitalism facilitated the extension of political rights 
to the propertyless and wage-laborers. The entrepreneurial republican push for extending 
political rights was premised on the idea that simple proprietary ownership was no longer apt for 
gaining political rights. Through such a perspective, the extension of democratic rights to all 
including the propertyless, all liberal individuals were seen as equals. The spread of democratic 
rights of citizenship appeared to become ubiquitous, therefore, as property qualifications no 
longer constituted one’s political rights.  
76 
 
Through the spread of formal political equality to everyone, Meiksins-Wood argues, 
citizenship was actually devalued rather than enhanced. By providing formal citizenship rights to 
all members of a community, an individuals’ civic status no longer appeared to be predicated on 
class position (2016, 213). The propertyless and wage laborers now had equal rights of 
citizenship to that of the capitalist class. Such a political equality had been previously 
unrecognized.  
For capital, the extension of formal political equality to wage laborers and propertyless 
people was fitting. The relation between capital and labor already presupposed formally free and 
equal individuals; capitalists understood all individuals to be “free” in the sense that all 
individuals were seen to be without prescriptive rights or obligations, without juridical privileges 
or disabilities (Meiksins-Wood 2016, 208). No matter what one’s economic status was, all 
individuals were thought to be free. Individuals were thought to be free to sell their labor on the 
market. Now, with the extension of citizenship rights, wage laborers and propertyless people 
were politically equal as well. The spread of market relations, which expanded citizenship rights, 
thus effectively produced the “detached” or disinterested liberal individual long revered within 
classical republicanism. That is, through the extension of citizenship rights, wage laborers and 
the propertyless emerged as “sovereign individuals” holding equal political rights to those of 
propertied-elites.  
Along with the expansion of citizenship rights, however, was the legal concretization of 
class inequality. With political equality not determined by class, economic inequality became 
more formally acceptable. It is in this sense that Meiksins-Wood argues that democratic 
citizenship was displaced to the purely political sphere. For, the economic relations of capitalism 
were now isolated from political and civil rights. The result of this isolation, she suggests, was 
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that a separate political sphere was created, one “in which ‘extra-economic’—political, juridical, 
military—status had no direct implications for economic power, the power of appropriation, 
exploitation and distribution” (p. 234). The problem then was that new formal political equality 
among classes provided few means for working class citizens to ameliorate a widening wealth 
gap among the polity.  
What Meiksins-Wood describes then is a broader problem for how citizenship is realized 
within liberal, capitalist democracy today. Indeed, the separation of the economic from the 
political within modern democracy presents a paradox for liberal citizenship. As Meiksins-Wood 
explains, within capitalist democracy:  
Socio-economic position does not determine the right to citizenship—and 
that is what is democratic in capitalist democracy—but, since the power of 
the capitalist to appropriate surplus labor of workers is not dependent on a 
privileged juridical or civil status, civic equality does not directly affect or 
significantly modify class inequality—and that is what limits democracy 
in capitalism… In that sense, political equality in capitalist democracy not 
only coexists with socio-economic inequality but leaves it fundamentally 
intact (p. 213, emphasis added). 
Within such a predicament, how can liberal citizenship address the most pressing issues of 
economic inequality, or of economic power within political relations?  
 The devaluing of citizenship, in this way, by isolating it to the political sphere, illustrates 
how property relations were re-valued along with this transition. Property in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries had achieved “a purely ‘economic’ definition, detached from juridical 
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privilege or political power. As such, the extension of formal political rights [left] untouched 
capitalist property relations and the power of appropriation” (Meiksins-Wood 2016, 224). The 
expansion of modern liberal democracy thus relegated property as a relation “outside” of the 
political sphere. This, in turn, liberated the power of property’s economic utility as an 
exchangeable asset. The way in which property was isolated in the economic sphere, argues 
Meiksins-Wood, was through the “separation of and enclosure of the economic sphere and its 
vulnerability to democratic power” (p. 235). The separation of the political from the economic in 
this sense may have presented the propertyless and wage-laborers with newfound political rights, 
rights of liberal citizenship. Such rights, however, could not protect against economic inequities 
of capitalist democracy. The spread of capitalist property relations came to redefine democratic 
notions of equality with liberal individualism.  
 Through an historical understanding of property relations within republican democracy, 
we are better able to see the inequities present within modern liberal citizenship. The notion that 
property is best realized for its exchange potential allows for political relations regarding 
property to appear to be separate from matters of political citizenship. From this contemporary 
perspective, property is a commodity, not a political relation influencing citizenship. Yet, the 
effect of economic valorization of property continues to shape political values of property. The 
appearance of economically and politically distinct spheres that Meiksins-Woods points to is 
particularly problematic for propertyless people. For, although propertyless people retain many 
formal citizenship rights, their personal political rights are not commensurable with the rights of 
propertied-citizens. Given how liberal rights predominantly function, propertyless people are 




The (Negative) Right to Property Insecurity 
Given that liberal citizenship status is no longer contingent upon property requirements, property 
no longer directly defines citizenship status. Regardless of an individual’s propertied wealth or 
holdings, liberal-democracies recognize that all citizens have formally equal rights. However, 
property remains a fundamental component in shaping political life. The predominant way in 
which citizenship remains propertied is through the protection of liberal rights of property. In 
liberal democracies, rights are the tool by which individuals most apparently secure their 
liberties. Individually-protected rights of citizenship, or simply, liberty rights, provide the 
powerful connection between rights of property and citizenship to this day.   
 Protecting liberty is the sine qua non of liberal-democratic institutions. Modern liberal-
democracies protect liberties through individual rights because individuals’ liberty is thought to 
be “maximized” through liberty-rights protections (Shuck 2002). It is in this sense that liberty 
rights help to “defend” individuals from government or citizens’ interference. As such, liberal 
rights are largely understood as “negative” rights in that they afford individuals a right to non-
interference. Put another way, negative rights are a right to an individual’s freedom from 
interference (Jones 1994). Negative rights are the predominant rights “type” in liberal-
democracies because they are bestowed upon individuals, not society at-large. As such, liberty 
rights are easier to maintain and adjudicate among individuals than are collective rights.   
 Because each liberal citizen has formally equal personal or liberty rights within liberal-
democratic society, each liberty right protects individuals from other members of the public or 
from undue government interference. In this way, individual liberty rights are quite durable in 
that individuals are protected in pursuing their own interests. Given that liberty rights are so 
tightly protected, it is difficult to make individual rights commensurable with other rights. In 
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other words, liberty rights so narrowly protect individuals that other individuals’ rights of liberty 
generally cannot override the “strength” of any individuals’ equal rights of liberty. When rights 
are equal in this regard, individual and collective claims against liberty rights can be difficult to 
pursue.  
 That liberty rights are often incommensurable matters when considering property rights 
and relations. While the Constitution does protect citizens’ equal rights to acquire property, 
liberal-democratic institutions do not ensure that individuals will succeed in obtaining any. How 
people gain access or ownership over property is not regulated by government, as “the 
Constitution protects the fruits of one’s labor, market gains, or luck, but it does not provide or 
require the provision of such fruits” (Abraham 1996, 26). As such, the system of negative liberty 
rights underlying the American system of jurisprudence merely protects extant property 
holdings. As Abraham argues, the negative right to have one’s property protected, but no equal 
right to acquire property limits “political authority and the very scope of politics itself… [aiming 
instead] to allow maximum opportunity for individual flourishing” (ibid, 3). Seen through the 
lens of property, negative rights strongly protect individual property rights as the means of 
securing the “fruits” of an individual’s labor.          
  In that property is legally protected as a liberty right, property rights maintain political 
inequalities among citizens. Those lacking ownership of, or even simply access to, property, 
within a system of “property-based individualism” are denied equal protection of life and liberty 
in many circumstances. For that reason, the protection of individualized rights to property 
reinforces an “authoritative form through which certain values become natural, common sense” 
(Abraham 1996, 8). As Blomley (2004) and others point out, the traditional ownership model of 
property is valued above other forms of property or resource uses, such as commonly held 
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properties or indigenous uses of land. Rights protections use law to uphold values that derive 
from long-held understandings about property and its proper uses.  
But so too does the legal protection of property establish economic inequalities. 
Protecting property as a negative right (against others) enables the ability of individuals to 
generate wealth and accumulate propertied assets. This of course is how and where most 
individuals hold their wealth: in property. But when property owners use those properties to 
disadvantage others, through exclusion or other externalities to the public, rights are the barrier 
preventing property insecure people from contesting such harms. The “neutral” position of law 
is, therefore, complicit in maintaining property inequities. Government abstains from intervening 
in people’s pursuits of acquiring property by protecting individuals’ negative rights to non-
interference. The neutral position of the state in this sense permits wealth disparities rooted in 
property relations.   
The legal neutrality of negative liberty protections of property become a mechanism 
against and through which propertyless people must work to realize certain freedoms. For 
property insecure people, simply having a liberty right to acquire property does not afford an 
individual actual property. Rather, such a liberty right merely suggests there is opportunity to 
have one’s property protected if they should happen to obtain it. The protections of property 
cannot protect what propertyless people do not have. Thus as Abraham (1996) notes, “negative 
liberty… is good provided you have cash” (p. 63). And so too are liberty rights “good” for 
protecting property if one has property to protect in the first place.  
The prioritization of liberty rights within liberal-democracies distinguishes property as a 
primary component of democratic citizenship. In the U.S. particularly, liberal rights of property 
ownership have come to define “the elements of model citizenship,” a model of citizenship “put 
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forth as worthy of emulation outside of Western liberal contexts” (Roy 2003, 464). The notion of 
the “American dream,” most notably, is explicitly premised on the ownership of property and 
implicitly on the rights that protect such investments. Without secure interests in property, such a 
model of liberal, propertied-citizenship becomes particularly difficult for houseless people to 
endure. It is to the struggles of the property insecure that I turn in the final section of this chapter.  
Houselessness and the Properties of Citizenship 
Having access to space is necessary for sustaining biophysical necessities of life. Life-sustaining 
actions are made increasingly more difficult when restrictions on accessing property are placed 
upon a given space. The production of property is a process by which seemingly neutral space is 
legally bounded through ownership rights via titling. By bounding and titling real spaces, 
property is presented as something “fixed, natural and objective” within space (Blomley 2004). 
Property, therefore, becomes identifiable by who “owns” it, by who has legal rights to control 
how this space is accessed and used. This process is how systems of liberal property determine 
ownership rights over propertied-spaces. For houseless people, the legal regulation of property 
limits acts of social reproduction to almost no publicly-available spaces.    
For many cities, rights of property are used as tools to police the houseless and maintain 
urban spaces devoid of houselessness. One recent survey tracking houselessness policies of the 
United States’ 187 largest cities found that laws criminalizing houselessness have increased over 
the last decade. Tracking how cities regulate commonplace actions of houseless people, for 
instance, the survey found that 47% of cities ban “sitting or lying down” in public spaces, an 
increase of 52% over the last decade; 32% of cities prohibit “loitering, loafing, and vagrancy” 
city-wide, an increase of 88% over the last decade; and 18% of cities prohibit “sleeping in 
public” city-wide, an increase of 31% from 2006 to 2016 (NLCHP 2016, 23-24). Such laws 
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inhibit life-sustaining activities without providing solutions for the underlying issues producing 
houselessness. Such laws, therefore, simply allow for police and other quasi-public entities to 
enforce strict spatial legislation that pushes houseless people out of public properties.  
 As argued in Chapter 1, houselessness scholarship on property has primarily focused on 
how property rights are used as tools of exclusion. Such work gets us closer to seeing how 
property is dialectically related to citizenship by showing us how houseless people can be 
marginalized from the public and thus lose certain freedoms central to citizenship. Notable 
among this literature is the work of legal scholar Jeremy Waldron. Waldron (1990) suggests that 
“the connection… between liberty and independence and the idea of private property helps 
explain the view, common until the middle of last century, that the ownership of property was an 
indispensable qualification for citizenship and for the franchise" (p. 300).  
Contemporarily, however, the idea that independence derives from property has shifted in 
meaning. Now the liberal notion of independence given through rights of property connotes 
something more akin to that of negative freedom, or one’s right to not be interfered with. For 
Waldron (1993), the most pressing issue for houseless people relates to the ways in which 
property restricts freedom. Negative rights of property seemingly afford owners absolute control 
over their property, a right protected by the government but at the same time protected from the 
government. Property rights, within the lens of negative liberty rights, function by protecting 
owners from houseless people’s “interference” on their properties. This includes overseers of 
public properties as well. The negative right securing owners’ right to exclude provides a 
powerful means of regulating people within space.  
It is in this sense that Waldron suggests liberal property systems work against the 
houseless. People without access to or ownership of property in this liberal property system are 
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easily excluded from space, leaving people few-to-no places to legally be. The legal system of 
property rights, Waldon argues, establishes a set of rules that “provide freedom and prosperity 
for some by imposing restrictions on others” (1993, 337). As such, liberal property systems 
protecting private ownership rights restrict the freedom of property insecure people. Whereas 
once property ownership constituted a sense of independence and aptitude for self-governing 
citizenship, property now exudes merely a right to not be interfered with by other citizens or the 
state.     
Property ownership and the legal regulation of property therefore produce a geography of 
limitations for houseless people. As Mitchell (1997) has shown, such legal restrictions on 
property shape citizenship for the houseless. For instance, anti-houseless laws, he argues, 
regulate the public to the point “that there literally is no room for homeless people, [which] 
recreates the public sphere as intentionally exclusive, as a sphere in which the legitimate public 
only includes those who… have a place governed by private property rules to call their own” (p. 
321). Ownership rights of property are merely the tool through which to exclude houseless 
people from spaces. But by enacting these tools of spatial regulation, however, rights of property 
define who constitutes “the public.”  
What Waldron, Mitchell and others are pointing to is how houseless people exist in a 
“negative” relation to property. That is, how it is that houseless people are excluded from public 
and private spaces because of the way in which negative liberty rights provide owners with 
highly-protected powers of exclusion. In a strict legal sense, people insecure in their interests of 
landed property—the houseless—can only be in a negative relation to those who possess secure 
interests and thus rights of property. Thus, for Waldron, private rights of property limit freedom 
by preventing for houseless people the agency of choosing where they may want to occupy 
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space. The act of exclusion makes houseless people unfree. And for Mitchell, not only do 
property regulations exclude houseless people from spaces necessary for their survival. Owning 
and controlling access over property also bestows property rights-holders with the power to 
define who it is that may become a member of “the public.” In short, the negative rights of 
property constitute who is defined as a proper liberal citizen, who, in Waldron’s terms, may be 
able to enjoy their personal rights to freedom.      
The legal geography of property ownership thus inhibits houseless people from enjoying 
liberal citizenship more broadly. The geographies of such a legal paradigm of propertied-
citizenship underscore how the very elements of model liberal citizenship are realized in places. 
It is a paradigm recognizing only “formal rights of property,” which in turn marginalizes 
houseless people’s claims to shelter and space that are made outside of these formal legal rights 
(Roy 2003). It is in this sense that Roy (2003, 464) suggests that, within the American paradigm 
of propertied-citizenship, those who do not meet its propertied mandates are “rendered marginal 
in the discourse and practices of citizenship” more broadly. From this perspective, houseless 
people cannot enjoy full rights of citizenship, as the negative liberties secured by owning 
property delineate who may access or realize the privileges and protections of liberal citizenship. 
Such analyses show us how law limits human mobility and security, thereby connecting 
how houseless people are limited in their rights of citizenship based on property exclusions. But 
such legal geographies do not exhaust the ways in which we can examine property’s effect on 
houseless people. Research examining rights of exclusion situate houseless peoples’ experiences 
largely within a negative relation to property. Yet, such an approach tells us less about property 
as a relation itself. That is, it tells us less about how citizenship has been produced through the 
values of property and how those values affect houseless people. 
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Seeing houseless people only within a negative relation to property leaves us primarily 
with an understanding of the inadequacies of liberal or common law. These insights no doubt 
provide a foundation through which to better understand how property operates legally. But 
property, we have seen, is more than strictly a legal system of rights backed by liberal-
democratic institutions. Property is also a relationship among individuals and society that is 
moderated through law. The social and moral values invested in liberal rights and law are co-
produced; law does not write and enforce itself. There are normative social values embedded 
within property, deriving from both historical and contemporary relations surrounding property.  
When we do not see property also as a social system of values and relations we risk 
overlooking how property affects the houseless as well as the housed. A relational or dialectical 
analysis of the changing values of property over time helps us see how property shapes “proper” 
democratic citizenship and why this matters particularly for houseless people. It helps us see how 
the processes producing property have created “permanences” representing particular values 
inherent within the proper socio-political order. The permanences maintained in property values 
then help us to see the contradictions of extending formal citizenship to those without secure 
interest in property and how this effects houseless people today.   
Property ownership, as we’ve also seen, once defined the proper socio-political order 
within republican-democracy. Ownership represented the very capacity for independence and 
thus to be self-governing, a notion of property-as-propriety. But as the valuation of property 
came to emphasize its exchange potential, property-as-commodity, the political values of 
property changed too. No longer did property constitute merely a capacity for self-governance 
and enable citizens the natural ability to make decisions for the public good, though these values 
are still idealized in property ownership. Now, property ownership appears to demonstrate the 
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ability of individuals to “earn,” for citizens to show their independence and fitness for 
democratic contribution through their labor. In this way, property still mediates citizenship 
today, though the values attached to property have changed, by separating capitalist relations of 
property from the reach of political rights of citizenship. These changes in values have been 
central to how property has and continues to influence the ideals of liberal citizenship.    
Analyzing property and citizenship dialectically helps us see the stability through which 
property influences values of liberal citizenship and how citizenship is dependent on property to 
be realized. Understanding how the values of citizenship are co-produced along with those of 
property is critical for better understanding the plight of houseless people within liberal-
democracies. For, as I argued earlier, the liberal-democratic model of propertied-citizenship 
maintains a limited citizenship for people without property. Examining how property relations 
produce and moderate citizenship prior to, and in concert with, the state in regulating property 
allows us to better understand in what ways property limits citizenship for those seen as outside 
of the proper socio-economic order. Despite the changes in property’s material value, property’s 
core values of liberty and independence continue to demarcate citizenship, not only as a status, 
but as a social standing. It is in this sense that I argue property resides at the core of citizenship 
identities more broadly.  
It is necessary therefore to show how the dialectical relationship between property and 
citizenship matters to houseless people as experienced by them. The following two chapters 
attempt to provide insight to the contradictions of property insecure citizens within the model of 
propertied-citizenship. Chapter 3 uses examples, primarily from Hazelnut Grove, to demonstrate 
how particular values of property, that of self-ownership through earning, are upheld through 
property relations surrounding self-governing encampments today. Chapter 4 demonstrates the 
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necessary limitations of encampment resident’s citizenship rights, a right of citizenship limited 
by the structure of property rights and relations established around the unique situations of 
encampments. These case studies show us the everyday ways in which the very liberal tenets of 
citizenship are realized through property relations, relations with multiple consequences for 
houseless people that require us to see how property produces the “proper” political order still 
















Chapter 3: Preserving the Values of Propertied-Citizenship 
Tucked-in against the bluffs of Portland’s Overlook neighborhood sits the self-managed 
houseless encampment Hazelnut Grove (H.G.). H.G. has been at this site since late summer, 
2015. The space is heavily-shaded in the summer and relatively exposed during Portland’s rainy 
winters. To the north of the site is an embankment creating a natural barrier to the backside of 
the site (Figure 1). Facing south, the encampment overlooks the Willamette River with a view of 
downtown and the westside neighborhoods rising into the hills. Lying between two major 
roadways, and up slope from the Union Pacific railyards and a maze of raised highway onramps, 
H.G. feels isolated from much of the city despite being sited centrally within it.  
 
Figure 6. Looking South over Hazelnut Grove from the top of the bluff. 
 
 H.G. is geographically central within the city’s landscape, but so too is it located at the 
heart of Portland’s socio-political struggle over organized houseless encampments. H.G. began 
somewhat organically, as a loosely affiliated group of individuals protesting in front of City Hall 
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during the summer of 2015. The protestors were mostly houseless people, advocating for greater 
housing affordability in a city experiencing rapid population growth, large-scale developments, 
and rising rents and housing prices. A few of those protestors were connected with individuals 
who had been sleeping on-and-off at the site where H.G. eventually would be formed. After the 
protest was swept from City Hall, some of the protestors began camping at the H.G. site. From 
September to early December of 2015, the site grew from a few individuals to around 70 people 
(Theen 2015). The group became so large that a second camp was formed; the second 
encampment—Forgotten Realms—eventually moved to a separate location and would disband 
within a year. As the more organized of the two camps, H.G. found favor with the mayor and his 
staff. Then-mayor Charlie Hales visited H.G. that fall with his staff and expressed admiration for 
what H.G. was attempting to do through its organizing. Despite the mayor’s rhetorical support, 
however, the City never officially sanctioned the encampment and it has continued operating 
without a permit to this day.14 
 H.G. has been able to operate without an official permit for a few different reasons. 
Primary among them is that Portland, like many U.S. west coast cities, declared a state of 
emergency for housing and homelessness (S.O.E.) in October 2015. The S.O.E. was declared in 
recognition of the city’s growing crisis of housing affordability and due to the rise in the 
unsheltered houseless population. While the S.O.E. had different intentions, notably for the 
purposes of this research, it allowed for, if not encouraged, self-governing houseless 
encampments to operate on municipal property. 15 The City allowed for encampments to 
 
14 In March 2020, Hazelnut Grove signed an agreement to move to church property in North Portland. In doing so, 
the encampment will be permitted to operate through a private landlord. 
15 The City’s housing and homelessness state of emergency was implemented in different stages. In February 2016, 
a set of wildly controversial policies were implemented known as the “Safe Sleep” initiative. The City allowed 
houseless people four options for “safe” sleep through this policy. The first and second options expanded shelter 
services and allowed RV owners to sleep in their vehicles. The third and fourth drew the most public ire. The third 
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establish themselves because it recognized that many houseless people simply had nowhere to 
go. What the S.O.E. did for the City is allow it to ease zoning restrictions that would have 
otherwise prevented temporary shelter accommodations for encampments. H.G. continues to 
exist then because the City has extended the S.O.E. each year since it was declared, thereby 
maintaining the easements on zoning which allow the encampment to operate there.    
 But H.G. also exists today because it has been remarkably active in its organizing. It 
operates with a code of conduct which provides a set of encampment rules residents must abide 
by; it has created an extensive set of bylaws through which the group governs its operations and 
grounds some of its decisions; and it now enjoys registered 501c3 status. Above all, the 
individuals comprising the encampment are incredibly adept at building up the different pieces 
of infrastructure needed on the site, such as sleeping pods, a kitchen, and a commons area, all 
from donated materials (Figure 2). 
 
option allowed for individuals to occupy sidewalks (while adhering to the City’s sidewalk management plan) 
throughout the day, but they could do so with only a sleeping bag or tarp, not with a tent or larger structure. At 
night, from 9pm to 7am, individuals could erect tents on public rights-of-way or “remnant” municipal property. 
Individuals were instructed to sleep with six or fewer tents in one location, presumably to avoid growing into a 
larger camp. Tents were then to be taken down at 7am and any remaining garbage was to be cleared out. The 
fourth option was the most controversial and most pertinent to this chapter. Option four allowed for organized, 
sanctioned encampments on City-owned property. Sanctioned encampments were expected to partner with a 
local non-profit which had experience in service provision, to serve as a point of contact for the City. Sanctioned 
encampments were to establish and follow a “code of conduct” and the sites would have City-provided portable 
restrooms and sanitation (VanderHart, 2016). The guidelines implied that sanctioned encampments were to run 




Figure 7. Centered in this picture is the H.G. commons, with a pantry and a tool shed to its sides, and 
tiny homes in the background. 
 
The group has also been quite active in neighborhood politics. Despite backlash from 
some neighbors and the neighborhood association, the encampment has persevered through these 
tensions by seeking to promote the encampment’s peaceful integration into the neighborhood. 
The encampment has worked closely with the City since its inception, the result of which is City 
funding for basic sanitation services, such as port-o-potty servicing, trash collection, and rental 
of a security fence that bounds the site. It has proved capable of managing its own affairs while 
being accountable to the basic requirements of the City government.  
 That H.G. exists today is impressive given the opposition to the encampment let alone the 
extremely arduous work it takes to maintain such a community. Many individual residents of the 
Overlook neighborhood, as well as the neighborhood association itself, have been hostile to the 
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encampment’s presence since day one. H.G. has weathered a flurry of complaints contesting its 
rights to locate on its site. The complaints emanating from the neighborhood, depicted 
throughout this chapter, illustrate how deeply social values of property are embedded in 
everyday practices of, and political negotiation over, citizenship. The neighborhood’s grievances 
reflect not just that houseless people have no legal right to organize themselves on this specific 
site. The complaints also express moral objections to houseless ways of life, objections reflecting 
long-held values about what constitutes proper forms of citizenship within a liberal democracy.  
As the case of H.G. will show, “propertied-citizenship” is a socio-legal process defining 
how citizenship can be practiced in geographical space. But propertied-citizenship is also a 
socio-political process of value judgements that defines how citizenship ought to be practiced, a 
relational process demarcating “proper” citizens from those aberrating from the normative values 
grounded within liberal property relations.  
Positioning Portland’s Encampments 
While the H.G. case is indicative of how propertied-citizenship mediates houseless life, it is not 
the only self-governing encampment in the city. H.G. is one of five organized encampments in 
Portland today that are officially recognized by the city’s government.16 Among the others, most 
prominent is Dignity Village (DV), perhaps the longest running self-governing houseless 
encampment in the country. DV began as a protest in downtown Portland in the early 2000s. 
 
16There are many possible distinctions to be made between “organized” and “unorganized” encampments. But the 
nuances are impossible to completely describe. For my purposes herein, “organized” encampments are those 
houseless communities that are recognized by the City and are either officially permitted to be on municipal 
property or are simply tolerated by the City to be on a given property. Organized encampments operate with codes 
of conduct and generally have more formal infrastructure than unorganized groups. “Unorganized” encampments, 
on the other hand, are groups co-locating for safety, with individuals mostly living within single tents nearby one 
another. Unorganized camps are not sanctioned or tolerated by the City and will often be swept by the police or the 
Department of Transportation within a relatively short period of time. 
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Since 2003, it has been operating on City-owned property adjacent to the airport on the far north 
east side of the city. Not until after the 2008-2009 recession did more groups begin to make 
claims to space in the city. In 2011, Right 2 Dream Too (R2DT) began operating on a vacant lot 
on the edge of the downtown business district and was centrally located at the heart of Portland’s 
social services nexus. R2DT has since moved to a municipal property on the other side of the 
river from downtown and uniquely is permitted to operate as an overnight shelter as well. Kenton 
Women’s Village (KWV) opened on the city’s far north side in the summer of 2017 as a City-
sponsored pilot project created especially for women. Finally, the residents of Agape Village 
(AV) on Portland’s outer eastside began constructing their village in the summer of 2018 on 
church property adjacent to the I-205 beltway. Although other groups have attempted to establish 
organized encampments throughout the city during the S.O.E., all others have been dismantled 
by the City.  
 Each of these encampments has experienced similar struggles throughout their 
development but in many ways their struggles are unique to the encampments themselves. DV, 
for instance, has little to no pushback from neighbors (there are none, really) or the City. 
Therefore, based on how active the encampments are with neighborhood and citywide politics, I 
worked to varying degrees with each of the five encampments throughout my period of 
fieldwork (see my methodological appendix). So, for example, because AV was just beginning to 
“put the village together” when I was finishing my fieldwork, I did not have an opportunity to 
interview any members. My experience with AV thus came through attending early planning 
meetings and later through construction efforts in helping to build tiny houses on the site. My 
work with DV and KWV was different than that of AV. In these two encampments, I 
interviewed residents about their experiences with houselessness and about their experiences 
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with and observations on participating in self-governance. At DV, I attended bi-monthly general 
assembly meetings to observe the encampment’s self-governing processes.  
My work with R2DT was somewhat different again from the previous three. There I 
interviewed resident members, attended weekly general assembly meetings, and I volunteered by 
doing security shifts and general labor. Because R2DT is the only encampment that also operates 
an overnight shelter which is run by resident members, I was able to spend a significant amount 
of time there learning about the process of running a low-barrier shelter. By spending my time at 
R2DT in this way, I met and spoke informally with hundreds of individuals experiencing 
houselessness throughout the city.  
 Nowhere was I more involved among all the encampments than at H.G. There I 
interviewed members about their experiences with houselessness and their self-governance 
model. I attended H.G.’s weekly general assembly meetings to observe the decision-making 
process. Over time, I was invited to show up unannounced and was able to let myself in. Partly I 
did this knowing that residents would be around to talk with. But mostly, I would stop by to help 
with whatever ongoing project there was; moving wood, stripping nails, cleaning, painting, etc.  
Nearing the end of my fieldwork, and with H.G.’s permission, I began attending the 
groups’ meetings with the new City-County initiative, the Joint Office of Homeless Services 
(JOHS) regarding the camp’s relocation.17 Attending these meetings gave me a unique 
opportunity to see how local government works with the self-governing encampments. The City 
 
17 The “City” refers to the government of the City of Portland. The “County” refers to the government of 
Multnomah County. As part of the S.O.E. in 2015, the City and County established the Joint Office of Homeless 
Services (JOHS) to streamline the two government entities’ services and funding for houselessness initiatives. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I spoke with staff at the City and at Joint, as both government entities have staff working 
on houselessness.   
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and JOHS both work with each of the encampments, but to varying degrees. DV, for example 
has been operating so long that there is little need for City involvement whereas KWV is a pilot 
project facilitated by the City.   
As H.G. is the one encampment operating without a permit, it is in the most precarious 
legal standing. Because of this, the chapter predominantly reflects events surrounding H.G. After 
reviewing my field notes from meetings and site visits; reviewing and coding my interview 
transcripts with residents, neighbors of the encampment and City and JOHS staff; and drawing 
from media accounts of the encampment’s history, I found that much of the content that best 
illustrates the way in which property relations affect houseless people’s citizenship are presented 
through H.G.’s experience.  
The chapter draws from my fieldwork experiences to show how the values attached to 
property are produced and maintained through the lens of liberal citizenship. Primarily detailing 
the case of H.G., I emphasize the ways in which property owners neighboring H.G. as well as the 
City of Portland reinforce liberal property norms to the detriment of houseless encampment 
residents. I do so by focusing on the everyday relations between H.G., its neighbors and 
neighborhood association, and with the City and County entities working with these groups. I 
demonstrate how H.G.’s use of property is about more than simply a right to use property. I 
argue that the conflict over H.G. is also about houseless peoples’ struggles for citizenship. Who 
gets to use property and how that property is used, is filtered through normative understandings 
of liberal citizenship, norms which assume that houseless residents fall short of proper 
democratic participation. What follows describes how these liberal values are advanced to 




Delegitimizing Houseless Citizenship 
Residents of Portland’s houseless encampments are “property-insecure” citizens in that their 
rights to control access over property are restricted. That is, encampments do not have secure 
interests rights to a property. This differs from owners and renters of property, who hold legal 
rights through contracts to control, at the very least, who can be on or within a given property. It 
is through the term property-insecure that I suggest we are better able to see the plight of 
houseless people’s struggle in Portland’s encampments and elsewhere. For, houseless citizens 
hold equal political rights to those of property owners (under the law), but do not hold equal 
rights of property. It is property, then, that most immediately limits citizenship for houseless 
people, I argue, not the social stigmatization stemming from a lack property that a “second-class” 
designation connotes.18  
  As mentioned, H.G. has been contentious in Portland since it began operating. Upon 
H.G.’s arrival in the neighborhood in 2015, the Overlook Neighborhood Association (OKNA) as 
well as individuals residing within the neighborhood have taken different steps to remove H.G. 
from its site. One common narrative of neighborhood residents addresses the legality of H.G. 
One neighborhood homeowner stated that “as a whole, [OKNA] as a neighborhood was against 
[H.G.] because it is an illegal dwelling, an illegal taking of property.” Another neighborhood 
homeowner similarly stated that he was “not a big fan of people living just wherever they want.” 
 
18 The idea of second-class citizenship connotes that there are specific groups of people that, while holding full 
formal citizenship, have some of their rights restricted on account of those group differences (Eisenberg and 
Leonard 2018). Some suggest that the houseless are exemplary of second-class citizenship status (Feldman 2004, 
p. 18). Arnold suggests (2004) that once citizenship is extended to everyone within the borders of a nation-state, 
then the houseless will have full citizenship. This may be true in abstraction. But if property continues to mediate 
citizenship, as I suggest it does, then it is property that must be extended to houseless people. A “second-class” 
designation does not capture the reality of limited citizenship for houseless people because of how rights of 
citizenship are restricted by property.  
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Instead, he noted, “there are places for that. Shelters and things.” For many OKNA members, the 
assumed illegality of the encampment met with presumptions about what the proper form a 
houseless sheltering space ought to take.  
To the extent that the public property on which H.G. operated was seen as illegal, so too 
were the residents occupying it seen as illegitimate. One homeowner stated that “[H.G.] is a 
bunch of homeless guys that threw up a neighborhood, uh, that threw up a little encampment, 
then had activists show up and propose the self-governance and all that.” Another neighborhood 
resident noted how members at OKNA meetings articulated that H.G. was “not a good spot 
because there is an uptick in property crime and [that] it must be related.” Similarly, another 
neighborhood resident worried that they “don’t happen to know how many criminals are down 
there. And that’s a big issue for the neighborhood.” Another homeowner in the neighborhood 
claimed that “These people [Hazelnut residents] have no intention of [moving on]. I’ve met these 
people at our neighborhood meetings,” she said. And “they are quite content to live forever, do 
whatever the hell they want. Work if they want, not work if they want.” OKNA homeowner 
narratives on H.G. therefore suggested that because the encampment residents were using 
property in a non-traditional manner, that function followed form, by influencing the imaginaries 
about the criminality and apparent laziness of people who were residing at the site.  
It is important to note that not all Overlook neighborhood homeowners opposed H.G. 
One neighborhood homeowner, for instance, stated that H.G. felt “like a practical, if inelegant, 
solution to just getting people into safe living situations when there isn’t enough permanent 
housing for people. The [self-governing encampment] is a concept that people really like. So I 
think that if we normalize it… I think it is good for people to humanize the situation.” Another 
homeowner stated that she felt like H.G. “made a lot of sense where is located. People were 
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camping down there anyway,” she said. “It felt like having some organizational oversight felt 
great to me. And then I realized that the neighborhood association wasn’t reflecting any of these 
feelings that I had.” One neighborhood homeowner even stated he thought that H.G. had “the 
right to be there.” “In a general sense,” he said, “I support them to do what it takes to live down 
there. I am more interested in the collaboration of a community” than bringing an eviction upon 
the encampment.  
 Despite rhetorical support for H.G.’s existence, many Overlook neighbors suggested that 
the site H.G. was located at was not the right site in the end. The “right” of H.G. to be on the 
property became a central point of concern for OKNA shortly after H.G. moved in. The property 
on which H.G. sits is currently owned by the City of Portland. But when H.G. first occupied the 
vacant site the lot was owned by the State’s Department of Transportation. Shortly after H.G. 
occupied the site in 2015, the City was able to negotiate a sale transferring the property from the 
State to the City. It was critical that the City took ownership over the property if H.G. was to be 
able to remain on site. For, the City then would have the authority to protect H.G. and allow its 
residents to stay despite the encampment not having an official land use agreement.  
What upset OKNA was not that the City acquired the land from the State. Rather, OKNA 
took issue with the legality of using public land to shelter people. As one resident of the 
neighborhood noted, the S.O.E. seemed more like a public statement of awareness about 
houselessness than it did a legal justification for letting encampments operate. Because of this, he 
said, the City seemed to be “writing itself a free pass and was attempting to, carte blanche, waive 
a lot of [zoning] protections” to accommodate houseless encampments. A sense of a “free pass” 
was noted by several neighbors who saw H.G. as wrongfully occupying the site. This was partly 
because of the openness of the S.O.E. But so too did many homeowners feel the encampment 
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was taking over public property, property that was not H.G.’s but everyone’s. “Hazelnut Grove is 
there illegally,” one neighbor stated to me. “I don’t think it is right for the City to turn over 
publicly held property to the homeless camp. It belongs to all of Portland.” In this sense, H.G. 
was thought to be “taking” from, not giving to, the public.  
Some OKNA neighbors therefore felt, by using the property for their encampment, that 
H.G. was actively denying something to the public. One homeowner even suggested a certain 
sense of violence in H.G.’s occupation of the property. H.G. is “no different than the Malheur 
occupation,” he said. “It is the exact same philosophy. [The thinking that goes] ‘this is public 
land. Let us do what we think is best with it. We don’t need your society’s views with what 
should be done with it.’ And whether you are carrying around an M-16 on Malheur, or planting a 
garden at Hazelnut, you still have to abide by societal norms and requirements.”19 For these 
neighborhood residents, H.G. represented an aberration from how public property is distinct 
from private property. As if a commitment to proper citizenship was being abandoned, a “social 
pact” being broken, houseless residents were seen as without authority to manage the space of 
the encampment. 
Arguments that H.G. was illegal were commonplace. But the arguments of those 
opposing H.G. exceeded the realm of law alone. Moral objections were made by homeowners 
underscoring how liberal values of citizenship were assumed in matters of property use. Some 
H.G. neighbors, for instance, felt that encampment residents were not contributing equally to 
 
19 This person was referring to the Malheur County Wildlife Refuge occupation of 2016, a militant take-over of a 
State wildlife refuge in sparsely-populated southeastern Oregon. The similarity between H.G. occupying a vacant 
piece of government property on the side of a road and the violent takeover of a wildlife refuge, to my eye, stops 
at the act of physical occupation. The City of Portland allowed for H.G. to be there. The State of Oregon, FBI, and 
other interested governments parties did not want the libertarian Malheur occupiers to be there. Certainly, the 
Malheur occupation provides fascinating insight into epistemologies of property ownership and the role of the 
state in that ownership. 
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society. One neighbor of H.G. stated that “it wasn’t fair” that individuals “are able to say ‘I am 
homeless, I don’t have to pay for property and be part of it all.’” What is not fair, he suggested, is 
that houseless people “take advantage of the situation and are not playing by the rules. Can they 
just continue to live free?” he asked. Another neighborhood resident opposing H.G. was more 
direct about her feelings of unfairness regarding the encampments’ use of municipal property. “I 
have property because I purchased property,” she argued. “If you want to rent property, you can 
rent property. But just being a human being does not give you a right to property. You have to 
pay for it in some manner. Just the fact that you are human does not mean that you have a right 
to squat on land. No, not in this country.” For these property owners, included within the “social 
pact” of liberal citizenship is an economic obligation for all individuals to “earn” their way in 
life. Implied in the above comments is that people fulfill their citizenship not only through 
working hard so they can buy or rent property. They also become deserving of liberal citizenship 
through the act of laboring itself. In that H.G. residents were not paying to use their property they 
were seen to be violating fundamental duties required of proper citizenship.  
 For many homeowners, then, the encampments were “anti-democratic,” as one neighbor 
put it, because they took public property away from society. The notion that one is a responsible 
citizen only when one pays for property was widespread among neighborhood residents. As the 
chair of OKNA observed, there was an “element among a lot of the neighbors… suggesting that 
‘[H.G.] is illegally occupying a piece of land. I am paying property taxes. You’re not paying 
property taxes. Why can’t you follow the law?’” In these residents’ eyes, then, there was a sense 
of unfairness that H.G. was not upholding broader citizenship responsibilities.  
Property owners opposing the encampment felt that it is unjust for H.G. residents to hold 
equal rights to use property because they were not paying for property. Nor did they believe the 
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property was rightly H.G.’s to use because it was “public” property. Such judgements of value 
about who deserves to use property iteratively shape how Portlanders think about the legality of 
encampments. Despite H.G.’s ability to be there because of its support from the City, the values 
of propertied-citizenship espoused by neighbors work in tandem with the language of illegality 
to influence how we understand houseless people as unequal in standing compared to those of 
propertied citizens. 
Institutionalizing Property’s Values 
Normative valuations about the appropriate use of property are not isolated to the expectations of 
individual homeowners. These values are reinforced through local government approaches to 
managing houselessness as well. How these values are reinforced institutionally, however, is not 
as straightforward. In fact, for the most part, the staff I spoke with at the City and Joint Office of 
Homeless Services (JOHS) support the self-governing encampments. As the JOHS director 
recognized, there is “something very empowering about the self-governance model… That kind 
of self-efficacy, that sense of belonging, all of those things are really powerful contributors for 
people to reestablish themselves after a period of homelessness.” The City and JOHS in fact 
view self-governing villages as supplements to traditional shelters and work with encampments 
in this capacity.  
Government support necessitates institutional constraints for encampments, however. As 
the JOHS director went on to say, “if it is shelter, and if it is part of our response, then the village 
has to be part of the [housing] continuum. And it has to be a partner in the system.” And this can 
be challenging for encampments, he said, because “some of the villages will spring up and 
organize themselves in opposition to the system. [But] to get the support and sanction of the 
local government, there has to be this willingness to be a part of this system.” To be part of “the 
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system,” encampments sign conditional use agreements to use the municipal property and abide 
by certain stipulations in order to receive support from government. For instance, most 
encampments have signed use of space agreements which designate a list of legal requirements 
the encampments must adhere to as parties legally responsible for maintaining the site. Breaking 
the terms of these land use contracts could result in the City disbanding the encampments.  
The City and JOHS are less concerned with how a group like H.G. organizes itself 
internally in order to receive funding. Instead, government weighs its support for encampments 
by analyzing the benefit of funding this type of shelter. “We don’t just give somebody land 
because they ask for it” the JOHS director said. “We say, ‘what service are you offering that the 
community will benefit [from] in exchange for what you are asking?” Similarly the mayor’s 
senior policy advisor said that the City supports encampments when it can. But, he said, “it goes 
back to a question of where the dollars are best spent. Am I going to put my time in creating 
another 14-person village, or a 120-person shelter? It’s a question of priority… [encampments] 
can be a lower cost option. But again, they do come with other limitations.” Government support 
for the encampments therefore is measured through cost-benefit analyses concerned with what 
social and economic impact they bring as a service.   
Whether government can afford to sanction and fund encampments depends upon having 
available land to do so. “Land availability. We don’t just have land,” the mayor’s senior advisor 
said. “Despite properties looking empty, there are specific uses for City properties.” And even if 
a municipal property is potentially available for use, it also matters how that property is zoned. It 
must be zoned appropriately for human habitation. Many of the City-owned properties are not 
zoned to accommodate the infrastructures common to the encampments. In short, government 
calculates whether spending the money to sanction, potentially rezone, and then fund basic 
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services for encampments is the best use of funds to alleviate houselessness. Encampments make 
only a minor dent in Portland’s houseless population needing shelter.  
Limited City funding restricts how many encampments the City will sanction and 
support. But self-managed encampments that “spring up in opposition to the system” will also be 
denied conditional-use agreements for a socio-political reason: because of how local government 
structures pathways for houseless people to become stabilized. Houseless people seeking 
government support in obtaining longer-term housing begin their transition through a “housing 
continuum.” The idea here is that when houseless people come “off of the street” and get into 
government-funded shelters or encampments, they progress along a path towards eventually 
leaving that system. Perhaps they will end up staying in temporary housing for 3-9 months 
before leaving the system and obtain traditional housing, such as an apartment or rental house. 
Such a process is what government necessitates houseless people go through to become housed. 
That houseless people go through this potentially years-long process is not necessarily an 
issue for many houseless people relying on government support to find stable housing. Instead, 
the critical issue for formerly houseless people who leave the system is that they enter back in to 
the private market for housing. It is expected that formerly houseless people will rent apartments 
or single-family homes. This is problematic in that the majority of housing in the U.S. is 
obtained through the private market; there is almost no public housing available in the U.S. any 
longer (Cooper and Gowan, 2019). For individuals with little to no income, affording housing 
even when it is highly subsidized by the federal government can be difficult. Especially in cities 
where rents are increasing, affording rent for simple “efficiency suites” or one-bedroom 
apartments remains challenging.  
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Affording market-rates for housing is becoming harder to do for many city dwellers 
across the U.S., let alone for the houseless. Nearly all individuals in Portland’s encampments I 
spoke with are formerly renters or even owners of property. Many mentioned that they were 
houseless simply because they could not afford the rent. Equally problematic is that when 
houseless individuals are fortunate enough to get a year-long subsidized apartment through a 
local housing agency, that one year is often not long enough to become economically stable, let 
alone physically or emotionally stable, depending on one’s situation. Economic precarity 
remains a significant problem even when individuals get back into housing.  
With few available public-housing options and with waitlists for affordable housing 
sometimes stretching-on for years in Portland (Home Forward 2019), houseless individuals 
relying upon government support to become stably-housed must return to the system of 
privatized housing. Therefore, regardless of whether government staff support the practices and 
vision of self-governing encampments, returning to property or becoming “propertied” is 
structured into government support of houseless people. In this way, local government reinforces 
the propertied-citizen as the valued citizen, idealizing the economically-independent citizen as its 
end goal. Certainly it is hoped that houseless people can become economically stable. It becomes 
much harder to become stable for formerly houseless individuals, however, when disparities in 
the housing market force individuals back into precarious housing situations or when there is no 
housing at all.  
Whereas property owners more explicitly and directly uphold liberal norms of citizenship 
by condemning how encampment residents’ use property, government indirectly maintains the 
values of propertied citizenship through its structured system of support. Whether propertied-
citizenship is produced through relations between neighbors or institutionalized through 
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government support, the values upholding the liberal framework of propertied-citizenship work 
together to affect how H.G. residents may enjoy their privileges of citizenship. So how do these 
liberal constructs regarding property in Portland affect encampment residents’ citizenship? And 
in what ways does the model of propertied-citizenship diminish houseless people’s rights and 
opportunities for becoming stable? The second part of the chapter addresses these questions.  
Limiting Houseless Citizenship 
Houseless people residing in Portland’s encampments have had their citizenship privileges 
restricted in various ways. One common problem for houseless people affecting their ability to 
enjoy citizenship privileges or benefits is the lack of identification and especially an address. 
Without these things, individuals have difficulty staying in contact with services, such as housing 
providers, or they may have trouble receiving benefits from the government. Some individuals I 
spoke with indicated they were unable to open bank accounts because they did not have an 
address. “Since when can I not give money to a bank?” one individual asked. Others I spoke with 
lost employment opportunities because they indicated to an employer that they lived in an 
encampment. And perhaps the most direct link to political citizenship as we think of it is the 
guarantee of voting rights. While federal laws allow houseless people the right to vote by 
identifying an address for a shelter in which they are residing, voting can still be made 
enormously difficult for people without identification and stable address.20 Without identification 
or a stable address, access to certain social and political benefits of citizenship are restricted or 
make it that much more difficult for individuals to maintain their livelihoods. 
 
20 Most states have duration requirements for residency. For example, a state may require an individual to have 
lived in the same place for 30 days (NPV 2019). For houseless people, to remain in the same shelter or same 
general area of a city may be quite difficult to prove. For one thing, shelters do not always allow consecutive stays, 
forcing individuals to wait days until they can return to that shelter or to find other places.   
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But houseless people are not denied citizenship benefits and privileges only because they 
lack a stable address. They are also often denied the more substantive benefits of citizenship, 
such as the ability to participate in collective decision-making with the communities in which 
they live, or to get proper treatment in hospitals, or to simply have the right to rest in public 
spaces. Often, rights of citizenship are the legal means by which house people are denied more 
substantive benefits of citizenship. Thus, legal rights of citizenship overlap and frame how the 
more participatory and active privileges of citizenship are denied to houseless people. H.G. is 
again exemplary for demonstrating the ways in which houseless people are limited in their 
citizenship privileges and experiences because they lack property rights. To show this, I depict 
two moments in the relations between H.G. and OKNA which illustrate the uneven relations 
between propertied and property-insecure residents.  
Shortly after H.G. moved into its site in the Overlook neighborhood in 2015, OKNA and 
the encampment began “good neighbor” negotiations. The informal agreement between the two 
groups was mediated by the City. The talks lasted for a few months and then fell apart. There 
were different reasons given as to why the talks fell apart. The chair of OKNA suggested that 
H.G. began working “with the City to develop a permit outside of the good neighbor agreement” 
after initial talks had started between them, a move in which OKNA members did not approve. 
In turn, H.G. residents suggested that OKNA only wanted to talk about H.G. leaving during the 
talks and not about how to integrate the encampment into the neighborhood. In response to the 
talks falling through, the communications director for the mayor’s office stated they would 
forego an agreement because “the well had already been poisoned in terms of the relations 
between the neighbors and the camp” (Pitawanich 2017).  
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The reasons why the talks fell apart, however, were less important than why they were 
initiated in the first place. Many housed neighbors in Overlook objected to the group moving in 
without their consent. The then-chair of OKNA mentioned that he was upset that H.G. formed 
themselves without first coming to interact with the neighbors. That H.G. wouldn’t talk to 
OKNA, he said “created animosity from the get-go. If you don’t engage with the neighbors 
upfront, you are going to have problems.” The OKNA chair felt that the neighborhood 
association was being spurned by H.G. for not communicating with the association about their 
plans.  
Other neighborhood homeowners who were privy to the good neighbor discussions 
observed the process differently. One homeowner mentioned she “didn’t feel like the 
neighborhood was negotiating in good faith.” She suggested the talks were somewhat one-sided, 
more in line with the rhetorical position of OKNA. “There was an idea that the people living at 
Hazelnut were not participating in the process in a way that was okay with the neighborhood 
association,” she said. And because of that, she felt as if “a system was being set up that was 
making it very difficult for the residents of Hazelnut to succeed in the process.”  
In the end, it was H.G. who backed out of the good neighbor talks because of this 
seeming one-sidedness. One H.G. resident stated that “it's off-putting” to hear OKNA say “we 
don't want you here, we don't want you here” (Pitawanich 2017). As such, H.G. continued 
conversations with the City about the encampment’s future without OKNA. In response to H.G. 
no longer attempting to negotiate a good neighbor agreement one homeowner stated, “I don’t 
think that individuals in Hazelnut Grove have any intention of being controlled.” The premise of 
a good neighbor agreement, for this homeowner, was seen as a disciplinary mechanism for 
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OKNA. That is, homeowners felt the agreement was necessary to ensure houseless people would 
live by certain standards imposed by the neighborhood association.  
The failed good neighbor talks re-invigorated OKNA’s opposition to H.G. remaining 
situated in the Overlook neighborhood. Shortly after the talks ended, the chair of OKNA’s board 
wrote a press release to publicize how H.G. was “excluding” OKNA homeowners from the good 
neighbor agreement. With OKNA’s hopes ended for participating in good neighbor talks, the 
chair renewed OKNA’s “call for the [City] to remove Hazelnut Grove from its current site as 
soon as possible,” (OKNA, 2017 September 21) arguing again that the encampment was illegally 
placed. OKNA and H.G. never again attempted to re-negotiate a good neighbor agreement, 
despite the encampment becoming ever more involved in neighborhood affairs.   
Perhaps because of the discord resulting from the failed good neighbor agreement, a 
second moment illustrates how the neighborhood association attempted to restrict citizenship 
privileges from H.G. residents. I briefly return to the story that introduced this dissertation to 
reconnect a series of events that transpired between H.G. and OKNA.  
Recall that in August 2017, OKNA made plans to change its bylaws so that houseless 
people would not be able to participate and vote at neighborhood meetings. The proposed bylaw 
amendments stated that all individuals voting at neighborhood meetings would be required “to 
provide a legal home address to qualify for membership.” The intention behind amending the 
bylaws was explicit. As the amendment stated, the new bylaw would: 
Exclude houseless campers and squatters in vacant buildings. However, it would 
not preclude a houseless village from receiving full membership privileges. A 
city-sanctioned and permitted houseless village would have a legal address, and 
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its residents therefore would qualify for OKNA membership. Alternatively, a 
houseless village with a non-profit component could have a designated 
representative member in OKNA (OKNA, 2017 August 19, emphasis added).  
The wording of the proposed bylaw amendment did not need to mention H.G. by name. It was 
clear that H.G. was the only organized encampment in the neighborhood. H.G. did not have a 
legal address. It was not sanctioned by the City with an official land use permit. It did not have 
non-profit status at that time. The lengths to which OKNA went by wording the amendment as 
such was precisely meant to exclude H.G. from neighborhood representation while appearing 
neutral in doing so.  
The bylaw amendment did not pass. Enough supporters of H.G. and residents of the 
encampment itself were able to collectively win the vote to not have the neighborhood bylaws 
changed. Had the amendment passed, it would have barred H.G. members from participating in 
the association’s decision-making processes. Significantly, it also would have demonstrated to 
H.G that it cannot not enjoy the privilege of self-management within its own neighborhood.  
Why do OKNA’s actions—attempting to exclude H.G. from being able to participate 
within a neighborhood association—matter to questions of citizenship? At the time of the 
amendment vote, H.G. had been operating within the neighborhood for two years. OKNA 
members were still upset the encampment was there. As noted, many at OKNA thought H.G. 
was illegally occupying the public property on which the City was allowing them to operate. But 
it was not only that H.G. was still there. Now H.G. residents were beginning to show up to and 
participate in neighborhood meetings. H.G. residents wanted to be involved in neighborhood 
affairs, partly to show the neighborhood why they had the right to participate but also to show 
that they cared about how their encampment was received within the neighborhood. For OKNA, 
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because H.G. was unsanctioned, “illegally” using public property, and as such “undemocratic,” 
H.G. was not to be involved in the affairs of the neighborhood association. 
 The proposal to amend bylaws to exclude houseless people pointed to a larger 
relationship between OKNA and H.G., one illustrating how property owners utilize their 
citizenship rights and privileges to control how and when houseless people can realize their own 
citizenship privileges. In response to the failed amendment, one homeowner questioned further 
whether houseless people should have any rights to vote in OKNA meetings. He asked, why 
would “the camp get voting rights? On [account of] antiquated bylaws?” For this resident, the 
neighborhood association ought to have been able to create new bylaws that made transparent 
that they are excluding houseless people, particularly those at H.G. Such legal measures were 
needed, he argued, because residents of H.G. “do not have the best interest of the neighborhood. 
They are only interested in themselves. [Housed] individuals in the neighborhood are for the 
good of the neighborhood. Hazelnut people are not. They care about themselves.” For this 
homeowner, denying houseless people a right to vote was not just about voting rights in the 
abstract. Instead, it was about denying people whom he understood to be self-interested, 
incapable of collective decision-making. The implication was that housed individuals were 
assumed to be most capable of making decisions for the “good of the neighborhood.”  
 That H.G. residents were frequently depicted as invalid participants in neighborhood 
affairs was recognized by other homeowners attending neighborhood meetings. One individual 
recounted that the meetings were often hostile when H.G. residents were present. “I don’t get the 
feeling H.G residents are taken very seriously,” she said. “Sometimes they are cut off really 
quickly by the chair. He gives other people more time to talk… and he’s not so abrupt with 
them.” Another homeowner who attended association meetings noted a general sentiment of 
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disdain coming from housed residents toward H.G. residents’ participation. “They can be a little 
bit dismissive. There have been times when the president has said ‘you know, I have talked to 
the City and they have identified three spots for the camp…’ And then [one H.G. resident] will 
say ‘I just talked to the same person at the City and they did not say that.’ And I think in these 
moments there tends to be an understanding that ‘well, [the president] has the real story.’ So I 
think sometimes people do not take the [H.G.] residents that seriously.” That houseless people 
were not taken seriously in the public discourse is commonplace, particularly when they were 
making claims for equity within a specific polity as they were attempting to do with OKNA.   
Neighborhood association meetings I attended when H.G. residents were present were 
somewhat different than the above accounts. The above statements reflect early interactions with 
H.G. residents, recalling meetings before the heated bylaw amendment meeting when OKNA 
believed it could oust the encampment from the neighborhood. The meetings I attended took 
place after these events. What I observed from homeowners at the neighborhood meetings was 
something more like a passive acceptance of H.G.’s existence, with neighbors resigned to the 
fact that they could not force H.G. to leave. As such, instead of demanding H.G. leave, 
homeowners often questioned H.G. residents about the timelines of their relocation. For instance, 
some asked about “when [H.G. members] think they might relocate,” or “how long people are 
staying at the encampment.” At one meeting I attended in March, 2018, I spoke with a frustrated 
neighborhood homeowner who believed that people would never leave the encampment. That 
“they just want to stay as long as they can,” she said, was a commonly noted perception about 
H.G. from neighborhood residents. 
These two series of interactions between OKNA and H.G. indicate how the liberal values 
engrained in the model of propertied-citizenship are employed by housed people in attempt to 
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mediate relations with houseless people. The desire by property owners to define how houseless 
life ought to be, rather than how houseless life actually is for H.G. residents, underscores the 
taken-for-granted nature of the propertied perspective of citizen relations. In this case, the 
neighborhood association was ultimately unable to restrict H.G.’s right to participate in the 
association. Nor did OKNA get their way in good neighbor agreements. All too often, the power 
of propertied citizens to control houseless encampments does actualize to the detriment of 
houseless groups. R2DT, for example, was denied a preferred spot for relocation in 2015 due to 
push back and a lawsuit from its prospective neighborhood coalition (Schmidt 2016). It was the 
City that played a more direct role in shaping H.G.’s future. While the City supported the 
encampment’s right to exist, it actively worked to relocate the encampment. It is likely that the 
consistent pressure from OKNA members and individual residents to some degree influenced the 
City’s decision to relocate the encampment from the Overlook neighborhood.   
Balancing Rights of Property 
The opposition against H.G. necessitates that encampment residents must actively claim 
citizenship benefits beyond those protected narrowly within their constitutional rights. In other 
words, H.G. residents already hold liberty rights equally protected among all other citizens. What 
H.G. residents do not benefit from are the more substantive privileges of citizenship which 
propertied-citizens hold and draw from to influence political relations. H.G. residents struggle 
for the ability to participate in decision-making, to be heard and taken seriously when doing so, 
and to be able to enact change over their own living situations. So too must they constantly 
justify to others why they are deserving of space to shelter themselves. These are broader 
benefits of citizenship that most propertied-citizens do not need to actively claim.  
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Propertied-citizens do not have to claim or struggle for these more substantive benefits or 
privileges of citizenship because of the ways in which property secures political “strength” 
within liberal-democracies. As demonstrated by homeowners in Portland’s Overlook 
neighborhood, a fundamental characteristic of citizenship is assumed to be one’s ability to work 
hard and earn. As this thinking goes, from their labor can houseless people then benefit from the 
social and political privileges of property. The fact that the City “gave away” property to H.G. 
belies this value, placing H.G. residents outside of the realm of the legitimate citizen who pays 
for their property by renting or owning.  
Overlook neighborhood property owners therefore employed long-held arguments about 
property’s broader social function within democracy. In doing so, homeowners constructed 
houseless encampment residents as anti-democratic, unwilling to make good faith efforts at 
coming to neighborly agreements, or being devoid of the capacity to make decisions for the 
greater good of the neighborhood. When encampments and their residents were seen in this light, 
houseless people became aberrations from the proper citizen. In this way, property owners 
denied encampment residents their claims for self-sufficiency to participate in democratic 
politics because they lacked “legitimate” use rights of property. The power of propertied-
citizenship therefore was utilized to advance and even maintain political positions which adhered 
to liberal norms surrounding property use and ownership.   
Homeowners are not alone maintaining the values of propertied-citizenship. Such values 
are also institutionalized. The way that local government supports houseless people is also 
critical. Such governmental support is multi-faceted, however. Portland’s government supports 
houseless self-governance because of the dignity and autonomy it gives houseless people through 
their struggles for stability. At the same time, local government expects that individuals will 
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leave self-governing encampments quickly, promoting individuals’ integration back into the 
private market. For many houseless individuals, the difficulty of affording rents within urban 
private housing markets are what led them into houselessness in the first place.       
That the model of propertied-citizenship derives from liberal-democratic principles 
reflects a key contradiction regarding property, one that actually benefits houseless encampment 
residents. In that property access or ownership strengthens how citizens may use their political 
privileges, H.G. shares in enjoying some of those privileges. That is, H.G. has the right to use its 
property because the City of Portland authorizes to do so. In this way, H.G. holds use rights to 
property, albeit limited use rights. As semi-propertied citizens, H.G. residents enjoy some control 
over their living situation by being able to manage how they organize themselves on City 
property. These privileges secured through access to property engender certain political powers 
which H.G. and other Portland encampments rely upon for stability, which, as the next chapter 










Chapter 4: A Possessory Interest: How Property Rights Shape Citizenship Rights in 
Portland’s Houseless Encampments 
 
Portland’s self-governing houseless encampments provide an excellent case through which to 
better understand how liberal property rights mediate citizenship rights for houseless people. The 
encampments are unique in that they hold some rights to property. As previous chapters have 
shown, property rights are essential for individuals to realize citizenship within liberal 
democracies. Contemporary rights of property are understood to provide liberal citizens the 
freedom to protect themselves from others and from the overreach of the state. While Portland’s 
encampments benefit from their property rights, these rights are restricted, limiting the ability of 
houseless encampment residents to realize their autonomy as equal citizens.  
Portland’s houseless encampments are unique among modes of houseless shelter not only 
because they hold rights to use property. The encampments are also “self-managed.” In the most 
immediate sense, the encampments self-organize their own operations. All decision-making is 
done through the process of self-governance, a democratic model of decision-making 
determining the day-to-day activities of the community. Dignity Village, as an example, holds 
weekly council meetings for the purposes of introducing new members to the community, 
addressing problems regarding the use of the space, negotiating divisions of labor within the 
encampment, and much more. With such meetings, the encampments manage how the sites are 
socially organized with little, if any, input from the City.  
Portland’s encampments are self-managed in a second sense. In legal terms, Portland’s 
encampments are contracted by the City of Portland to provide certain services on the 
encampment site. Primarily, this means the encampments are responsible for managing the 
temporary shelter services that they provide individuals. R2DT, for instance, provides services 
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by running a low-barrier shelter for roughly 60 overnight sleepers. As contractors, therefore, 
encampments have legal authority to control and maintain the use of the site within the bounds of 
their agreements with the City.     
Portland’s encampments are both collectives of individuals as well as legal entities unto 
themselves. The encampments are legal entities, most holding not-for-profit status, because they 
are the parties which hold the contracts between the encampment and the City. And it is through 
this legal status which encampments are endowed with rights to use property. But so too are 
encampments a collective of individuals who work and govern the operations of the communities 
themselves. Portland encampments thus differ from other houseless shelter services because they 
function as self-governing collectives comprised of resident members as well as being legal 
contractors. In this sense, they can be understood as institutions providing services to the public.    
The encampments have benefitted from such institutionalization primarily through rights 
of property. While none of Portland’s sanctioned encampments own any of the properties on 
which they sit, each of the encampments (except HG) hold “conditional use” or “use of space” 
agreements with the City. These agreements legally permit them to use a piece of municipal land 
for a given period of time. Such rights of property allow encampments to maintain their 
processes of self-governance by securing a dedicated site on which the encampment may 
organize itself. Without rights to municipal property, self-governing houseless groups would be 
vulnerable to police and state actions against them.   
Encampment property rights are specifically limited, however. While most of Portland’s 
encampments hold “possessory rights of interest” for their properties, these possessory rights are 
unique. In general, possessory rights to property allow tenants the right of “exclusive 
possession,” meaning that “tenants have the right to exclude all others, including the landlord 
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(except for rights under the lease to inspect or repair) from the land” (Williams and Robson 
2014, n.p.). Portland’s encampments are not subject to landlord-tenant law and thus lack rights of 
exclusive possession to their properties.  
Such limited property rights matter greatly for the encampments. As I will suggest, the 
encampments’ limited rights of property diminish the benefits deriving from the self-governing 
process. Because they lack the right to exclude, encampments are not always able to carry out the 
decisions they make as self-governing collectives. I will argue, therefore, that such limited rights 
of property diminish houseless individuals’ citizenship, depriving these individuals of certain 
freedoms that propertied-citizens enjoy.   
The chapter draws from fieldwork in Portland to detail the trade-offs of living in self-
governing encampments for houseless individuals. I demonstrate how the possessory rights in 
self-governing encampments benefit the individuals residing in them by allowing houseless 
people more autonomy over the ways in which they organize the site to stabilize themselves. 
This autonomy derives from having consistent access to a dedicated property. Compared with 
houseless people living in traditional shelters or on the street, then, self-governing encampments 
allow individuals the dignity of self-defining how such support services come to stabilize their 
lives.  
While benefitting the encampments, limited possessory rights to property create problems 
for these communities. Without a right to exclude, houseless encampment residents are left to 
their own devices when banishing members from the community. There is no backing from the 
state. But it is not just ex-members who resist leaving the encampments peacefully where the 
legal right to exclude matters. Encampments must secure themselves from anyone seeking to 
enter their sites. This is problematic. For, not being able to legally secure the premises presents 
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enormous risk for the individuals residing within the encampments. The chapter therefore details 
these specific limitations for encampments as well.  
Above all, I seek to detail how thoroughly entangled property and property rights are 
within houseless encampment life. Property rights have long been essential in defining the 
idealized liberal citizen. And liberal citizenship has been defined historically as the capacity of 
an individual citizen to self-govern. I suggest then that it is useful to understand problems 
surrounding property rights of self-governing encampments as matters of citizenship. I will argue 
that although encampments do benefit from possessory rights to property, the reality of a limited 
“right to exclude” for encampments means that these benefits come with certain costs. The 
necessary trade-offs required of individuals residing in encampments—acceding their right to 
privacy and security— diminish houseless people’s rights of citizenship. The disparity over the 
rights of property and rights to exclude for houseless residents further reflects how uneven 
relations of power develop between property-secure and property-insecure citizens.     
The Benefits of Houseless Encampments 
Nearly every individual with whom I spoke articulated how residing in an encampment has 
benefitted them throughout their struggles with housing precarity. Encampments provide 
everyday resources that housed people often take for granted. For instance, being able to leave 
one’s things in the same place and be reasonably assured that you will return to your things, is 
significant. Feeling secure in that you will still have your belongings at the end of the day, as one 
HG resident put it, “gives you the one thing that everyone else in society gets to have, which is a 
sense of ownership over something.” Not having to carry your belongings with you everywhere 
you go makes everyday life that much easier: going to the doctor; being at work all day; doing 
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“food bank” or “water” runs for the encampment; searching for housing; etc. A stable place to 
leave one’s personal items is necessary for all individuals to go about their lives with less stress.  
 Encampments also provide safer environments for individuals to rest. Having a group of 
individuals looking out for one another relieves much pressure that houseless individuals face 
daily. Having trusted individuals look out for you reduces the predatory actions that houseless 
people routinely experience living on the street or in shelters. Encampments also provide safety 
in the sense that they add a set of “eyes on the street.”21 All encampments do security shifts 
throughout the day and overnight to ensure only members and guests enter the site. But 
encampments also secure the areas around the sites themselves. R2DT, for example, monitors the 
street and parking lot of the neighboring business for unwanted or unsafe behaviors.22 Such 
security benefits not only the residents on site, but also functions to make neighbors feel safer by 
having someone inform them if something illicit were to happen nearby.     
 
21 One report studying Portland’s and Seattle’s encampments found that the presence of self-governed houseless 
encampments in these two cities correlated with lower crime rates in the areas surrounding the encampments 
(Schmid 2018).    
22 R2DT’s current site is located across the street from the Moda Center, the arena that hosts Portland’s 
professional basketball team in addition to large concerts. Moda staff park their cars in the parking lot abutting the 
fence of R2DT. And in their good neighbor agreement, R2DT is responsible for securing the approach road to that 
parking lot and the areas in front of the site facing the road. The irony of income inequity and how this relates to 
property is not lost on R2DT residents, whose front gate faces the glitzy stadium and is routinely subject to tens of 




Figure 8. Security desk at front of R2DT. Those on security check in overnight sleepers and monitor the 
areas around the perimeter of the gate. 
  
 The relative security that encampments provide their residents enables individuals to 
become more stable. For some long-term houseless individuals, being around others can often be 
difficult, as prior experiences in shelters or on the streets can create problems of trust around 
strangers. One resident of H.G. noted that being in the group setting of an encampment allowed 
him to “re-socialize” with others. “Being able to trust a random stranger again” was significant, 
he said. “It’s insane to me how distrustful you are when you are on the street, and how you have 
to be for your own survival. Because [on the street] if you don’t watch your back, the guy next to 
you doesn’t have to. That change in dynamic is incredible,” he noted.  
Similarly, one Kenton Women’s Village (KWV) resident noted how the village helped 
her to reconnect her sense of self again. “Once you feel like you are nothing, it is hard to get your 
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sense of worth back,” she said. She observed that when women come into the village,23 many of 
them seemed to be down on themselves. Such attitudes, she said, “stem from relationships, 
abuse, from being on the streets and feeling and looking like crud.” What encampments allow for 
people to do is share in these experiences, “to be together in a situation which gives them 
strength” she said. Encampments thus provide their residents the benefit of time, giving people 
the opportunity to get to know who they are living around, in what ways they are working 
together, and how these relationships may benefit themselves.  
Time also helps introduce individuals into the self-governing model. One Dignity Village 
resident noted how a chronically-houseless person coming into the village was impacted by the 
encampment’s mode of organizing. This individual was “houseless for 22 years prior to coming 
to Dignity,” he said. “The individual went from not trusting or speaking to anyone, to conversing 
and participating within the village before he obtained his housing.” There is a reward, this 
member mentioned, “in seeing people transform through that process of living in the village,” 
one whereby people find similarities among strangers, helping them to ease distrust and 
eventually work toward deciding how they want to become stable throughout their time of 
housing instability. 
 The personal stability gained from the relative security of encampment life is distinct 
from other traditional forms of houseless shelter. Many encampment residents spoke negatively 
of their experiences with the shelter system, a sentiment well-covered in scholarly literature on 
houselessness (Gowan 2010). For example, many mentioned how shelters and missions are 
 
23 I use the terms “encampment” and “village” interchangeably. Many residents within Portland’s encampments 
use the term village to describe their living environment. Dignity Village defines itself as such by name. The Kenton 
Women’s Village does as well. For these groups, the term village connotes a sense of collective living, a situation in 
which people know their neighbors well and can rely upon them for help when needed.    
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unsafe, dirty, noisy, inefficiently run, or too forceful in their “engagement with God.” One 
Hazelnut Grove (HG) resident candidly retold his experiences within shelters. “The security is 
only as good as the staff,” he said. “If the staff is friendly with [a] person that is going around 
stealing everything, then they let them steal.” But if security in the shelters can be piecemeal, by 
letting slide the harmful actions of a few people, other types of shelter security enact overly-
disciplinary measures to punish sleepers. Many shelters are zero-tolerance in this way, he said. 
Shelters “use standards of punishment that are… it’s not just disciplinarian. It’s against the 
Geneva Codes, man,” he exclaimed. “[If] one person is doing crazy shit, you can’t hold everyone 
responsible. But that’s how they do it. Like, ‘well, if that person doesn’t stop trying to stab 
everybody, we’re going to kick you all out.’” Although shelters are not always as chaotic as 
depicted in the quote above, houseless individuals who have spent a longer amount of time in 
them cast a negative light on their experiences within them.  
 Shelters do serve a purpose. They are an emergency solution, an intervention to save 
lives. As one staff member of a county government within the Portland metropolitan area put it, 
shelters function like “a band-aid.” They “prevent extensive loss of life for people that would 
perish otherwise with exposure to the elements,” he said. But this may be the true extent of their 
purpose. What shelters cannot do, he argued, is “give people an opportunity to address the things 
that cause them homelessness.” While the purpose of shelters is to give emergency assistance, 
therefore, they are not designed to address any of the overlapping problems causing 
houselessness in the first place. They are most simply a space to shelter individuals for very short 
periods of time.  
   Compared with shelters, encampments allow individuals to be situated day-after-day in 
an environment over which one has some control. Encampments allow for individuals to develop 
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some regularity or constancy within their lives. Because of this, this same county staff member 
gave praise for encampments. He noted that “in a village, you are part of the value of the village. 
You are the village. You are a cog that keeps the village going. You have responsibility and 
dignity. And accountability to your fellows. All the things that you lose when you lose housing. 
You get to build back some dignity. And you are providing a service to others by yourselves. No 
one else is doing it for you.” One R2DT resident similarly reiterated the differences between 
traditional shelters and encampments. “The obvious difference is accountability,” he said. 
“Based on what I’ve seen, it seems like a numbers game for [the shelters].” At the encampment 
“we do outreach, clothing, food when we have it. I like that we are completely independent, and 
donation based.” At R2DT, he said, overnight sleepers get “a place of refuge. We watch your 
back while you sleep.” Encampments also benefit, then, by remaining accountable to their guests 
and members.  
 Along with security, stability and accountability, Portland’s self-governing encampments 
also benefit by projecting a certain sense of order more closely aligned with housed society. 
Perhaps this is because many of Portland’s encampments are comprised of individualized tiny 
houses, a form of shelter in which the housed community validates as more formal. As one DV 
resident noted, for example, the fundamental difference between the housed and houseless is a 
house key. “If I didn’t have a house key to this tiny house,” he said, “I wouldn’t get treated like I 
get treated when I am in the village. [When] people see that you don’t have a house key, that you 
don’t go home at night… [they think] ‘well, my god… we can’t even talk to these people.’” As 
this resident explains, then, the ability to secure privacy through shelter is a social benefit to 




Figure 9. Kenton Women's Village original location, summer 2018. 
 
Encampments thus benefit from community approbation. As one KWV resident 
suggested, “I think we are actually accepted because we have little houses, our own little 
community. [Living in the village] I am treated like a person because nobody thinks that I am 
homeless.” Another KWV resident similarly acknowledged that outside of the encampments, 
houseless people are generally looked down upon by housed and, at times, even other houseless 
people. But when people find out that someone is living in an organized tiny house village, she 
said “people seem to respect that. They have a positive reaction to that.” That reaction is distinct 
from “when I was in a tent,” she said, “where I got looked down upon way more.” In that the 
tiny houses in encampments hold a resemblance to traditional housing, more so than sleeping 
under a blanket on the sidewalk, the encampments reflect valued social norms of how individuals 
ought to properly house themselves.       
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Overall, Portland’s self-governing encampments benefit their residents by creating a 
sense of security, stability, a shared sense of identity, and accountability for themselves and the 
community in which they live. These benefits provide houseless residents a degree of security 
often not experienced by houseless people staying outside or in traditional shelters. As such, the 
social benefits of encampments should be supported, for they allow houseless people to manage 
their own housing insecurity in a self-determining manner. But encampments have broader 
socio-political benefits as well. They offer individuals the opportunity to participate in collective 
self-governance, allowing individuals to actively shape their living situation within the 
encampment as well as in the larger community outside. These political benefits illustrate 
privileges central to liberal citizenship more generally. The following section depicts how 
encampments benefit residents through the lens of citizenship.  
Citizenship Through Self-Governance 
Liberal citizenship is often expressed as the state’s protection of rights for those holding formal 
citizenship. Individuals within liberal democracies hold liberty rights which protect them from 
others or from state overreach. As reviewed in Chapter 2, one of the primary liberty rights is the 
right to property. Property rights have long been thought to secure for individuals their freedom 
or autonomy, establishing the boundary between individual sovereignty and state power 
(Nedelsky 2011). Although property rights in themselves do not produce an individual’s 
autonomy, rights to property do affect how propertied and property-insecure citizens may 
advance and secure their own self-interests within liberal democracies.  
Liberal citizenship has often been simplified into two categories: passive and active 
citizenship. Passive citizenship connotes that citizens are bestowed certain liberty rights and have 
those rights protected by the state. Citizenship is “passive” in that individuals do not actively 
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engage within political discourse or participate in decision-making for the common good. 
Passive citizens “participate in their sovereign role [as rights-bearing citizens] only in the context 
of an elaborate system of political representation at a distance, carried out in the shadow of a 
permanent professional administrative apparatus” (Burchell 2002, 89). The correlative to the 
passive receipt of formal rights is an active understanding of citizenship. Such “active” modes of 
engaging politically are commonly seen as a citizens’ means of pursuing a vision of the common 
good (Mouffe 1993). Citizenship in this sense is seen to be practiced or “enacted” to advance 
one’s interests toward certain social and political ends (Isin 2008). Enacting citizenship is a 
means by which individuals claim rights they believe they should, but do not, have.       
Realizing liberal citizenship today remains contingent upon having a secure interest in 
property, through the access rights or possession rights of property. To a certain degree, 
Portland’s encampment residents experience some privileges of citizenship in that they reside 
within an “institution” which holds most possessory rights to property. For example, R2DT is 
recognized as an institution which, through its contract with the City, holds certain possessory 
rights of interest to use the property. Members of R2DT are able to benefit from the 
encampments’ property rights, then, which affords the community time and space with which to 
decide how they will operate, and, in turn, to have those decisions validated by the state. 
Residents are also able to benefit from the stability of having a secured property in which to rest.  
But so too do encampments allow or even force residents to enact or practice their 
citizenship by claiming rights to privileges generally not held by houseless people living outside 
of encampments. Many of the encampments, for example, must actively justify to the City why 
they should continue operating after their land use agreements expire. And in the case of H.G., 
that encampment must actively claim a right to space itself, to their neighbors and to some extent 
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the City, as they lack an official permit to operate. Within the encampments themselves, 
individuals have more agency over their circumstances, and are able to actualize their rights as 
self-governing citizens through the encampments’ decision-making processes. Thus 
encampments in some ways enable their residents to benefit from property just as does the 
idealized, propertied-citizen benefits from the use of their property.    
 Portland’s encampments thus provide benefits beyond the immediate matters of social 
reproduction mentioned in the previous section. Primary among these benefits is the sense of 
agency residents feel when making collective decisions regarding the operations of the 
encampment. For instance, many residents touted how participating in the self-governing process 
affected them. One DV resident mentioned feeling prideful in being able to say that the village is 
self-governed and self-supporting. “The fact that we do make the rules, [that] we get to decide 
how we are going to live… the bottom line: better self-esteem and better self-worth when we are 
part of the decision-making.” And while the decision-making process gives residents a sense of 
self-worth, encampments also are host to the primary source of knowledge about how best to 
support houseless people who are struggling: people living without housing themselves. As one 
R2DT member acknowledged, compared with staff in shelters or local government, “people who 
live [in encampments] know what is going on. And they know what needs to change to help the 
situation. Being able to control the environment you live in… I don’t think that is found in most 
conventional shelters.” Participating in the encampments’ decision-making process helps 
residents feel as if they have some control over their lives.  
When residents are able to control their environments as such, they feel accountable not 
only to themselves, but to others residing within the community. Residents mentioned how 
having the ability to deliberate over and vote on encampment issues provides the opportunity to 
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redress inequities arising within the encampment in a manner suited to the individuals affected. 
For example, if a resident was to bring an illicit substance into the encampment, rather than 
involving police, the community decides on how to deal with the individual. Likely this means 
verbal warnings or perhaps a night out of the encampment. The strength of the self-governing 
process allows the “offending” resident to explain their situation and to be heard among their 
peers. Their peers are then able to consider the claims and work with the individual instead of 
excluding them or using punitive measures to reprimand them. In this way, encampments’ self-
governing processes are flexible, adapting to the social contexts of the situation at hand.  
There is also a benefit in using direct democratic practices to make decisions about the 
operations of the encampment and how residents contribute. All residents concerned with how 
the community functions, on what, for example, the community ought to spend its collective 
finances, or when members are allowed to have guests visit, have a say as to what the criteria of 
the rules ought to be. All concerned residents get to collectively make that decision. As such, 
adhering to the democratic process within encampments develops “political structures that 
address marginality and exclusion,” albeit through “informal frameworks of governance and 
citizenship” (Sparks 2017, 15). That is, encampments afford their residents more opportunities 
for inclusion even if that social and political recognition is not always acknowledged outside the 
encampment.  
With little capacity to affect one’s living environment while houseless, encampments 
cultivate a sense of agency for their residents within the spaces of the village. The sense of self-
worth and dignity residents feel participating in encampment governance is significant. 
Reflecting on his work in Seattle’s self-organized houseless encampments, Sparks argues that 
self-governance establishes more than simply informal practices of citizenship which better 
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incorporate socially and economically marginalized individuals. The informal practices of 
citizenship that self-governing encampments foster, he argues, also work to “resist stereotypes of 
homeless unfitness for rational self-governance by producing a self-consciously democratic and 
collectively operated space” (2017, 6). If only informally, then, self-governing encampments 
function as spaces facilitating social and political inclusion for residents whose citizenship rights 
and privileges are continuously being challenged outside the spaces of the encampment.    
That residents benefit from the immediacy of “informal” governance within the spaces of 
encampments indicates the different ways in which these types of shelter better promote 
practices of citizenship for houseless people. While certainly important, I suggest, however, that 
residents more effectively actualize their citizenship—that is, benefit from certain rights 
protections as well as make claims to unmet rights—through their relations with individuals and 
entities outside the spaces of the encampment. Indeed, it is through interactions with neighbors, 
neighborhood resident and business associations, and local government that houseless 
encampment residents make claims to and realize the benefits of citizenship.  
Contra Sparks, then, who suggests that informal citizenship within encampments expands 
our understanding of houseless peoples’ political agency, I argue that examining the practices of 
citizenship enacted by residents through their relations outside of the encampments better 
demonstrates how houseless individuals claim and negotiate rights and privileges of citizenship 
similarly (though not equally) to those of propertied-citizens. For, houseless people’s political 
agency is not fully relegated to the spaces of encampments. Rather, encampment residents 
realize their citizenship privileges in relation to propertied-citizens.    




Due to the relative stability of life in Portland’s houseless encampments, residents have 
expanded their participation to matters outside of the encampment spaces. Many have become 
politically active within their neighborhoods and throughout the city more broadly. As one R2DT 
member acknowledged, participating in the decision-making process first within the 
encampments whet her appetite to engage in politics outside of the encampment. This change, 
she said, came because of the interactions she had during weekly meetings, which eventually led 
her to become a board member. Before coming to R2DT, and during her early time there, she 
said that she “was the quiet type, just doing what I was supposed to do.” “As far as talking with 
the City,” she said, “I didn’t think I would ever speak at City Hall or go and meet the mayor. But 
here I am, [going to] City meetings, good neighbor agreement meetings, neighborhood 
association meetings, meetings with the police. I would have never done that before.” Doing so, 
she reflected, “opened me up and I have found my voice to say, ‘hey, you know what? This is 
wrong.’” The very process by which encampments democratically organize themselves enhances 
the desire for many residents to take charge of creating something new and better for themselves 
and for their community.    
Actively engaging in wider community or city affairs is difficult to do when houseless. 
Yet, many in the encampments practiced some level of civic or political engagement. One 
resident of R2DT, who has since moved into traditional housing, was motivated by the R2DT 
mission to effect social and political change outside of the encampment as well. He recalled that 
living at R2DT “opened my eyes,” motivating him to “want to do more to help people.” Thus, 
while staying at R2DT, he began organizing with the national Poor People’s Campaign, was 
active in organizing at the state capital for Oregon’s Houseless Bill of Rights, and supported 
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local groups in Portland advocating for rights of houseless people. Another resident of H.G. was 
voted on as board member at the neighborhood association in which the encampment is located. 
Her intention was to promote the rights of the encampment to a neighborhood association that 
was largely hostile to its existence (see Chapter 3 for more details). As a voting member of the 
association, she used her time to advocate for houseless rights, but also to participate in shaping 
neighborhood plans broadly.  
Enacting citizenship for these houseless individuals meant pursuing and advocating for 
rights that they felt they did not benefit from, but ought to have, as houseless people living in 
encampments. For H.G. particularly, I observed a general desire among its members to exist 
peacefully within the neighborhood while shaping the discourse around houseless rights. For 
them, this meant not only showing up to neighborhood meetings. It also meant forming a 
houseless outreach committee as part of the neighborhood association. The point of the outreach 
committee, as one Overlook neighborhood resident put it, was to “improve communication, build 
relationships, and maybe kind of challenge the neighborhood association” on their position 
regarding H.G. and houselessness generally. Engaging in neighborhood politics in this way was a 
means by which H.G. residents actively demonstrated that they did care about neighbors’ 
concerns with safety surrounding the encampment.   
The neighborhood association houseless outreach committee was also comprised of 
housed neighbors. Neighbors on the committee would routinely come to HG’s weekly meetings 
to see what concerns were pressing at the moment, what needed to be accomplished for the 
week, and to understand how the encampment was trying to plan its future. Housed neighbors 
joining H.G. for their weekly assemblies would reiterate to the neighborhood association that 
they too share the concerns of H.G. residents, “validating” for the association that the real 
133 
 
concerns of houseless individuals in the encampment were not made up simply to agitate the 
neighborhood association. Because of this coalition of houseless and housed, H.G. residents were 
better able to organize themselves to advocate for their right to exist.  
One result of this committee’s organizing was a door-knocking campaign which took 
place in the summer of 2018. The idea was to spread accurate information about H.G. to housed 
residents of the neighborhood by having encampment members introduce themselves face-to-
face with neighbors. I went along with one H.G. resident during the campaign and found most 
neighborhood residents to be receptive to hearing about why H.G. was located where it was and 
what the members were doing to better the space. The mere fact that H.G. residents were 
spending their time walking the neighborhood with the purpose of inviting open dialogue over 
the encampment’s existence indicates a level of organization which generally goes unnoticed to 
the public. Although many individuals in the encampments have become engaged in political or 
civic actions as a result of pushback from the public, so too do many within the encampments 
advocate for the self-governing model of shelter because they see it as a more dignified way of 
sheltering individuals.  
  Residents of Portland’s encampments also became actively engaged in their 
communities, however, because of the relative precarity in which the encampments stand. Not all 
of the encampments are permitted by the City to operate. H.G., for instance, has always been 
susceptible to being closed by the City. And those that are officially permitted by the City have a 
set amount of time in which they may continue to operate—two years for R2DT, for example. 
Adding to the precarity of the encampments is their limited rights to use the property; they are 
like tenants but with restricted possessory rights. For, the City has the overriding authority to 
determine how long and where the encampments can operate, and the state has limited the 
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encampments’ full possessory rights through recent legislation (as discussed below). 
Encampment residents actively involve themselves in wider community politics, therefore, as a 
means of advocating for their political rights as members of larger polity outside of the 
encampment. 
That encampment residents continue to struggle for political recognition when living in 
encampments is unique among other citizens who benefit from holding a lease or by owning 
property. The limited rights of property for encampments work to diminish the benefits of these 
self-governing communities. There are clear benefits of self-governing encampments: security, 
time to stabilize, dignity through self-determination and control over one’s environment, and 
having the space with which to engage the wider community in the social and political struggle 
of being houseless in encampments. But these benefits come at a cost for encampment residents. 
As the second part of this chapter will show, the encampments’ limited rights to property require 
a necessary trade-off for houseless encampment residents.  
Limits to Self-Governing Encampments 
While it is important to recognize the value encampments hold for their residents, the benefits 
individuals experience within the encampments are limited in distinct ways. These limits become 
apparent when looking at how encampments’ decision-making processes are restricted based on 
limits of property rights. As previously mentioned, although Portland’s encampments hold 
possessory rights of interest to their properties, their possessory rights do not include the right of 
exclusive possession. In other words, while the encampments have many rights common to what 




This disparity has consequences for the individuals residing in the encampments. Without 
the right to exclude, encampments cannot enforce their decisions to remove unwanted members 
from the community. It also means that they are unable to restrict any and all individuals from 
the site of the encampment. The encampments’ limited property rights in effect take away the 
ability of residents to see out the collective decisions they make about who is welcome in the 
encampments. The limited possessory rights of the encampments ultimately diminish the 
sovereignty of the self-governing process by which these communities function, in turn, affecting 
the rights of the individuals residing within them.  
Removing, Not Evicting 
Although it is rare, encampments will vote to remove a resident and the individual will refuse the 
action and remain on site. The person may refuse to leave because they believe that the claims 
against them are illegitimate or because there may be no one to enforce the collective decision. 
While each encampments’ bylaws concerning removing members is different, a majority vote is 
usually made to decide to remove someone from the encampment. Often the individual is given a 
definite amount of time to transition out of the site; 30 days is common, but depending on the 
severity of their “charge,” it may be only a day or two. If the person stays longer than their 
allocated time to vacate, verbal warnings toward the individual continue prompting them to 
leave. Reasoning with individuals about why the community has voted to remove them usually 
works to get that person to leave. But there are times when people refuse, a frustrating process 
for everyone within the encampment.  
Individuals who vehemently refuse their ban cannot be easily removed because 
encampment residents are not legally defined as tenants. In general, landlord-tenant laws afford 
renters and owner-occupied residents the right of exclusive possession. Exclusive possession 
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allows tenants the right to exclude all other persons from a dedicated property-space. Such a 
right allows individuals to exercise their right to privacy, a right enforced through the powers of 
the state. Because encampment residents are not traditional tenants, they cannot utilize the 
support of the state to arbitrate disputes over “evictions.”24 Encampments are left to deal with 
such matters in their own way. Therefore, when it does happen, removing a resistant individual 
from an encampment can be a drawn-out and messy process.  
Portland’s encampments have never been subject to Oregon’s landlord-tenant law. That 
law, Oregon Revised Statute 90 (ORS.90) delineates the protections and responsibilities of 
tenants and property owners. Until summer 2019, that Portland’s encampments were not subject 
to landlord-tenant law had always been informal, an agreement never explicitly stated in state 
law. That summer, however, the State of Oregon passed House Bill 2916 (HB 2916).25 One 
stipulation of HB 2916 mandated that encampments not be subject to ORS.90. In passing HB 
2916, therefore, the State institutionalized the historical practice between the encampments and 
the City of Portland by making it state law that encampments are not subject to landlord-tenant 
law.  
The fact that encampments are not subject to landlord-tenant law is complicated in its 
consequences, however. Advocates for Portland’s self-governing encampments applauded the 
passing of HB 2916 while some encampment residents themselves indicated that such lack of 
protections created certain difficulties for their self-governing process. On the one hand, the 
 
24 I put eviction in quotes because encampments technically do not evict in a strict legal sense. Eviction refers to 
process whereby an individual must relinquish use of something by state force, such as through a sheriff’s escort. 
Eviction is then a legal term applicable to relations with the common law of the liberal state.   
25 The primary purpose of HB 2916 was to retract the State’s two-parcel-per-municipality limit on “transitional 
housing accommodations,” or encampments. The bill now authorizes city governments to demarcate the number 
of encampments they feel is necessary (Oregon HB 2916).  
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legislation recognized the authority of the encampments to self-govern. Implied in this authority 
is that encampments can self-select their members, and when needed, they can banish members 
as well. But the state does not say that encampments cannot banish residents. Rather, the state’s 
legislation maintains that encampment’s cannot legally evict people. In other words, the 
legislation mandated that when encampments do banish someone, it can only be done informally, 
not through the legal eviction process that all tenants would ordinarily go through.     
Certainly, to not be subject to landlord-tenant regulations provides encampment residents 
one substantial benefit. When individuals are voted out of an encampment, they do not receive 
official evictions on their record. Unlike tenants, who generally accumulate court fees in addition 
to their official note of eviction, encampment residents avoid such economic and legal 
punishments. Because official evictions disproportionately impact precariously-housed and low-
income people (Purser 2016, Desmond 2016), houseless citizens are thereby protected by this 
legislation against the potentially damaging effects that official evictions can have on individuals 
looking for affordable housing. That HB 2916 passed this provision suggests that the state 
recognizes the detriment to houseless people that evictions can have on them. In this sense, such 
legislation is a progressive stance attempting to protect houseless people against further burden.  
At the same time, the legislation denies encampments the rights of exclusive possession. 
Perhaps the most powerful property right, encampments have no legal right as property “tenants” 
to officially exclude unwanted individuals from the premises. The issue here is not that 
encampments desire to take ex-resident members to court to extract compensation, and now, 
because of this bill, they cannot legally do so. One of the more “humane” aspects of encampment 
evictions is that residents help to try and avoid further harming already vulnerable people. 
Instead, the issue is that encampments have no legal rights to exclude, thereby forcing 
138 
 
encampment residents to rely on themselves to remove residents who have been voted out. Put 
another way, encampments have no support from the protections of the state if they need help 
managing an eviction.   
When dealing with contested removals, encampment residents are left to their own 
devices. One DV resident, considering the difficulty of encampment evictions, complained that 
the encampment “can vote [someone] out. But if the person won’t leave, the police won’t help us 
remove them.” The same DV resident noted another reason why encampments cannot legally 
evict. He stated that encampments “can’t evict people because that would mean, for the City, that 
we are defined as an intentional community… and the City doesn’t want that.” Intentional 
communities can be broadly defined as residential communities that organize themselves around 
shared values and intend on maintaining themselves in perpetuity (Sanford 2017). The City of 
Portland cannot allow self-governing encampments to operate in perpetuity because 
encampments are legally considered “transitional housing accommodations” under Oregon 
Revised Statute (ORS 446.225). This means that encampments can be only temporary places of 
respite for individuals. If encampments were to become permanent, akin to intentional 
communities, they would likely have tenant contracts with their members. If this were the case, 
Portland’s encampments would function like permanent facilities, a condition the City does not 
want.  
Seemingly a matter of legal semantics, the inability of encampments to remove residents 
is of legitimate concern in the lives of encampment residents. Whether or not the State backs 
encampments’ legal right to evict, these communities still banish individuals when necessary. 
And for good reasons. But when encampments must rely upon themselves to organize their 
community, to keep themselves safe, and to enforce their own decisions, evictions that go awry 
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make life enormously difficult for residents. As one H.G. resident noted, enforcing evictions can 
be onerous because the group “doesn’t have the ability to pressure people out of the space.” The 
reason for that, he said, is “because we don’t own the property. So we can’t trespass them or 
anything.” Encampments cannot utilize the state-backed right to cite someone for trespassing on 
the encampment site. Instead, encampments must figure out their own means of dealing with ex-
members and non-authorized individuals.  
This is made all the more complicated when evicted residents, after being voted out, 
simply stay at the site or return to it frequently. Members note there are two options for handling 
ex-members who refuse to leave the premises: “shaming” individuals into leaving or physically 
removing them. Ruminating on these options, one H.G. resident said “you can just make them go 
and physically handle them out. But at that point, you are no worse than some of the people we 
rally against the hardest.” The result, he laments, is “a group shaming.” And that is unfortunate, 
he said, because “there is a lot of resentment by the end of it.” Shaming involves continually 
reminding a person they are not wanted in the community any longer. Ideally, he said, the 
“person who is getting mobbed realizes, ‘oh, well I don’t really fit in here and I don’t want to be 
here. So maybe I should just leave.’” However, this is not always the case. Every now and again 
residents will remove the ex-member’s belongings and place them outside the encampment to 
further entice them to leave. This is unfortunate for the individuals voted-out and for the 
community who must spend more energy on trying to enforce their decisions to keep out 
unwanted individuals.  
Delimiting Personal Rights Through Rights of Property  
One of the biggest challenges that encampments face is seeing out decisions to remove unwanted 
individuals. While sometimes a smooth process, other times banishing residents involves verbal 
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and physical altercations. The inability of houseless communities to ensure that their evictions 
happen smoothly is exacerbated by the limited possessory rights of the encampments. The heart 
of this disparity lies in the incommensurability of the property rights of encampments and the 
rights of its residents. For, the limited property rights of encampments do not guarantee 
encampment residents their personal rights to privacy and security—rights that are central to 
citizenship.  
As previously mentioned, Portland’s encampments are legally designated as self-
governing shelters. Most holding non-profit status, the encampments are “sovereign” entities, 
contracted by the City to manage their own shelter operations. As legal institutions, they are 
almost entirely removed from state or private influence concerning how their sites are run. As 
institutions, encampments are responsible for ensuring that their residents are safe and that their 
members contribute to maintaining an orderly encampment space. In the collective interest of the 
community, therefore, encampments partly realize their authority as institutions when they 
banish or “evict” residents.     
That encampments cannot enforce their own eviction decisions is problematic in different 
ways. One common reason residents refuse to leave after being voted out concerns personal 
property located on site, particularly property which is highly immobile. One ongoing dispute at 
H.G. I witnessed during its weekly assemblies was about who retains ownership over tiny houses 
when a resident is voted out. Sometimes a resident who has built their own tiny house gets voted 
out of the community. For such an individual, to bring along their house when they leave the 
encampment would be nearly impossible to do. Even more problematic for encampments is 
deciding who retains “ownership” over tiny houses when they were collectively built, either by a 
group of volunteers, which many houses in Portland’s encampments have been, or by successive 
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individuals inhabiting the house. Because encampments do not own the property on which they 
operate, delineating ownership over personal property can be thoroughly contested by banished 
residents.    
The disparity between institutional and personal rights thus places encampment residents 
in a bind. Encampments do not own the property on which they reside, nor do they enjoy full 
possessory rights to the property as tenants. Encampments cannot guarantee their residents rights 
to privacy and they are not able to secure residents’ personal property because encampments lack 
the right to exclude. Compounding this is that houseless residents hold personal liberty rights as 
citizens separate from the encampment’s property rights, including citizenship rights to privacy 
and to self-protection. But because encampments are limited in their property rights—institutions 
without the right to exclude—residents’ personal rights to privacy and protection against others 
are curtailed. In other words, the limited property rights of the encampments prevent residents 
from securing these key liberty rights as citizens.  
So what does this mean for encampments and their residents? Two main problems arise 
regarding encampments’ limited property rights and how this affects the personal rights of 
residents. The first concerns the autonomy of encampments as self-governing collectives. If an 
encampment collectively votes to remove an individual, its lack of legal right to evict prevents 
them from realizing their decision to remove that individual. The second, and perhaps more 
significant dilemma, is that encampments cannot legally exclude non-authorized intruders from 
entering their property.26 Without the right to exclude, the encampments are vulnerable to 
anyone who wishes to enter for any reason.  And this does happen. It is not uncommon at H.G., 
 
26 Only the City of Portland does not have a legal right to enter the encampments without 24 hours’ advance notice 
since the City has contracts between the encampments and the government mandating that they must notify the 
encampments of their intention to stop in to the site.  
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for instance, for someone to walk through the gate in the middle of the night and look around. 
All the encampments run security shifts overnight for this very reason. Not having a legal right 
to exclude means the residents at the encampments cannot secure their site; they are unable to 
legally keep out anyone for any or no reason whatsoever; the police, neighbors, intruders seeking 
to cause harm, etc. Such rights of protection and privacy, to secure one’s space, are rights tenants 
leasing an apartment or homeowners enjoy and have protected by the state. 
 The disparity between encampment rights and the personal rights of residents illustrates 
the underlying connection between property and rights of citizenship and how property rights 
shape the actual experiences of houseless citizens residing within encampments. The right to 
exclude others from property has been one of the most powerful actions available to those with 
property rights. Some even argue that property is defined by the right to exclude itself; deny 
someone the right to exclude, argues Merrill (1998, 730), and “they do not have property.” The 
lack of a right to legally exclude for encampments becomes instrumental in demarcating 
houseless people residing there as property insecure people.  
In this way, Baron (2004) argues that the state of being houseless ought to be considered 
through the legal status of “no property,” a legal rhetoric suggesting that houseless peoples’ 
rights are actually a set of “no rights, disabilities and vulnerabilities” resulting from the duties 
and actions attached with liberal property rights (p. 287). For encampment residents, then, they 
still remain in a negative relationship to property, despite collectively holding some possessory 
rights to property. For, they are not always on “the rights-asserting, power-enforcing side” of 
property rights. Rather, houseless encampment residents are on the receiving side of property, 
the side that has duties or liabilities imposed on them by property owners (Baron 2006, 1427). 
Portland’s houseless encampment residents therefore do not share the same liberty protections as 
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property owners. For, they do not enjoy the property right which secures their personal rights to 
not be interfered with—the right to exclude—except insofar as the encampments can informally 
protect and promote these rights on their behalf.  
Conclusion 
Self-governing houseless encampments are thought to provide more authority for their residents 
in operating their shelter than the average houseless person holds. With some possessory rights, 
houseless encampment residents do benefit from self-organizing, by creating stable and dignified 
spaces for residents. In some ways, therefore, encampment residents’ right to access property 
confers privileges of citizenship similar to those housed citizens also experience.  
These privileges are not as complete for encampment residents as they are for propertied 
citizens, however. Houseless residents cannot fully enjoy citizenship rights of privacy and 
security when residing in encampments, for they cannot enjoy the state-backed right to exclude 
when residing in the encampment. So while property has been historically understood to secure a 
citizen’s freedom and autonomy within liberal democracies, and thus the capacity for rational, 
self-governance, houseless encampment residents necessarily forego the ability to secure their 
immediate surroundings until they access or own property. That is, they cannot realize the 
benefits of self-governance essential to the model of propertied-citizenship.   
The case of Portland’s self-governing encampments indicate not only that encampment 
residents reside within these spaces precariously, but the legal predicaments of the encampments 
directs attention to larger inequities within liberal-democratic citizenship. Much scholarship on 
democratic citizenship has shown how liberal rights are unequally experienced. But property 
relations have not been a central feature in defining these inequities. The contradictions present 
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in Portland’s houseless encampments demonstrate one way in which property rights shape how 
personal rights of citizenship are negated.  
By examining how houseless citizenship is relationally produced, by looking at how 
citizenship is claimed, enacted, and limited within and outside of the encampment for houseless 
people, we are better able to understand how citizenship privileges and rights are mediated by 
property access. What self-governing encampments highlight for us is how liberal rights of 
citizenship are not fully commensurable with liberal rights of property. What this means for 
Portland’s houseless individuals residing in encampments is that encampment residency 
necessitates a trade-off in citizenship privileges. Residents relinquish their legal right to 
guaranteed privacy and security in order to have more control over other aspects of their lives 
through the self-governing process. The benefits may be comparatively good, then, for those 
individuals who have suffered on the streets or within the shelter system. But these benefits come 
with personal risk. Without the assurance that the sites are protected through legal rights of 
exclusion, residents are vulnerable to the uncertainty of living outside of formal protections of 
the state.  
Whether the benefits outweigh the limitations is subject to a resident’s own experience 
residing in an encampment. What is less relative, and thus more cause for concern, however, is 
the way in which common law structures the rights of individuals through property. The core 
discrepancy surrounding rights in the encampments is that encampments themselves have 
separate rights from the individuals residing within them. Legally, encampments are recognized 
as only individual entities, institutions that are legally subject to their use agreements. The fact 
that these institutions function through the labor of a collective of individuals is separate. These 
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individuals have personal citizenship rights. But as we have seen, the rights of property limit 
how those residents can secure their liberty rights.  
What this points to therefore is a broader shortcoming of how liberalism recognizes the 
collective rights of such groups. There is little within the individualized nature of liberal rights 
that allows for collective representation. The liberal model of propertied-citizenship cannot 
effectively encompass the collective rights of marginalized groups, such as R2DT or H.G. 
Instead, liberalism must strike a balance between rights of property and personal rights of liberty 
by protecting one over the other. Those without property often go unprotected in this 
relationship.      
To begin to redress the inequities of propertied-citizenship requires some theory of 
justice. Such a theory would be sensitive to the divisive role property plays within liberal-
democracy more broadly, which is the topic of Chapter 5.  















Chapter 5: Before the “End of Politics:” The Injustice of Property in Democracy 
“I am for the pod community in St. Johns, but I am against the current proposed location on 
North Roberts because of the potential for negative impact on the preschool, the assisted living 
community and the immediate neighbor next door" - Neighbor of potential relocation site of 
Hazelnut Grove 
“I think that the City has pursued the camps unevenly. You see that the City is picking out areas 
where property owners are “less sophisticated.” I have yet to see it tried in the West Hills, in 
Westmoreland, in Laurelhurst. All three of these facilities are sanctioned in North Portland. 
There needs to be an expectation that these encampments could be sited anywhere in the City… 
and property owners know that going into it” - Hazelnut Grove neighbor 
“You know, R2DT and Hazelnut formed an unsanctioned village and then they expected 
something from that. I personally don’t agree with that. You want prime time property? Then 
anyone can go, “we need prime time real estate for our village.” I don’t think it should work that 
way. Folks who start villages now seem to have a bunch of political power. And you are kinda 
going, “huh, that’s interesting.” How much money is the City going to spend to try and appease 
these [houseless people in encampments]”- Kenton Women’s Village neighbor 
 
Common to the narratives of homeowners about self-governing houseless encampments is that 
they are out of place. Although neighbors of encampments often express approval for the idea of 
encampments existing somewhere, they always seem to be in “the wrong location.” When I 
asked the chair of the Overlook Neighborhood Association (OKNA) what he thought of 
Hazelnut Grove’s original location, he said that “there are issues with that site in particular, 
[issues] for the neighborhood specifically that just make it unsuitable for it. It’s a wildlife 
corridor, it’s a fire hazard. If it goes up in flames in the summer, it is going to take out part of the 
neighborhood. It’s just not a good place.” While there are certainly legitimate safety concerns 
about any group who must live outside, the Chair’s comments represent a more generally-shared 
attitude toward organized houseless encampments in Portland: that there are certain interests that 
are more important than those of the residents of self-governing encampments.27 For many 
 
27 Such “not in my back yard” oppositions are nothing new for houseless services. Scholars have noted how the 
social and spatial expansion of houselessness in the U.S. has exacerbated citizen opposition to social services being 
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homeowners I interviewed, it is “the neighborhood” that is not a good place for self-governing 
encampments, not so much that self-governing encampments are not alright in and of 
themselves.  
That idea that specific neighborhoods are not appropriate for an encampment to be in is 
reflected in the quotations above. These statements illustrate a sense that the real issue needing to 
be addressed is how propertied-citizens are affected by the encampments. As the second 
quotation shows, some homeowners neighboring encampments believe the City is responsible 
for mis-locating three North Portland encampments, KWV, HG, and R2DT. This homeowner 
feels as if the City was purposefully placing self-governing encampments in areas that it views as 
“less sophisticated.” In addition to feeling that encampments are disproportionately placed in a 
few areas of the city, other homeowners feel that Portland’s self-governing encampments 
experience unmatched political power compared to that of propertied-citizens. That is, because 
the City supports these encampments in their use of public properties, the rules of the democratic 
game no longer seem to apply for propertied-citizens who oppose the encampments. Such 
statements indicate that homeowners feel a threat to the perceived power of the self-governing 
encampments, specifically as it regards the use and rights of property for the camps. Implied 
within these statements is a concern that Portland’s self-governing houseless communities are 
disrupting the model of propertied-citizenship that has been established within liberal-
democracies.  
 
sited near them. Emergency services for houseless people such as shelters and clinics were often located in inner-
city areas, what Dear & Wolch (1987) termed “service dependent ghettos.” As the the spatial spread of care 
services for the houseless grew, moving to suburban areas, for instance, opposition from new populations were 
seen. With such a spatial expansion of houseless services came a social pathologizing of houseless people as 
deviants (Takahashi 1998, Lyon-Callo 2001).            
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Indeed, Portland residents are sympathetic to the conditions of houseless people. Many 
housed Portlanders generally see the self-governing encampments as helpful emergency services. 
Despite this sympathy, however, rarely do homeowners feel that the encampments are located in 
the right place. The site where HG is located is not the only location that is contested by 
neighbors. All of Portland’s villages experience pushback by neighbors, residents claiming that 
these villages are better off elsewhere. Before landing at its current site, Right 2 Dream Too 
(R2DT), was turned down from several locations because neighbors insisted that the prospective 
sites were “not the right location” (VanderHart 2017). Dignity Village, and even the Kenton 
Women’s Village, whom many hail as the most successful of the city’s villages, also were 
subject to complaints by neighbors.  
A common refrain for the houseless, when pressed with no place to legally be, is: where I 
am to go? In the context of self-governing encampments, then, where is the proper location for 
any of Portland’s self-governing encampments? Surely answers to this question regarding ideal 
locations for encampments are matters of geographic concern. One recent project, in fact, has 
located ideal sites for Portland’s encampments using site suitability analysis. The analysis found 
117 vacant properties within the City of Portland boundaries. Of these vacant parcels, only 29 
were publicly-owned and not designated as parks and/or green spaces (IPMS 2018). Portland’s 
government has relied upon this sort of site suitability analyses to locate available properties for 
encampment relocations.  
Yet site suitability queries are poor tools for examining other aspects related to location, 
especially matters of inequity and power. Where Portland’s encampments locate themselves are 
matters of social, political, and economic conceptions of how property should be valued. These 
are not just matters of finding an ideal location for encampments, but questions of the proper use 
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of property and how rights to property are used to produce certain socio-spatial ends. For the 
homeowners quoted above, encampment rights to property bring certain harms to neighboring 
property owners and appear to affect the control homeowners feel they lack in keeping out 
encampments from their neighborhood. For the houseless in encampments, such properties do 
more than simply extend lifelines, but allow for certain segments of the houseless population to 
live with a sense of agency through collective decision-making. Yet, as we have seen, 
encampments’ property rights cannot fully ensure the stability that houseless people are seeking 
through such practices. These geographic problems are concerned with the equity of property 
relations. In short, they concern what relationships of justice could look like for houseless people 
living in a model of propertied-citizenship. 
Geographers have long been interested in issues of justice. By one account, mentions of 
social justice within geographic research appeared as early as the first decade of the twentieth 
century (Heynen et el. 2018). But geographers did not take up justice as a concept in earnest until 
the late 1960s radical turn within the discipline. In doing so, however, geographers interested in 
justice began moving away from examining liberalism, most notably in Harvey’s (1973) analysis 
of urban justice. My first focus of this chapter is to retrain attention back on liberalism within 
debates of justice. Working through these debates, the majority of which came during the 1990s, 
helps us see the ways in which the model of propertied-citizenship is dependent upon democracy 
for its realization.  
Reviewing the debates about justice in the liberal tradition sets up my second goal of this 
chapter: to analyze how democratic politics have been incorporated within the discipline of 
geography. While geographers have examined the concepts of citizenship and scale related to 
democracy, they have been less inclined to work within theories of democracy in relation to 
150 
 
liberalism itself. I suggest that the discipline’s preoccupation with neoliberalism over the last two 
decades may have likened democracy to simply that of liberalism—the political ideology 
providing the foundation for new liberal theories of economics. In tandem with the attention to 
neoliberalism, new ontological interpretations of the political further distracted attention from 
democratic politics and theories behind them. In this light, normative interpretations of ordinary 
democratic politics have been largely absent from political and geographic analyses (Exceptions 
to this are found in Barnett 2017, Barnett and Low 2004, and D. Smith 1995).28  
The chapter begins by reviewing liberal theories of justice and includes how geographers 
have contributed to these discussions. Central to these debates is an intractable problem 
concerning the scale at which theories of justice might apply. Those maintaining universal 
theories of justice, I suggest, distract from a focus on how it is that democratic politics situate or 
produce socio-economic inequities. The second part of the chapter analyzes how geographers 
have been influenced by political thinking which promotes a particular understanding of 
democratic politics, one where everyday political actions do not amount to politics proper. Such 
post-democratic or post-political theories of democracy, I suggest, are helpful in addressing the 
constraints of liberalism. But when we follow such ontological constructs to their logical 
conclusion, I argue that we lose valuable insight into how the everyday procedures of democracy 
negotiates inequities. What we miss, I suggest, is how democracy as a political process 
necessitates citizenship participation to be able to prioritize certain normative values which lead 
to social and political inequities.       
 
28 I will closely examine the work of Barnett (2017) later in the chapter.   
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In analyzing key debates within these literatures, my attention to spatializations of 
democracy are not explicit. Rather, my analysis of geographers’ perspectives on justice and 
democratic politics implicitly provides geographic critique. As such, I do not advance a 
geographical theory of democratic justice as much as I imply that geographic thinking helps us to 
realize an understanding of democratic justice. In ending the chapter, I draw from my analyses of 
the democratic justice literatures to address what this means for Portland’s houseless 
encampment residents, citizens active in producing the boundaries of a liberal model of 
propertied-citizenship.  
Situating Liberal Justice 
Ideas about what justice is or ought to be precede liberalism as a political ideology. 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill were influential in 
advancing utilitarianism as ideal means of arriving at political and economic justice for liberal 
society. Most notable within liberal scholarship on justice, however, is that of John Rawls (1971) 
in his A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory of justice recognized that socio-economic and political 
inequality was an intrinsic quality of liberal political life. Although widely critiqued, Rawls’ 
theory laid the foundation for constructive debates regarding what justice and injustice ought to 
mean. The general tenor of these debates suggested that no universal theory of justice is plausible 
within liberalism. For, justice is a concept situated within certain times and spaces; its meanings 
represent something unique among different groups of individuals.  
Whether or not a universal notion of justice can be established, justice as a concept holds 
significance. As a guiding principle that can be used to ameliorate suffering, by addressing how 
some groups are oppressed by liberal institutions, the concept is decidedly political. This section 
therefore reviews crucial insights from the debates over justice throughout the last five decades. 
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To keep the discussion relevant, I draw from geographers and urban theorists’ contributions to 
this large body of scholarship so that I may point to avenues for intervention into the inequities 
of houseless citizenship discussed in the final section. 
The main intention behind Rawls’ theory of justice was to devise a way to maximize 
equality among citizens within liberal society. He envisioned a world where all individuals 
would have fair and equal opportunities to obtain material resources while individual liberties 
were still protected. To make his argument, he developed a hypothetical situation whereby all 
individuals knew nothing about each other’s class status or other social characteristics. Under 
such a “veil of ignorance,” Rawls imagined that individuals would better identify just principles 
because no one person would be aware of their own social position. Individuals in the “original 
position,” Rawls argued, would choose to maximize economic equality amongst the group by 
attempting to minimize the material deprivation of the groups economically worst off. That is, 
they would choose to do so if they were following his principles of justice.  
Rawls’s theory defined two principles of justice. The first principle states that "each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others" (1971, 53). The second states that "social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all" (p. 53). The first 
principle takes priority over the second, but socio-economic inequality must be attempted to be 
mitigated. He states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (p. 72). In other words, 
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socio-economic inequality is permitted, but citizens should attempt to minimize economic 
disparities for those less well-off.  
Through his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls provided a liberal egalitarian model of 
political organizing dependent on social cooperation. He assumed his theory to be one based on 
“fairness” because the most disadvantaged would not be forgotten while all individuals would 
have their liberty’s protected. Justice, for Rawls, was found within the balance between 
competing claims to protect individual liberties while maximizing the material conditions of the 
worst off within the group (p. 9). In this way, there is no objective end to justice, no quantifiable 
value by which justice is achieved. Rather, justice is found when individuals adhere to the 
contract laid out in the two principles, whatever may be the results of the groups’ decision-
making. It is thus fundamentally a rights-based theory, in that the principles necessitate that 
rights and duties are the source from which equality derives.       
Rawls’ theory of justice was critiqued by many and for different reasons. Most notable 
was Robert Nozick’s libertarian understanding of justice as rooted in relations of property. 
Nozick (1974) saw Rawls’s contractarian model as unjust because it requires individuals to “act 
as resources for the benefit of others” (p. 26). That is, Rawls’ social contract requires individuals 
to redistribute wealth based on situations of the worst off within Rawls’ original position. 
Against distributive theories of justice generally, Nozick argued that only relationships that are 
voluntarily entered into, without force of the state or other individuals, represent a just exchange 
or relation. For Nozick, then, distributions are just if all individuals are “entitled to the holdings 
they possess under the distribution" (p. 151). In Nozick’s “entitlement theory,” justice is found 
when people are "entitled to [their holdings] by the principles of justice in acquisition and 
transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice" (p. 153). That is, individuals are entitled 
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to their resources if they acquired their properties justly, through just acquisition. In that people 
are entitled to their holdings and cannot have them taken for the benefit of others, Nozick 
suggests that all that remains to be done to push “toward equality of opportunity is convincing 
persons each to choose to devote some of their holdings to achieving it" (p. 235). In other words, 
equality through redistribution can only be achieved by voluntary giving to those who have less.  
Nozick’s position is one that renders the state and its institutions virtually non-existent, 
save to arbitrate disputes between conflicts over resources. While Rawls did not theorize the 
state in A Theory of Justice, he assumes a liberal state where individuals hold liberty rights. Thus 
his model is premised on the notion of liberal-democratic states. Perhaps because of this, many 
of Rawls’ other major critiques have centered on the liberal model itself, questioning Rawls’ 
apparent reification of extant liberal individualism.  
An underlying component of Rawls’ liberal theory, for example, was that self-interest can 
be set aside by individuals who are then able to make decisions for the greater good of society. 
Again, this happens when individuals adhere to the two principles of justice. By promoting strict 
adherence to these rights and duties, Rawls espoused a deontological theory of liberalism, one, 
Dworkin (1978, 169) argued, which “takes rights so seriously as to make them fundamental in 
political morality.” Rawls’ theory only makes sense, as Dworkin noted, if the individuals within 
this hypothetical scenario never become aware of their unique talents and interests. For, when the 
“veil of ignorance” is lifted, he argued, “some will discover that they would have been better off 
if some other principle… had been chosen” (p. 153). In establishing rights-based boundaries for 
maximizing equality, Rawls’ theory maintained the liberal prominence of individual rights. The 
logical ordering of equal liberty rights over those of socio-economic inequality reflects 
protections already present within liberalism. 
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Others critiqued Rawls’ prioritization of the “right” over the “good.” Similar to Dworkin, 
Michael Sandel (1982) argued that what would justify deontological theories such as Rawls’ is 
not that “they maximize the social welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they 
conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and independent of it" 
(p. 1, emphasis added). Sandel suggested Rawlsian liberalism depicted individuals as subjects 
who were “given prior to their ends” (p. 9). In other words, Rawls’ theory assumed equality 
could be maximized only when the rules or principles of liberal rights were followed, regardless 
of the results of such a hypothetical arrangement. This, Sandel argued, denied the moral and 
rational aspects of human nature (p. 179), a human nature that cannot be pre-given, but one that 
was formed through social, and, in this instance, political engagement. Justice, for Sandel, cannot 
be pre-conceived by adhering to Rawls’ two principles of justice, for doing so ignores the 
capacities of individuals to use reason to derive a common good which may not be feasible by 
adhering to pre-given principles.  
Such critiques of Rawls anticipated much of the scholarly discourse on justice throughout 
the following decades. Sandel’s conclusion is that the concept of justice, if it is something even 
knowable in the first instance, is only found upon reflection over what constitutes a common 
good for society. And it is along these lines that Amartya Sen argued that we cannot know what 
justice is through a Rawlsian model. Sen (2009) argued that Rawlsian justice is one predicated 
on just institutional arrangements for society, an approach called “transcendental 
institutionalism” (p. 5). This approach concentrates on “perfect justice,” by identifying “social 
characteristics that cannot be transcended in terms of justice,” like those of Rawls’ two 
principles. By focusing on the perfect form of institutional justice, Sen argued, Rawls’ approach 
was “not directly focused on the actual societies that would ultimately emerge” (p. 6). A 
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contractarian model, from this perspective, is concerned with finding alternatives to the 
imperfect ways in which society’s inequities may be addressed. 
Another main critique of such a rights-based theory of justice also concerns the absences 
and thus limits of the liberal framework within which Rawls was working. As a rights-based 
mode of political organizing, Rawls’ theory of justice attempted to amend for injustices primarily 
by re-distributing goods, so as to lessen socio-economic disparities. The expansion of economic 
benefits for the poor, for example, is often championed as a matter of distributional justice. 
Nancy Fraser (1997) has argued that a notion of justice only attending to socio-economic matters 
of redistribution misses the related social and cultural injustices extant within liberal society. 
Given how distributive theories narrow the scope of what is conceived of as an injustice in this 
way, by only looking at patterns of economic inequality, Fraser argued that cultural 
misrecognition and domination were left unaddressed. Justice for Fraser would necessitate both 
economic re-distribution and a cultural politics of recognition that seeks equality for traditionally 
dominated social groups.   
Similar to Fraser, Iris Marion Young has argued that an emphasis on distribution misses 
essential aspects of social justice. For her, justice “should not only refer to distribution, but also 
the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities 
and collective communication and cooperation" (1990, 39). For Young, attempting to minimize 
economic inequality through redistribution of material goods is valuable. But any theory of 
justice must also attend to the social and cultural aspects of liberal society, particularly those 
capacities of social life that are limited by the institutions of liberal-democracies. Distributional 
theories of justice, Young argued, reify “aspects of social life that are better understood as a 
function of rules and relations than as things” because of how they conceptualize social justice 
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“primarily in terms of end-state patterns, rather than focusing on social processes” (1990, 25). 
From this perspective, redistributive theories of justice overlooked how social structures 
constrain the self-determination of individuals or groups.     
Young therefore emphasized how liberal institutions themselves were a source of 
injustice because of how they limited the scope of remedies for inequalities. Injustice for her 
partly stems from the institutional or systemic constraints on individuals’ self-development and 
their self-determination, or how institutions oppress and dominate groups and individuals (1990, 
41). This happens because of the way in which liberal institutions reduce social differences, 
universalizing what liberal subjects’ needs ought to be. In upholding such narrow idealizations of 
the liberal citizen, liberal institutions marginalize and silence differences within liberal society 
(1990, 48-58). Social justice, for Young, therefore “concerns the degree to which a society 
contains and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realization of these values... 
(1) developing and exercising one's capacities and expressing one's experience... and 
(2) participating in determining one's action and the conditions of one's action" (p. 37). She 
argues that these universal values assume equal moral worth for all persons. And as such, justice 
requires the promotion of them for everyone.  
Fraser and Young’s critiques of liberal theories of justice reflected a turn in the social 
sciences more attuned to cultural values, values which distributive or structural accounts of 
justice often did not incorporate. These and other contributions helped highlight absences present 
within discussions of liberal injustice more broadly. For, they illustrated the consequences of 
universalizing liberal identity in theories of re-distributive justice.  
But Young’s and Fraser’s accounts of social injustice were challenged for their apparent 
relativism. In response to Young, David Harvey argued that post-structuralist approaches to 
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justice emphasizing difference and otherness inhibited appropriate responses to matters of 
injustice. To be sure, like these other scholars, Harvey (1996) acknowledged that “there can be 
no universal conception of justice to which we can appeal as a normative concept... there are 
only particular, competing, fragmented, and heterogeneous conceptions of and discourses about 
justice which arise out of the particular situations of those involved" (p. 342). Further, Harvey 
agreed with Young’s critique of distributional justice for its ability to emphasize “the 
heterogeneity of experience of injustice” (1996, 349). Yet, Harvey stated that a concept of justice 
necessitates some universal application against the heterogenous positions of identity recognition 
commonly advanced through identity politics. “Somewhere between the vulgar essentialist view 
and the potentially infinite fluidity of multiple and shifting identifications,” Harvey argued, 
“there has to be a sufficient permanence established (however contingent) to give direction (for a 
time and in a place) to political action” (p. 357). For him, finding similarity across differences is 
needed for a theory of political action as well as for justice.  
For Harvey, class is the identity through which similarities are most universally realized. 
For, he understands class not as a fixed position but as a process. As such, he defined class as 
“situatedness or positionality in relation to processes of capital accumulation” (p. 359). Only by 
re-engaging “with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation, can we hope to reestablish 
a conception of social justice as something to be fought for as a key value within an ethics of 
political solidarity built across different places" (1996, 360). Despite people having “multiple 
roles in relation to different circuits of capital,” Harvey argued that “certain ‘permanences’ 
form…in a given place and time and are more or less effective in relation to processes of capital 
accumulation across a certain space and time” (p. 360). It is through the process of class 
identification, in relation to our situatedness in relation to capital, that “we find ourselves sharing 
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a world of similarity increasingly also characterized by homogeneity and sameness” (p. 360). 
While Harvey recognized that social differences contribute to contextually-specific geographies 
of injustice, he nonetheless claimed that “a political program which successfully combats any 
form of oppression has to face up to the real difficulty of a loss of identity on the part of those 
who have been victims of that oppression” (p. 364). In other words, if justice is the concept used 
to ameliorate real oppressions, socio-economic alliances must find similarity through more 
“permanent” or commonly identifiable aspects of social life. 
Among these theorists, therefore, there are divergent notions of what justice ought to be. 
On the one hand, universal and distributive theories of justice overlook the heterogeneity of 
oppressions within liberal society and may reinforce inequities among groups because of this 
generalizing tendency to equate oppressions as similar. At the other end, claims for justice 
premised on identity may create complications for forming alliances which may more effectively 
advance claims for retribution within liberalism. Reconciling these theoretical tensions is not my 
purpose herein. Rather, what I suggest is most important within the debates over social justice is 
how these critiques identify the differing ways in which liberalism constrains the ability of 
individuals and groups to affect their political and economic positions. 
Rescaling Universal Identities 
In an essay reflecting on liberal urbanism, Neil Smith (1995) suggests that a theory of social 
justice may not be possible or even desirable given the irreconcilability of identity-based and 
universalist understandings of justice. But Smith clearly saw significance in maintaining the 
concept of justice as a political tool. And the political purchase of working with the concept of 
justice could be found in what he termed the “subversive doubleness of justice” (p. 135). Smith 
used Marx’s explanation of exploitation to analogize the doubleness of justice. He stated that 
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“Marx’s redefinition of exploitation… combined two situated knowledges—that of the capitalist 
and the worker—in one vision; [exploitation] was thereby simultaneously homogenous and 
differentiated” (p. 133). Exploitation as described by Marx, Smith argued, was “simultaneously a 
judgement about social injustice and a measure of economic productivity; the calculation of the 
capitalist’s rate of surplus value was simultaneously the calculation of the worker’s rate of 
exploitation” (ibid). As such, a critique of justice was “always already inscribed in the analytical 
‘description’ of capitalism” (ibid). What followed from this, for Smith, was that justice was a 
condition resulting from the dialectical relations of exploitation. In other words, the concept of 
justice or the political usefulness of the concept of justice was likely to be found within the 
analyses of exploitation because of the latter’s double meaning.   
Smith argued that this kind of critique of exploitation presents a good analogy to the 
internal relations of liberalism. He saw a similarly dialectical relationship within liberal theories 
of justice. He noted that “liberal conceptions of social justice have traditionally centered on the 
language of individual rights, responsibilities and fortunes… regardless of identities” (p. 134). If 
there ever was a more homogenizing feature of liberalism it is that everyone is understood as 
“equal” in their rights to liberty. At the same time, Smith noted, it has been “a centerpiece of 
radical critiques that identity always mediated this supposed universalism of individual rights” 
(ibid). Within liberalism, then, Smith saw a “subversive doubleness” at play in regard to 
injustice. That is, there is always a doubleness underlying how liberalism structures justice. 
While individuals have the capacity to claim and argue for more personally perceived identity-
based rights, those rights must still be equally applied to all citizens, necessitating that these 
rights claims be universalized. Put another way, for identity-based claims of injustice to be 
recognized within liberalism, much analytical and political work is needed to connect how 
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individually experienced injustices could translate to broader rights that can be protected for all 
citizens. Any attempt to do so, Smith suggests, “is absolutely dependent on retaining and 
continually remaking the scale translation between individuality and justice” (p. 135). The ability 
to use the concept of justice as a progressive tool toward ameliorating oppression and domination 
therefore relies upon how these dialectically related aspects—the relationship between identity 
and individualism—are structured within the confines of liberalism. 
Smith’s recognition of the doubleness of liberal justice underscores the political utility of 
taking seriously the procedures and limitations of liberal-democratic politics. For, 
acknowledging the limits of universal and relativist theories of liberal justice does not negate the 
values promoted when appeals to justice are made. As Iris Young (1990, 35) has noted, “appeals 
to justice still have power to awaken a moral imagination and motivate people to look at their 
society critically.” And despite being “hopelessly confused” when justice is analyzed in 
abstraction, Harvey argues (1996, 361) that “ideas of social justice can still function… as a 
powerful mobilizing discourse for political action.” Justice might not be able to be distilled into a 
universal theory, but it remains a concept with wide political purchase in that it holds a general 
or tacit understanding that moral wrong exists through social relations, a moral recognition that 
exceeds the narrow legal definition of justice as a matter of solely law and order.   
If, as Smith suggests, justice is situated in the scalar translation between individual or 
group identities and the universal rights equally protected for all citizens, can we ever identify 
where justice resides within liberalism? Rather than developing upon a Rawlsian framing of 
justice, I suggest we can reasonably identify situations of injustice. Looking at instances or 
relations of injustice, as Amartya Sen (2009) has called for, may help identify and attend to 
inequities in the world. Against Rawls, therefore, comparative or “realization” approaches to 
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justice avoid universal or “transcendental institutional” models detailing what perfect justice 
looks like. Instead, as Sen (2009, 9) advocates, a comparative approach better helps us see what 
choices are available when attempting to mitigate a certain injustice and then reasoning through 
the effects of those choices that avoids the trap of trying to identify “a possibly unavailable 
perfect situation,” as with Rawls’ original position. For, injustice is experienced differently 
among individuals within liberal society. Therefore, “situating” injustice may provide the needed 
context about a particular inequity which may more easily allow for remediation to take place.29   
Suggesting that identifying situations of injustice offer a clearer path to identifying 
inequities and how to ameliorate them does not abnegate the calls from theorists like Harvey 
which suggest there are more universally-experienced oppressions common to all of society. 
There are identifiable relations of oppression affecting large swaths of society. For instance, the 
property-insecure within the liberal model of propertied-citizenship are generally limited in their 
citizenship protections (See Chapters 3 and 4). However, these limits are not equal across space 
and time. Rather than pre-determining the limits of propertied-citizenship within space, I suggest 
what is more effective is examining how the procedures of democratic politics affect 
marginalized groups. Doing so provides a way of situating the inequities of houselessness in 
their actual social, political, and economic context, an idea I develop in relation to Portland’s 
encampments at the end of this chapter.   
With this in mind, I turn to theories of the political by tracing the work of two thinkers, 
Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Ranciere, as they have had particular purchase within geographers’ 
approach to scholarship on politics. The political theories promoted by these two are useful for 
 




illustrating the tensions between liberalism and democracy, particularly as they pinpoint the 
limited spaces within liberalism to oppose unequal relations of power. Yet, such theories of the 
political tend to eschew ordinary analyses of democracy, by escalating proper democratic politics 
to modes of resistance infrequently experienced within liberal-democracies. I suggest after 
reviewing the post-political scholarship that we continue to analyze the normative relations of 
democratic politics. We ought to do so, however, by evaluating how it is that democracy 
functions as means of addressing socio-economic inequities, not how democracy has eliminated 
politics from social life. By evaluating democratic politics in such a way we can begin to see 
how injustices are situated and affect the demos.    
After Post-Politics: Tracing A Geography of Democratic Injustice  
While geographers have contributed to theories of justice, geography has largely eschewed 
analysis of liberal or democratic theory itself (for notable exceptions see Staeheli 2008, 2010; 
Barnett & Low, 2004). Perhaps this avoidance is due to liberalism’s close connection with neo-
liberalism, a political-economic concept which geographers have analyzed at length (Leitner et 
al. 2007; Hackworth 2007; Harvey 2005; Larner 2000; Peck and Tickell 2002). What much of 
the geographic literature on neoliberalism argues is that liberalizing economic processes since 
the 1970s have eroded democracy in places where democratic politics were once assumed to be 
robust. Here, capital is understood to have taken over democratic institutions, thus enabling the 
expansion of global circuits of capital accumulation (Purcell 2007). Because of this, some have 
even argued that neoliberalism’s shaping of contemporary governance has left democracies in a 
state of “post-politics” (Swyngedouw 2009; Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014), a hollowed out 
democratic state whereby democratic institutions are effectively externally controlled.  
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Geographers certainly have attended to key aspects of social and political life within 
democracies, however. The study of citizenship, for instance, has garnered much attention within 
the discipline, emphasizing the ways in which space and scale are inherent in the process of 
affecting individuals’ claims for, and denial of, citizenship rights. Cities, for example, are 
highlighted as critical spaces through which citizenship practices come to the fore (Staeheli 
2003, 2011; Rossi and Vanolo 2012; Blokland et al. 2015). Particularly, urban public spaces 
have been shown to function as sites representing the public/private divide, where “the public” 
and civic life is defined and reconstituted (Mitchell 1995, 2003). Such work examines how the 
production of citizenship is a process closely connected to the production space.  
So too have geographers contributed to discussions about the relational nature of scale in 
forming citizenship. Scholars have decentered the nation-state as the sole determining factor in 
forming individuals’ citizenship experiences, eschewing much common political analysis of 
citizenship which pays attention only to the nation-state as the scale at which citizenship is 
determined. Migration scholars, for example, have shown how transnational migrants produce 
new spaces of belonging within their new countries of residence (Erhhamp and Leitner 2006); 
how it is that immigrants (and their allies) advocate for alternatives to political membership 
within the rigid structures of liberal democracies (Leitner and Shrunk 2014); and the various 
ways in which ethnic identities of migrants cohere uneasily to presupposed civic or national 
identities (Secor 2004). The significance of space and scale in identifying citizenship formations 
provides needed context about who is claiming, enacting, or losing citizenship and how such 
processes are structured by social, political, and economic processes.    
The geographic emphasis on the role of space and scale in forming citizenship illustrates 
well how individuals are politically hindered or enabled within democratic society. Geographers 
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have not given as much attention to theories of democracy as they have to theories of social and 
political life within democracies. Democratic theory can generally be defined as inquiry which 
examines “the normative purpose of and scope of democratic practice, the nature, scale, and 
membership of democratic communities, and the design of democratic institutions" (Bray and 
Slaughter 2015, 4). This has led Barnett and Low (2004, 3) to argue that the terms through which 
“geographers have engaged in discussion of politics, justice, citizens, [and] elections have 
nourished an avoidance of reflection on the normative presuppositions of political institutions 
and on the basic criteria of political judgement underpinning democratic processes – criteria 
concerning what is right, what is just, what is good, and concerning how best to bring good, just, 
rightful outcomes about." Barnett (2009) insists that analyzing the effects of democratic 
procedures necessitates normative inquiry. For, the practical issues of democracy, such as “who 
should rule, how rule should be organized, and over what scope of activities… are internally 
related to questions of justification” (2009, n.p.). Better accounting for democratic politics 
requires not only analysis of empirical procedures of politics but also normative analysis of how 
such procedures relate to democratic ideals.  
This is not to say that politics generally within democratic states have not been theorized 
by geographers. Indeed, theories of “the political” have been robust throughout the last three 
decades. Particularly influential have been radical theories suggesting an end to traditional 
politics that are found in the thinking of Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Ranciere among others. 
Such accountings of politics were taken up by political geographers seeking to give similar 
accountings of the production of space. I address the ideas on politics of both of these theorists 
and of those drawing from them.  
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Chantal Mouffe’s understanding of traditional democratic politics is one that is 
necessarily antagonistic in that politics is about eliminating differing interests from the polity. 
Liberalism structures democratic politics as a “rational process of negotiations among 
individuals” (1993, 140), she argues, thereby eradicating the plural interests inherent within 
social relations. For her, “the political” represents the naturally antagonistic relations present 
within society. “Politics,” then, is the means by which liberal-democratic institutions seek to 
deny “the political” from articulating differing visions of democratic life (Mouffe, 2016, n.p.). 
For her, proper politics is enacted when groups are able to articulate multiple values within the 
realm of politics, representing the multiple subject positions from which society actually comes 
to politics. Liberalism’s push for political consensus, its desire to achieve hegemony through 
universalism, therefore is not democratic for Mouffe in that it cannot incorporate such plural 
identities. The best democratic politics can do is to enable conflict within politics, as proper 
politics are only realized in pluralist social relations.  
Democracy for Mouffe (2005) can then only be extended when radical pluralism is 
recognized. The notion that democracy can only be found through pluralist conflict, what she 
terms agonistic pluralism, is proper democratic politics. This is so, she argues, because agonistic 
relations allows for groups traditionally excluded from politics to negotiate as “adversaries” 
rather than as enemies to be excluded from the demos (p. 102). Mouffe’s notion of democratic 
politics underscores the ineradicable nature of difference located within plural identities 
represented in social life. The point of democratic politics from this perspective is to extend 
proper democracy by keeping conflict present through agonistic relations.     
Such an understanding of democratic politics fits comfortably with geographic theories of 
relational space. Drawing from Mouffe’s claims about how identities are differently shaped 
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through genuine engagement with “the political,” Doreen Massey (1995) notes how “spatiality” 
is also “implicated in the accomplishment of difference and identity” (p. 285). For, “social 
space,” Massey argues (p. 284), is “constituted out of social relations, social interactions, and for 
that reason is always and everywhere an expression and medium of power” (p. 284). Similarly, 
Purcell (2008) suggests that we ought to consider a radical democratic project that embodies 
pluralist, non-essentialist forms of political organization. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
Purcell suggests that opposing the oppression of others is best pursued by establishing “networks 
of equivalence,” a process of organizing disparate social interests against neoliberal interests. 
For, Purcell, this sort of pluralist politics is essential to advancing urban justice at a more 
universal level.  
Like Mouffe, Ranciere’s understanding of democratic politics has influenced much work 
within geography. For Ranciere, democracy as it is traditionally understood represents the 
closing down of politics. Traditional democracy erases politics because it forces us to arrive at an 
assumed consensus. He defines traditional politics as “the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution 
of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (1999, 28). Traditional 
democratic politics, then, concerns itself with the mundane task of coming to common agreement 
in accord with the procedures of democratic institutions. For Ranciere, this is problematic, as he 
sees democracy’s tendency toward consensus to be the antithesis of politics. Most strongly, 
Ranciere argues the apparent ubiquity of democratic consensus has come to represent something 
of a post-political moment, one whereby “proper” politics is all but eradicated by the logics of 
“policing” on behalf of the state.  
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Whereas the traditional understanding of democracy is facilitated by a set of state 
procedures working toward consensus, politics in Ranciere’s view is acted out in those moments 
of rupture which rework the stability of these procedures. Thus, he differentiates between the 
logic of traditional politics, what he calls “the police,” with what politics proper ought to be: an 
“extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing” (p. 29). In other words, proper politics is 
any activity working to reconfigure “the police,” activities that can disrupt the stasis of 
institutional procedures which keep individuals in a particular social order (p. 42). For Ranciere, 
true democratic politics is thus any activity attempting to realize individuals’ natural equality by 
means of disrupting the “police logic” of state institutions. In that true democratic politics rarely 
happens in the current political-economic environment, Ranciere suggests we are within a post-
political state, one where we are experiencing an end to politics.  
Ranciere’s conception of politics has been taken up particularly within urban geography. 
Some agree with Ranciere that we are now within a post-political state. Notably, Erik 
Swyngedouw has advanced Ranciere’s post-political thesis by arguing that urban politics and 
environmental problem solving are out of reach by the standards of traditional democratic 
politics. Swyngedouw (2009, 604) argues that the current approach to the environmental crisis 
represents a “postpolitical condition, one that evacuates the properly political from the plane of 
immanence that underpins any political intervention.” This is so, he argues, due to the rise in a 
neoliberal mode of governance which has “replaced debate, disagreement, and dissensus with a 
series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics 
and technocratic environmental management” (ibid). From this perspective, the means of 
traditional governance of democratic states eliminates the opportunity for citizens to reject and 
rework such modes of governance.  
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Some geographic scholarship has pushed back against Ranciere’s notion of the political, 
however. Davidson and Iveson (2015) argue that such a framing of politics is limited in its 
purchase for affecting change on the ground. For them, a political theory which sees “dissensus” 
entirely eliminated from democratic political life can have “the perverse effect of reinforcing, 
rather than undermining, the perception that ‘there is no alternative’” to a depoliticizing trend of 
modern democratic politics (p. 546). As such, they argue that we cannot hold so closely to 
Ranciere’s perception of politics as rare moments of dissensus because “politics is latent [across 
space], not just in its most peripheral and excluded spaces” (p. 557). They caution that politics is 
not everywhere, but that the potential lies within all spaces for enacting politics.  
What the post-political thesis eschews, therefore, is how the routine procedures of 
democratic politics still matter in social life. The post-political thesis assumes that the ongoing 
procedures of democratic institutions are useless within contemporary politics. As Mitchell et al. 
(2015) argue, such an assumption thus misses how it is that democratic consensus or hegemony 
is achieved through the willing consent of citizens within a polity. For powerful interests do 
often sway decision-making within democratic politics. And the post-political thesis pushes aside 
the fact that political interests must still be negotiated within democratic practice. By examining 
these negotiations, these achievements, we can better understand how it is that democratic 
politics play a fundamental role in shaping social life. Particularly important to this discussion is 
how dissensus is not eliminated from, but incorporated into, the practice of democracy itself.  
Ontologies of the Political 
The post-political theories espoused by Mouffe and Ranciere refrain from engaging in the 
uncertainty and contestation inherent in democratic politics. In that these types of theories 
identify exactly what politics is or is not, and where politics happens, what gets constituted as 
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politics is restricted in scale to very particular times and spaces. Critiquing such theories, Clive 
Barnett (2017) argues that such ontological accounts of politics are misleading. Any political 
theory, he argues, attempting “to determine the essence of the political, the core ontological 
sense of democracy, or the prescriptively normative rules of public deliberation” (p. 7) ought to 
be suspect. Such accounts are suspect, he suggests, because democracy has no core ontology. 
Rather, he sees democracy as a “practice of making sense of what is at stake in [certain] 
situations, as a step toward finding ways of engaging with them” (ibid).  
Such ontologized accounts of politics have two related limitations for Barnett. One is that 
such political ontologies “often define democracy in a one-sided way, reserving authentic 
democratic action for the disruption of identities, hegemonies, and settled formations” (p. 77). 
By prioritizing dissensus, theories of the political “turn to ontology” to explain conflict, and in so 
doing, “turn away from conventional forms of knowing about politics” (p. 79). From this 
perspective, “taken-for-granted forms of politics, in the form of partisan competition, policy 
making, and administration, are held to express a consensus that reproduces established orders. 
The political, on the other hand, is taken to be the realm of real antagonisms covered over by 
mere politics” (ibid). What results in following Mouffe and Ranciere’s versions of the political is 
a view “in which proper democratic energies are always reserved for fundamental 
reconfigurations or disruptions of whole political systems” (p. 167). Such theories suggest that 
enacting democratic politics occurs only in rare moments of dissensus, not through the ordinary 
means of debate, voting, legislation, protest, and so on.     
A second limitation to such ontologies of the political follows closely from the first: that 
such politics too narrowly restrict where politics is found. Strongly spatialized ontological 
interpretations of politics, Barnett (2017) argues, “are accorded a privileged status as proper 
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expressions of the political,” spatial accountings which suggest that “genuine political energy is 
only ever to be found off center, at the margins, at odds with the mainstream” (p. 9). Barnett uses 
Massey’s thinking on spatiality to illustrate his critique. Massey develops a spatial politics, an 
ontological understanding of space, Barnett argues, which presents space as “the sphere of 
meeting up, of coexistence, of the unexpected and unpredictable” (p. 123). And while this may 
be true, for Massey, “space takes on a privileged status as the very site of politics,” (ibid) one 
that enables difference and multiplicity essential to ontological accounts of politics. Somewhat 
ironically, therefore, the radical openness of such spatialized political ontologies deny that proper 
politics can be situated in the mundane spaces of traditional politics, spaces such as the council 
chambers of city hall.  
Barnett asks us to leave such ontological accounts of politics behind. Doing so, he argues, 
allows us “to escape the overly territorialized imagination of enclosure and exclusion, as well as 
the temporal imagination of disruption and rupture that accompanies this way of thinking” (p. 
169). When political agency “depends on the movement of ontological strata,” as it does within 
theories of post-politics, it “distracts attention from the ordinary forms of action through which 
injustice is articulated as a wrong in the course of political life” (ibid). In other words, we cannot 
develop exact ontological accounts of how and where politics takes place without displacing 
other forms of politics outside of this purview. 
Barnett’s project is not about reclaiming a proper accounting of democracy or politics. 
Rather, he encourages a normative analysis of politics which does not privilege the times and 
spaces of politics. He is, in short, advocating that we analyze the “ordinariness” of politics. By 
this he means that democracy as a political practice is found in many aspects of life. What a 
normative accounting of democratic politics ought to analyze for Barnett is the “situated disputes 
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and structures of expectations that shape particular formations of political contestation” (p. 72). 
As a normative mode of inquiry, analyzing democratic practice relies upon a sensitivity to 
context by staying open to the capacity for democratic politics to take different forms. From this 
perspective, democratic inquiry ought not to prescribe and demarcate proper politics. Inquiry into 
democracy is better served when analysis shows how democratic procedure is used to advance 
certain interests over others. 
It is important to consider what the theories of post-politics do not tell us about politics, 
then, for at least two reasons. First, ontological theories of politics may close-down relevant 
avenues for thinking through the absences and opportunities of democracy. Rather than assuming 
that traditional democratic politics eliminates dissensus, attending to where and why consensus is 
formed in democratic procedures may show us much about how social, political, and economic 
power is unevenly experienced within democracies. A second deficiency of post-political 
theories is that justice may rarely or never be experienced from this perspective. As we’ve seen, 
a theory of justice is nearly impossible to identify a priori. But thinking through the everyday 
relations of democratic politics that are unhindered from the closure of post-political accounts 
may allow us to think about justice or injustice in less dramatic, more ordinary ways. I return 
briefly therefore to geographic discussions of justice to give insight as to how we may be able to 
think through democratic injustice before I apply those insights to the situation of Portland’s 
houseless encampments. 
Resituating Democratic Justice  
As previously discussed, the contested nature of justice has sparked wide debate. Some have 
suggested that justice is best realized when we conceptualize how specific oppressions are 
experienced within the liberal polity, thus rejecting any universal theory of justice. Others argue 
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in response that justice becomes an empty concept without some universal or wider appeal for 
those affected by oppression and domination. The constraints of liberalism as a political system 
make realizing either perspective of this debate difficult to do. I suggest that it is more 
productive to engage with the political utility of the concept of justice while not strictly adhering 
to any determining theory.  
Accounting for how the structures and procedures of liberalism oppress groups 
differently is a political project that still holds much purchase. To reiterate Neil Smith’s thinking 
about justice, one way of examining injustice is to address the ways in which liberalism, as an 
institutionalized set of political procedures, universalizes and thus neutralizes social and political 
identities through political procedures relating to citizenship. Smith’s thinking aligns with 
Barnett’s appeal for a geographically sensitive understanding of justice within democracies. For, 
Smith’s inkling that justice is better understood by attending to “the scalar translation between 
individuality and justice,” suggests that there is no privileged site of injustice, no pre-ordained 
location for justice or injustice to take place within. So too does Barnett reject spatial ontologies 
pointing out proper places for politics. 
For Barnett, the evaluative work required of democratic inquiry is about prioritizing 
claims of injustice. Prioritizing injustice within critical theories of democracy, Barnett (2017) 
states, “lies in recognizing that the central conceptual and normative issue at stake is not a 
contrast between the universal and the particular… rather, the challenge is to reconstruct the 
confrontation between claims of impartial universalism embedded in traditional political thought 
and the claims of inclusive universalism” (p. 11). Against Rawlsian claims to universal principles 
of justice, therefore, Barnett and Smith both suggest analytical attention to injustice ought to 
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address how democratic political institutions and procedures affect the ways in which citizens 
are harmed or benefit from these political structures.  
So how can democratic inquiry do this? The final aspect of Barnett’s critique of political 
theories of democracy is telling. He follows Sen (2009) in suggesting we examine claims of 
injustice, as injustice derives from felt and articulated senses of wrong which are necessarily 
rooted within the particularity of lived experiences (Barnett 2017, 243). Barnett sees justice not 
as an ideal, therefore, but as a condition, one that can be “approached through repair, redress, 
reparation, and redistribution” (p. 248). Drawing from Iris Marion Young as well, Barnett 
suggests that “appeals to justice and claims to injustice are not a result, they do not reflect an 
agreement; they are rather the starting point of a certain kind of debate. To invoke the language 
of justice and injustice is to make a claim, a claim that we together have obligations of certain 
sorts to one another” (Barnett 2017, 268, citing Young 1998). The best means available through 
democratic inquiry to consider injustice, suggests Barnett, is to analyze the where, what, and how 
of claims-making. Geographically, then, what is important is analyzing the situatedness of 
claims, from where claims for injustice emanate and how those claims are judged and received 
by others. It is a certain type of deliberative democracy, one that analyzes how injustices are 
emplaced and how the claims of those affected by injustice are or are not received and redressed. 
Barnett’s critique of democratic political theory gives us much to consider. In drawing 
out what he sees as the strengths of democratic theory, using normative evaluation to address 
claims of injustice, Barnett helps us think through the ways in which post-political thinking, or 
what he terms ontologies of spatial politics, is spatially deterministic. So too is his critique of 
justice one that helps see a way out of stuck debates over what a theory of justice must include. 
By emphasizing the situatedness of sensed harms—oppression or domination felt among certain 
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groups—he allows the “ordinary” to return to political analysis. Analysis of politics from this 
perspective then ought to focus on who is advancing certain aims over others, who is affected by 
those decisions, and how those who are affected claim recognition and redress for sensed 
experiences of inequity throughout these democratic procedures.     
To be sure, Barnett’s approach has shortcomings.30 But for my purposes here, I want to 
draw from his and other geographers’ arguments that the “ordinary” procedures of democratic 
politics still provide significant insight into our social, political, and economic relationships. 
Contra an end-of-politics perspective, which sees politics present only in moments of rupture and 
resistance from groups rejecting marginalization, I suggest there is much to understand about 
socio-economic injustice by engaging with the “mundane” procedures of democratic politics.  
It is through this normative lens I want to illustrate how democratic politics matters to 
houseless residents of Portland’s encampments, and in turn, what the experiences of houseless 
encampment residents tell us about justice within democratic politics. By remaining attuned to 
how democratic values are presented within the political relations surrounding houseless life, we 
are better able to see how such values both inhibit and promote political agency for houseless 
citizens.  
Why Democracy Needs the Demos 
Throughout the previous chapters, I have examined how the values embedded within property 
are upheld as a universalizing feature of democratic citizenship. Chapter 2, for instance, 
 
30 Barnett (2017) never develops his notion of justice as situated claims-making with empirical grounding. So while 
his arguments about the spatial determinism of spatial ontologies make sense, he does not develop an analysis of 
how we may think spatially otherwise. A second criticism that applies to Barnett’s work applies to critiques of 
deliberative democracy more broadly. And that is that individuals most skilled in rhetoric, not to mention who 
have the time to participate in deliberation, are likely to prevail with their views about what justice or other 
collective decisions will look like.  
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addressed how propertied-citizenship remains hegemonic as a form of liberal citizenship, 
reflecting the ubiquity of property in structuring socio-economic and political life. My focus here 
is on analyzing what political implications result from thinking democratically about the 
situations of houseless encampments. In doing so, I work through what democratic procedures 
tells us about propertied-citizenship and what challenges this model of citizenship presents for 
democracy.  
To begin, I analyze the actions of Portland’s houseless collectives through the related 
concepts of opposition and resistance to illustrate the ways in which encampments have 
navigated political relations with the City of Portland. I show that when encampments become 
formalized with backing from the City, for the most part, they become subject to rules of the 
democratic political game. Adhering to formal political engagement largely eliminates for the 
encampments the political option for actions of resistance, though hard dissent is always a last 
resort for organized encampments. Commitment to formal political negotiations, agreeing to the 
political rules of democratic politics, however, does not mean that encampments agree with and 
accept the positions of the City. Encampments continue to maintain adversarial positions by 
opposing City and community interests. Encampments transition to being formally tolerated or 
sanctioned, however, I suggest removes hard dissent as a reasonable option for political 
opposition against the City.  
The level of organization with which Portland’s self-governing encampments operate 
today obscures their origins. Dignity Village (DV), Right 2 Dream Too (R2DT), and Hazelnut 
Grove (HG) all began as sites of protest.31 Beginning as loose collectives of houseless people, 
 
31 Kenton Women’s Village (KWV) did not start as a protest. Instead, it began formally as a pilot project 
spearheaded by the City of Portland. KWV always had the support from the City. KWV has always been formally 
managed by Catholic Charities, rather than being contracted through the City to manage itself as a collective. 
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these encampments slowly organized themselves and advanced a clear position against the 
practices of the City of Portland: that routine sweeps and inadequate shelters were not solving 
the problem of a lack of housing. Despite a slew of legal and political measures taken on behalf 
of the City against each of the protests, the encampments were nonetheless able to resist the 
City’s policing of land use ordinances by continuing to occupy central spaces within the city. By 
remaining in place and ignoring the legal penalties that were likely to result from doing so, the 
encampments eventually won the struggle to have a right to their own self-organized spaces and 
the City acquiesced to the pleas and resistance of the encampments, negotiating agreements 
about where and how the self-organized houseless collectives could operate.  
Today, Portland’s self-governing encampments hold the spirit of these actions close. The 
early resistance efforts by these encampments avoided legal punishment, and instead, gained 
them land use agreements.32 The result of this resistance was that the City officially sanctioned 
or tolerated the encampments, affording the encampments property and time to better organize 
themselves. DV, for instance, was given its own plot of municipal land in 2003 and is contracted 
to manage itself on that site. R2DT remained at their original downtown site for five years before 
moving to its current site and now operates on City property. And HG, although only tolerated 
by the City, has remained on its site for over four years. Each of Portland’s encampments enjoy 
relative stability to continue operating because of the fact that they hold conditional use permits 
or simple service agreements with the City. The contractual agreements establish legal 
 
Because of this, KWV never collectively advanced a politics against that of the City formally, as many of the basic 
amenities that the other encampments have struggled over or have yet to receive were provided for the Women’s 
Village from its beginning.     
32 It is worth noting that many semi-organized houseless encampments have been swept from Portland’s streets 
and vacant spaces for decades. Relatively, therefore, it has been quite rare that self-organized groups are effective 
in persuading the City to sanction them. 
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relationships with the encampments that make them beholden to cooperating with the City and 
the wider community.  
The formal backing of encampments by the City is partially a result of the resistance 
efforts of the houseless collectives. These moments are significant for understanding the histories 
and politics of Portland’s houseless encampments. However, through the formalizing of 
encampments came a restriction on the nature of available political actions for the encampments. 
I explore this transition through the concept of resistance. 
While the concept of resistance has been theorized widely, I follow Daase and Deitelhoff 
(2019) in making a distinction that resistance can be understood as two related concepts: those of 
opposition and dissidence. Opposition, they suggest, is political action that advocates “changes 
within the system of rule by accepting the applicable rules of the game of political participation.” 
Dissidence, on the other hand, makes “use of means of actions that lie outside of… accepted 
rules” of political participation. While both forms of resistance voice dissent and are capable of 
offering alternatives to the ruling order in doing so, they suggest that “the two forms of 
resistance differ over how they will do so—by accepting the rules or rejecting them and 
deliberately violating them” (p. 19). Although merely ideal types, categorizing forms of 
resistance as such offers an explanatory means for showing how resistance to democratic power 
changes in situations like those of Portland’s encampments. I suggest these changes more 
accurately depict what it is that democratic politics do and do not allow for. And therefore, we 
are better able to see not just that democratic politics exist in ordinary situations, but that the 
implications of such politics are downplayed within the post-political literatures. I return to 
Portland’s Hazelnut Grove to develop one short case which helps explain the significance of 
democratic politics.        
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Returning to Hazelnut Grove 
As a protest site which eventually came to be rhetorically supported by the City, HG created its 
site by resisting the government’s decision to sweep houseless encampments. By doing so, HG 
acted outside formal rules of democratic political participation. The encampment placed itself on 
government property and developed an organized encampment of nearly 80 people within its 
first two months in the fall of 2015 (Killen 2015). At that time, the very point of HG was simply 
about resisting the punitive force of the police and developing some level of organization to 
build solidarity in numbers. When in its first few weeks HG received legal notices requiring that 
the encampment clear out, it dissented, rejecting the threat of legal punishment and continued to 
operate on its chosen site.       
Throughout its first two months, and against a pending threat of removal, HG continued 
organizing. It developed shared work responsibilities for jobs such as security or food 
preparation. It created a list of encampment rules to be adhered to by all members. And it also 
began to engage with different forms of political action. It began to negotiate its positions 
through deliberation. Most notably this happened when the encampment was visited by then-
mayor Charlie Hales and his staff. During the visit, the mayor was shown around the site and 
heard the positions of HG’s members. In response, the mayor agreed to let the camp stay, 
assuring the encampment that it would be okay to remain given that the City was then only 
weeks away from announcing the City’s first state of housing emergency. The City’s Housing 
and Homelessness State of Emergency provided the framework through which the City would 
formally accept HG as an organized houseless encampment, like it already had for R2DT and 
DV. By officially recognizing HG, the City also provided the encampment a bare minimum of 
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services; it provided a rental fence to secure the perimeter of the site, it paid to have portable 
toilets serviced, and it provided a lockable storage container.  
Despite entering into a formal agreement, HG and the City did not agree that the 
encampment was best placed at that particular site. Although the City tolerated HG existing 
somewhere, a new mayor coming into office in January of 2016 publicly stated that HG would 
need to relocate. And in early 2018, the City began searching for new sites on which to relocate 
the encampment.  
The relationship between the City and HG seemed reflexive. The City not only allowed 
HG residents to come to the meetings but requested that resident members show up to steer the 
decision-making process and to give their opinions on all details of the move.33 Despite this 
inclusive and participatory sentiment, some HG members were highly skeptical of the City’s 
plans to relocate the camp. Some members were particularly concerned that the site would be 
moved far out into the periphery of the city, making access to food and services a problem. 
Despite some members adamantly resisting the encampments’ relocation, however, the City gave 
HG no option but to work with them in finding a new site. Not doing so would mean the 
encampment would very likely be shut down entirely. As of the time of this writing, HG has 
secured a new site on a private property in a not-too-distant neighborhood from where it 
originally located. And it continues to work with the City and other advocacy groups in 
effectively making this transition. 
This brief recap of HG’s history helps illustrate why it matters that political forms of 
resistance shifted for the encampment throughout its tenure. Initially, HG was effective in 
 
33 I too joined several bi-weekly meetings between HG and the City about the encampment’s potential relocation.  
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resisting police sweeps. The encampment worked hard to organize itself, hoping to show the City 
why the self-organized houseless space was necessary. Not long after, HG was formally accepted 
by the City and given financial support and backing. What the City’s acceptance of the 
encampment did, however, was diminish the encampment’s ability to dissent against decisions 
that if found unsatisfactory. For, HG had entered into the realm of formal political engagement 
by agreeing to participate in the “rules of the democratic game.” In other words, HG now had to 
comply with the City in exchange for their “right” to remain operating with City support. In 
agreeing to such terms, the City received HG’s consent to be governed through democratic 
procedures.  
Post-political theses suggest that such a process highlights the ways in which traditional 
politics has eradicated dissent or “proper politics.” Against this, I argue instead that the 
interactions between HG and the City underscore the multiple political interactions that are 
necessary in gaining consent in the first place. The relations between the two show how political 
negotiations ranging from resistance to opposition achieves the consent of houseless individuals 
to be governed by the City. The City has effectively achieved consent from HG, DV, and R2DT, 
albeit in different ways and through the efforts of multiple political actors. In the case of the City 
of Portland and its self-governing encampments, this has happened through decades-long 
processes.  
Achieving consent in this way represents how it is that democratic procedures structure 
the very opportunities for political participation. Achieving consent then includes incorporating 
resistance into the democratic process. The City of Portland did not create consensus among 
several different collectives of houseless individuals, it negotiated it. Considered from this 
perspective, consent is not understood as one dramatic moment of rupture or rare event. Rather, 
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consent remains a continuous process of political actions circulating through time and space, 
progressing and regressing with small steps along the way.  
If consent is achieved procedurally then how this achievement happens is significant for 
understanding democratic politics. Contra Ranciere, if democratic politics is actually enacted 
through many ordinary political actions, we ought to think of consent not as the closing-down of 
democratic procedure, but instead dependent upon ordinary political actions. Achieving consent 
is fundamentally political, as Mitchell et al. argue, because it is done so by the “willing consent 
of people who might otherwise be expected to dissent” (2015, 2636). This was true in the case of 
HG. When the City began planning for relocation, it gave HG the option to either agree to 
relocate and remain operating and funded by the City or to be swept out and ended as a 
collective. Here consent from HG members was all but assured as they had no ability to reject 
the City’s proposition because of how the City had been working with the group for over four 
years, providing it very small amounts of funding and services. The movement from resistance to 
opposition then was a process of establishing consent.  
How the City negotiated consent with HG is important to consider. It tells us something 
about democratic politics that the post-political perspective tends to downplay. And that is that 
while resistance does enable change, it does not only do so when it reforms “the police” order. 
Rather, resistance allows for dissent to be incorporated into the formal procedures of democratic 
politics where oppositional politics may then advance positions for extended periods of time. 
Instead of this transition bringing about the end of proper politics, I suggest this is the very stuff 
of politics. This fact should not be taken lightly. Portland’s self-governing encampments 
represent a unique model of houseless shelter that has been cultivated through massive 
organizing efforts over decades. Such efforts show why the self-governing idea is being 
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replicated in other cities in the country (Greenstone 2020). Rather than a governance mechanism 
forcing consensus against the will of a marginalized group, here consensus depends on the active 
engagement of oppositional groups going back and forth between being unwilling and willing 
participants within democratic procedures.  
Democratic politics necessitates that resistance be incorporated into political procedure as 
opposition. As such, democratic political procedures require that opposition remain legible, as a 
form of dissent within democratic rules of the game. And in doing so, in achieving the legibility 
of consent, the encampments are less likely to weaponize resistant or dissenting actions to 
advance their claims because of the way in which the groups have benefitted by being 
incorporated into the democratic procedures of the City (See Chapter 4 for the benefits of 
encampments). It is this process of achieving consent, then, that illustrates the power of 
democracies as a system of political decision-making rather than as a shell of neoliberal 
governance removed from real political negotiating. Democracy in this sense requires the 
participation of the “demos,” or the citizens who are said to rule within democratic states, for 
consent to be achieved. 
But perhaps more significantly, the City’s negotiations with the encampments situates 
matters of democratic justice within these political actions. For, the City has publicly 
acknowledged the value that self-governing encampments hold as a means of sheltering 
houseless individuals. Indeed, the City created and continues to fund the Kenton Women’s 
Village for this reason, recognizing that traditional shelters are not meant for all people 
experiencing houselessness. As a response to the cries of houseless people and their advocates, 
the City has acceded to the desires of self-governing groups for land, by “leasing” municipal 
properties on which the encampments operate. In doing so, it shows us that the process of 
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achieving consent to be governed from the encampments is also a means of negotiating what 
justice can look like for encampments within liberal-democracies.  
Of course, just what justice can look like for each encampment is different and dependent 
on the resources of the City. In wrapping up the chapter, I will argue that finding injustices 
impacting houseless groups in Portland has as much to do with the effects of property relations 
as it does with the democratic negotiations between the City and self-governing encampments 
themselves. For, the inequities rooted in property that houseless encampment residents 
experience derive from liberal values and the democratic practices reinforcing those values. 
Propertied Citizenship: Democracy For and Against the Demos 
Propertied citizenship is a model of liberal citizenship that necessitates access to or ownership of 
property to enjoy certain citizenship benefits. That is, propertied-citizen is an individuals’ ability 
to secure interest rights within landed property. Property-insecure citizens within such a model 
are excluded from important benefits, such as privacy, security, and freedom of mobility. 
Houseless citizens residing in self-governing encampments complicate this model somewhat. 
The unique access to property that Portland’s self-governing encampments have affords residents 
some benefits that propertied-citizens also hold. But there are necessary limits to the benefits for 
houseless citizens. Examining how these limits are arrived at helps indicate how property 
becomes prioritized as a democratic value within liberalism. To do so, it is necessary to explain 
how the liberal prioritizing of property is advanced as a value through democratic politics.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, property ownership was the criteria for liberal citizenship in 
the U.S. for over a century. Property was seen to encompass the values of liberty, autonomy and 
self-governance, and even of fitness for democratic participation itself. Today, property 
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continues to mediate the benefits of citizenship because it is protected as a liberty right, 
preserving these values through constitutional protections. Constitutional protections do not 
automatically instill values into citizens, however. Rather, I argue that property remains a 
normative requirement of citizenship because it is still negotiated through democratic politics. In 
other words, the values associated with property continue to be supported in democratic 
negotiations between propertied and property-insecure citizens.   
We have seen the democratic negotiation over property’s values within the political 
relations between HG and its neighborhood association (OKNA), for instance. There, some 
propertied residents asserted the illegitimacy of encampment residents as proper citizens. 
Because the encampment’s use of municipal property was not “earned” by encampment 
residents, houseless people were seen to be undemocratic, not fulfilling proper citizenship by 
pulling their weight in society through economic independence. For some OKNA residents, the 
ownership or payment for property constituted a required ticket for proper democratic 
citizenship. So too was property at the core of OKNA’s attempted amendment to its bylaws, 
changes which would have excluded HG residents on the premise of lacking an address. The 
bylaw change would have denied houseless individuals the right to participate in neighborhood 
decision-making for the association. In these ways, propertied-citizens advanced a narrative that 
the right way for houseless people to help themselves is to remove themselves from the 
encampment and get into traditional housing before they are ready to participate in politics.  
We also saw how democratic negotiations over the values of property were advanced for 
houseless encampment residents through political relations with the City. While the City affords 
encampments rights to utilize municipal properties, these rights are intentionally limited in 
scope. Without the right to exclude, encampments lack the ability to protect their privacy and 
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security. Restricting encampments from this right of property keeps houseless citizens from 
enjoying significant benefits that propertied citizens hold. Such rights restrictions work to 
reinforce the notion that the houseless citizen cannot realize the self-governing privileges or 
obligations traditionally bestowed upon liberal citizens.   
What I want to argue then is that the process of diminishing citizenship for houseless 
people in Portland’s encampments is not entirely out of the hands of ordinary citizens or those of 
the staff and officials at the City of Portland who work with the encampments. Contra the post-
political thesis, citizenship cannot be eradicated through neoliberal modes of governance by 
excluding the demos. Rather, it is quite the opposite. Houseless citizenship can be reduced in 
import through the very inclusion of property-insecure people into democratic politics. Property-
insecure people within encampments are necessarily implicated within political negotiations, 
agreements where houseless groups get to decide along with the City how their self-governing 
encampments will operate. In this way, houseless citizens are able to realize political agency 
when they otherwise may not have such control over their lives. But the fact that encampments 
are democratically agreed upon, in a way that limits resident’s control over their property by 
gaining the consent of the residents staying there, demonstrates how the values of property that 
work against houseless citizens are reliant upon political negotiations.  
So what could justice look like for Portland’s houseless encampment residents? If we 
follow Barnett who suggests that justice is best understood as a condition, one that makes sense 
of different claims of injustice in attempt at redressing and repairing those harms, then some 
form of justice has been already been approached by the City of Portland. By acknowledging the 
desire for houseless people to stabilize themselves on their own terms in encampments, the City 
recognizes why it is necessary to allow houseless groups to organize themselves in such a way. 
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The City may, then, consider the allocation of municipal property to self-governing groups as a 
form of redress for the harms that traditional shelters and life on the street can create for many 
individuals.  
Yet, to suggest that justice has been achieved in the cases of Portland’s houseless 
encampments would fall short of a justice sensitive to the scale at which property, as a 
commodity and as a system of rights and relations, impacts houseless people. Assuming justice 
has been achieved is first problematic in that it would suggest that it is okay for people to be 
living in such conditions of precarity, conditions lacking basic health services and amenities that 
keep people safe. Assuming that justice has been achieved would also overlook how the values 
embodied within liberalism and democratic procedures are used to restrict rights of property for 
encampments. In doing so, and doing so democratically, property comes to serve as the 
mediating resource which demarcates the responsible citizen from the not-quite-responsible 
citizen, the fully self-governing and autonomous citizen from the citizen who does not have full 
control over their life.  
Indeed many of Portland’s self-governing encampments are a form of repair and redress 
which benefits the many individuals who have and continue to reside within them. But we should 
not see allocating municipally-owned or church-owned property to self-governing groups as 
justice in its final form. For, houseless people residing within encampments are daily reminded 
that a broader injustice exists: the inequities of the liberal model of propertied-citizenship.  
Houseless encampment residents are working against a model of liberal citizenship that is 
nearly universal, a model which often denies the opportunity for houseless people to benefit from 
the privileges of citizenship until they have traditional housing. For the lucky ones, the length of 
time in which one resides in an encampment can be quick. Kenton Women’s Village is notable 
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for the rapidity at which it gets women into traditional housing. 23 women have moved into 
permanent housing over the last two years from a village that only had 14 tiny-homes on site 
(Catholic Charities 2020). For many, however, stable housing is far-off. It can take years to find 
subsidized housing in the city. And when housing becomes available, it may be a struggle to 
retain.  
 Justice then would also recognize therefore that liberal citizenship privileges must be de-
coupled from property ownership and access. Following Smith (1995), we ought to pay attention 
to the ways in which the liberal model of propertied-citizenship negates the claims for dignity 
and security being expressed by encampment residents, claims unique to houseless people who 
already hold equal political citizenship. Political citizenship is not protective enough, in other 
words, when the model of citizenship is so closely attached to property. This would mean 
valuing houseless groups’ use of public properties as equal to that of propertied-citizens. And 
that the encampments’ rights of property ensure that these values are protected for houseless 
citizens. 
If we are looking for a place to begin to repair the harms brought upon encampment 
residents, then justice must be situated within the political negotiations which determine how the 
property-insecure are restricted from the full slew of rights that access or ownership over 
property provides for citizens. In other words, considering what justice could entail for 
Portland’s houseless necessities political dialogue about why it is that they do not have the rights 
of propertied citizens. Why, that is, the property-insecure must have limited rights to property 
when they are people in need of safe and secure shelter. This attempt at redress is local in impact.  
To address the more ubiquitous inequities of liberal propertied-citizenship as a general 
model of injustice for property-insecure people, analytical attention ought to be paid to how 
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democratic procedures can be used to de-couple property from citizenship. For, it is well 
understood that it is the economics of privatized property that remove houseless people from 
landed resources. But it is politics, the liberal-democratic process, that ensures that houselessness 
persists by making it appear and believing that houseless people too are equal in their citizenship.  
In the concluding chapter, I sketch out what opportunities exist for property-insecure 
people residing in houseless encampments to advance claims for justice through democratic 
practice. For, there may be space within democratic politics for houseless people to have certain 
harms redressed, harms deriving from limited property rights. Any attempt at answering these 
questions will need to inquire into how we can move beyond the values of propertied-citizenship, 




















In July of 2016, nine months after the City of Portland declared a State of Emergency for 
housing and houselessness, the condition of houselessness in the city hit fever pitch. As part of 
the State of Emergency, the City had allowed for individuals to camp on public properties at 
night through what it called the “Safe Sleep” policy. Nowhere was this more evident than along a 
popular biking-walking path called the Springwater Corridor Trail on the city’s south side. 
Stretched over two-miles, the camps on the Springwater Trail were small and unorganized. By 
July, the total number camping along the corridor was estimated to have been somewhere 
between 400-500 people (Slovic 2016). The consequences of the City’s “Safe Sleep” policies 
were taking form in undesirable ways. After reports of several fires and one shooting, the City 
ended the safe sleep policy and began the process of disbanding the enormous encampment.  
That summer, a reporter from the Aljazeera Media Network was in Portland reporting on 
the crisis. The report addressed a wide variety of houselessness issues happening then in the city. 
The report covered the overwhelming events at the Springwater Trail, but it also addressed the 
city’s self-organized encampments. Regarding the self-organized camps, the report struck a 
positive tone. The piece emphasized the promise of the democratic model of these encampments, 
noting how they created certain challenges “to the dominant discourse on [mitigating] 
homelessness and commonly proposed solutions to the crisis” (Strickland 2016). The report 
illustrated the growing popularity of self-governing encampments as a better path toward 
emergency shelter. Self-organized encampments, it implied, were a dignified means toward 
dealing with the crisis.  
What struck the reporter as unique about the encampments was the mode of political 
organization through which they operated. For, amidst the uncertainty of the housing emergency 
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there were houseless groups using direct democratic approaches to manage and stabilize 
themselves. Portland’s encampments seemed to be finding a way of navigating the constraints of 
the model of propertied-citizenship ubiquitous within liberal-democracies. “One of the moral 
challenges [the camps] pose to the city,” the report noted, “[is that] they have mitigated 
inequities in a horizontal way without the benefit of the resources of the housed, without the 
benefit of a representative government that's responsive to them” (ibid). Part of the report’s 
intention was therefore to represent how there was a “deep democracy at work” within the 
encampments, a mode of houseless organizing giving hope to houseless and housed Portlanders 
alike amidst that summers’ chaotic events.   
Although it was one of many reports on organized houseless encampments in the U.S., 
the report picked up on something important to the story told throughout this dissertation: that a 
democratic mode of organizing for self-governing encampments provides houseless people 
certain benefits that are often left wanting in the solutions historically provided to help houseless 
individuals. It speaks to an intuitive appeal about how democracy is seen as the great equalizer, 
that anyone can use the tools of democratic practice to effect their situation. And this point is 
well taken. The promise of democratic governance for encampments has made significant gains 
for houseless groups in a place like Portland. But what the story does not talk about is perhaps 
even more telling. Absent in the report is any indication that democracy has its limits. The story 
does not speak of the ways in which people residing in organized encampments experience limits 
to their democratic processes on account of their insecure interests in property. It is almost as if 
to say that once the encampments have been sanctioned by the City, then self-governing 
democracy has been realized.    
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By taking democracy seriously, this dissertation has critically analyzed how such 
idealized accounts of houseless people enacting direct democracy play out in practice. The 
chapters show that when we center property in examining houseless peoples’ struggles, by 
scrutinizing the relations of property in context of houseless peoples’ struggles, we 
simultaneously examine the nature of liberal-democratic practice. And in this way, we have seen 
how democracy enables the very conditions of houselessness, given that citizenship for houseless 
people is contingent on access to property. Most directly, I showed that political relations 
between the City and many of Portland’s self-governing encampments have used the democratic 
process to work out some form of repair for the inequities faced by the city’s houseless people. It 
was houseless groups’ resistance to the City’s former punitive approach to houselessness that 
won the encampments space for self-governance. At the same time, and by agreeing to use the 
City’s property, the encampments have acquiesced to the limits of their self-governance. Due to 
how the encampment’s rights to property have been structured, the citizenship privileges of 
houseless encampment residents are limited in specific ways, most notably by lacking 
guaranteed security and privacy through a right to exclude.  
Why property has been so politically definitive in houseless peoples’ lives is a historical 
question that I addressed in the second chapter. Looking at the historical relationship between 
property and citizenship shows us how the values attached to property have shifted over time. 
The political values of liberty and autonomy intertwine with economic rationales about property 
concerning an individuals’ ability to own their labor and become proper earners. This distinction 
is particularly problematic for people without secure interests in property today. For, what I have 
referred to as the model of propertied-citizenship suggests there exists equal political citizenship 
for the property secure and insecure alike.  
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This dissertation has tried to show why it matters that we recognize how the model of 
propertied citizenship limits houseless peoples’ citizenship benefits. But why citizenship, it 
might be asked? Is it not housing that matters most for houseless people? No doubt housing is 
the very thing that houseless people need. It would be trite to argue anything else. Yet, 
houselessness persists today. And in many cities there are growing numbers of houseless people. 
Much research on houselessness has argued that the liberal mode of economic organization in 
capitalist democracies has led to housing shortages, unaffordable rents, an utterly decimated 
number of publicly-subsidized and publicly-owned housing units, all mixed in with bouts of 
under and unemployment. Clearly, houselessness is primarily an economic condition.  
While this may be so, I have tried to show that there are other reasons houselessness 
persists within capitalist democracy. For, I have tried to make clear that it is the politics of 
property that reinforce inequities for houseless people within liberal-democracies. Liberal-
democratic politics at many levels is about protection of rights and of the right to be heard in 
making self-interested claims. And so too is it about power and who has the power to decide 
whose claims matter most. The concept of citizenship names and mediates this process of 
political judgement. It is important then that houseless claims to equal citizenship are not only 
claims for personal liberty rights, but for claims that property security are paramount in the 
struggle for houseless peoples’ stability. 
 The self-governing encampment model practiced in Portland puts property at the center 
of discussions about political inequality and citizenship rights for houseless people. The political 
relations surrounding houseless peoples’ use of property helps us see the importance of 
embracing arguments for citizenship when advancing the claims of property-insecure citizens. 
Rights to property matter most to the property-insecure because it is interest in rights of property 
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that secure the privileges of citizenship—autonomy, security, privacy—which help keep the 
property secure safe. The predicaments of encampments also force us to contend with what is 
just—and what is not—about property relations and rights of property in liberal capitalism more 
broadly. That self-governing encampments cannot have full tenant rights of property shows us 
the underlying contradictions in relations of property that shape political standing within 
democracies.     
Confronting the Limits of Propertied-Citizenship 
This dissertation has primarily examined the ways in which liberalism reinforces a core set of 
values through property relations and rights-protections. Given the systemic way by which 
liberalism is organized, property is protected over the personal liberties of citizenship. When we 
follow the limits of liberalism closely, we are able to see that citizens who lack interests rights to 
property do not hold equal citizenship protections or are able to enjoy the benefits of citizenship. 
Thus by examining property relationally we may better understand the limits of the traditional 
ownership model, how this model harms houseless people, which can point to avenues for 
advancing justice beyond this model. 
 Examining how liberalism and its democratic mode of political organization are realized 
shows us the subtle ways that property is intertwined with liberal citizenship. What this means 
for houseless people within liberal-democracies is that personal liberties are infringed upon 
through property relations and the rights backing people’s interests in property. Without the 
wherewithal to pay for access to property, houseless people are necessarily limited in their ability 
to have a reliably safe space in which to live. The precarity and potential violence for those 
without secure access to property should not be the outcome of a democratic system which 
upholds notions of equal protection for all. Property-based inequities are essential to the 
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functioning of liberal-democracy, however, ensuring that the property insecure must necessarily 
trade their security and privacy for the opportunity of stability. Put more simply, without the 
means to pay for property access, houseless people are remaindered from citizenship and its 
benefits. And that is why it is citizenship that is what is at stake for houseless people.  
By closely examining the workings of liberal-democracy I have sought to illustrate the 
contradictions of how prioritizing property affects the way people realize citizenship. Examining 
liberalism internally, however, allows us to understand the limits of liberalism itself. And in 
doing so, we see primarily what liberal-democracy cannot do to effect change for property-
insecure people. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a political system, which equally 
protects the interests of property-secure people with the inability of property-insecure to obtain 
property, will provide the political leverage needed to address the issues of limited citizenship 
for the property insecure. In other words, how will liberalism allow for the property-insecure to 
secure interest rights to property? When liberal-democracy is premised on balancing individual 
liberties and protecting private property, a collective right to secure property for those without it 
does not fit the negative form of liberty in which rights are predominantly protected. A political 
system that does not register the dialectical relations between citizenship and property cannot 
address this central problem for houseless people. This is what makes the model of propertied-
citizenship particularly dreadful for houseless people: they must struggle for a secure interest 
right to property and citizenship protections at the same time.      
 Working within the restraints of liberalism to understand how houseless people are 
denied citizenship benefits has other drawbacks. The focus herein has been on houselessness 
generally, which I have assumed to be a class position. Particularly, I understand houselessness 
to be the condition of having no secure interests in property. This condition can be ameliorated 
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only through financial exchange in the form of rent or a mortgage. However, the liberal model of 
propertied-citizenship affects people beyond their class position. For instance, the model of 
propertied-citizenship also shapes how people of color struggle for representation and for rights 
of citizenship as well. Liberal citizenship smooths over differences like race and ethnicity as 
well, equating all citizens as the same. But the history of property insecurity for people of color, 
not to mention the violence of persons having been property in themselves, is clearly not 
accounted for under a liberal model of equal citizenship.  
The idea that propertied-citizenship restricts people beyond the condition of class, 
intersecting with race, ethnicity, and gender also presents avenues for more research on the limits 
of liberal citizenship. There is clear connection, for instance, to the limits for people of color in 
realizing the benefits of liberal citizenship premised on the traditional homeownership model 
which was premised on white interests in property. A significant aspect leading to the 2008 
housing recession, for instance, was due to the push to expand homeownership opportunities in 
order to realize the idealized American Dream. Yet, it was people of color who 
disproportionately were affected by predatory mortgage lending. How property has been and 
continues to be the mediating force for these citizenship struggles presents itself as an important 
matter to examine.  
In paying close attention to liberalism we are unable to see the ways in which liberal-
democratic institutions are likely to satisfy the needs of the property-insecure. To take Portland’s 
houseless encampment residents, the City and the State would need to allow the encampments to 
have full possessory rights over their properties if houseless people were to have a secure interest 
property. While this could feasibly happen for a handful of encampments, the scale of the 
problems for houseless people who are not organized like Portland’s encampments would likely 
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not happen to meet the actual need. For this would require a massive property redistribution that 
allows houseless encampments possessory rights of interest to a property. This is unlikely to 
happen within liberal-democracy, as property is consumed through market exchange, not through 
government redistribution.  
It is important to recognize that there is no one approach to solving houselessness that 
will address all of the aforementioned problems. Self-governing encampments are not an end-all 
solution to houselessness and they should not be romanticized as such. Encampments offer a 
more dignified alternative to life on the street or in a shelter for the many who choose to live in 
them. But they will not end houselessness. A politics which recognizes how the model of 
propertied-citizenship in liberal-democracy restricts houseless people would advance an agenda 
for security in property as a collective right of citizenship. 
Advancing a collective claim for property-security is a political goal which moves closer 
to advancing justice for all those without secure interests in property. As we’ve seen, liberal 
justice appears universal in its application. Under this model there is no universal right to 
property security unless you have the means to pay for it. If there is no citizenship right ensuring 
property security under the model of propertied-citizenship, justice will not be universally 
recognized.  However, with the understanding that justice must be context-sensitive while more 
broadly applicable at the same time lies a notion that property security could be a right of 
citizenship. This means rejecting a narrow understanding of citizenship as idealized through the 
liberal model—the sovereign homeowner—and more representative of a citizenship that 
recognizes the differences among people and how their relations to property are also unique. A 
geographic perspective helps give such context to why relations of property impact people 
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differently and how universal appeals to the model of propertied-citizenship undermine the 
relations of property in different places.  
What an internal critique of property relations under liberalism points to, then, is how a 
non-liberal agenda securing property for all citizens may be possible. Democratic institutions, to 
varying degrees, enable progressive opportunities for change. To advance an agenda that seeks to 
promote property-security for houseless people is possible. But it is a struggle that will not be 
easily won. When we consider the numbers of the property-insecure in the U.S. alone, a 
progressive politics that requires all citizens have a secure interest in property will be highly 
contested by those benefiting from a marketized private property system.  
A progressive political agenda advancing property security for all would be more likely 
to come from a democratically-organized approach to organizing society. Specifically, such a 
democracy would ensure that the property insecure not only have their claims for property 
recognized, but physically addressed through some form of redistribution. To redistribute 
property within the confines of liberal democracy would simply reinforce the privatization of 
property. Thus a progressive politics focusing on property redistribution would also need to 
address ways in which the economics of the model of propertied-citizenship could be reshaped 
through democratic control over housing to avoid the very limitations of this marketized model 
for the property-insecure. 
As this dissertation has shown, houseless people have the democratic wherewithal to 
manage their struggles collectively but they are disadvantaged by the pecuniary limits of the 
propertied-citizenship model of liberalism. Beginning to amend for this injustice is to move 
beyond the property-based restrictions of liberalism. Essential for this is having the right to be in 
some place. This sentiment was intuited by a resident at Hazelnut Grove. When I asked Meg, a 
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woman now in her early sixties, why she had a right to property, why she had the right to occupy 
public property, she responded: “Well, I have had to ask this myself. Did I ask to be born? I am 
alive. For whatever the reason, I am now homeless. I would love to go away. But I am not going 
to disappear. I have to go somewhere. I would love to climb under a rock, but I don’t own one. 
You gotta go somewhere. And there was no place.” It is my hope then that the very limits of 
propertied-citizenship that Meg is confined by no longer exclude her from her right to property. 
A collective right to property-security is what she and all property-insecure people need most. A 
secure right to an interest in property is a right of citizenship that has countless benefits. It is time 
to recognize the duplicity of liberal citizenship and how it maintains houselessness while 
appearing to address it through stop-gap measures. The only way to do this is re-value property 


















Appendix A: Methodology 
 
This project originally sought to answer a set of questions regarding houseless encampments in 
Portland, Oregon quite broadly. Before conducting fieldwork, two main questions guiding my 
research focused on why the City Government of Portland was managing the houselessness crisis 
through the use of self-governing encampments. One initial research question asked, for 
instance: In what ways does the City of Portland’s non-traditional approach to managing 
unsheltered homelessness affect efforts to mitigate homelessness? Similarly, a second research 
question guiding my initial research in this project asked: In what ways do rights or use of 
property affect the City of Portland’s management of unsheltered homelessness and thereby 
shape its governance approach? As these questions show, my original interest in the role of urban 
governance in responding to the houselessness crisis was significant.  
While in the field, however, some of my initial inquiries about urban governance and 
houselessness in Portland evolved. I was still interested in the relationship between the City 
Government and the encampments. But I began to see that many of the encampments and the 
residents in them did not talk much about the City. The City Government for many encampment 
residents was simply something to put up with or something to work with so as to abide by 
zoning ordinance guidelines. What became apparent in the discourses I was hearing in weekly 
meetings at encampments, at neighborhood association meetings, and in the media, were issues 
related to property use. What each encampment could do to the properties on which they 
operated, who had control over those decisions, and how these decisions affected the people 
living in encampments became central to my thinking while doing fieldwork.  
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How property related to houselessness was of significant analytical interest for me when 
forming this project. One initial research question I had, for instance, asked: What potential and 
what limitations do self-governing encampments hold for realizing more substantive citizenship 
practices for the homeless? This question would eventually become a focus of Chapter 4 in this 
dissertation. My interests with the connection between how property shaped citizenship 
continued to grow throughout my fieldwork experiences as well as after finishing fieldwork 
while I was analyzing my data and writing-up the results. What follows is my explanation of 
what methods I used during fieldwork to get at these questions, why I used these methods, and 
what were the merits of the methodological approach I took throughout this project.     
Methods 
My fieldwork in Portland lasted from September 2017 to August 2018. During my time there, I 
worked with four different encampments: Hazelnut Grove (HG), Right 2 Dream Too (R2DT), 
Dignity Village (DV), and Kenton Women’s Village (KWV). At the encampments, I observed 
weekly or semi-weekly meetings; interviewed encampment residents formally and informally; 
volunteered to do security; and helped with projects, like building, painting, cleaning, etc. In 
addition to work with and at the encampments, I attended neighborhood association meetings as 
well as observed meetings between HG and the Joint Office of Homeless Services—the City-
County entity dealing with all issues related to houselessness in Portland. Separately from work 
at the encampments, I interviewed neighbors of the encampments as well as City and County 
staff members who work on houselessness issues in the Portland area. The following subsections 





The majority of my interviews for this project were with houseless residents residing in 
encampments at the time of the interview. I conducted formal interviews with 28 residents 
among all four encampments. Formal interviews were semi-structured because there were 
particular topics I wanted to address with encampment residents during our conversations. As 
opposed to structured interviews, which tend toward standardization and replicability across 
populations (Brinkmann 2014), a semi-structured approach gave me more leeway to follow up 
on the different meanings behind answers to residents’ responses. For instance, one question I 
asked encampment residents was about whether they thought the self-governing encampments 
were “political.” Asking such an open-ended question elicited a range of responses about 
citizenship rights, property, and about the participants’ perspective on the City or neighborhood 
relations.  
Semi-structured interviews were used to get the experiences of encampment residents on 
a variety of issues pertaining to encampment life. My interview questions asked residents about 
being houseless in general; about residents’ thoughts on the self-governing model and the 
benefits and limitations of encampments as modes of shelter; and about the politics of the 
encampments, such as with the relations between the encampments and the City Government and 
with its surrounding neighbors.  
Allowing participants to respond to my questions with their own interpretation of the 
questions’ meaning produced a varying number of topics. Of note was the difference in response 
to my questions from encampment residents about citizenship. While residents at HG I believe 
interpreted that to mean a sense of political rights and active engagement within institutional 
politics, residents at KWV often responded to that question about a feeling of community and 
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sisterhood present within that encampment. So too were there different responses to questions 
about property rights at the different encampments. Whereas DV residents simply assumed their 
right to be there, residents at HG were actively fighting for the right to exist where they did. The 
benefit of having semi-structured conversations therefore was that it produced a broader data set 
from which I was able to develop more nuanced understandings of my research themes on 
property and citizenship. The social and geographic differences between encampments and how 
this influenced residents in their thinking was important to better understanding the benefit and 
limits to encampments more broadly.     
Discussions with encampment residents took place either in an individuals’ house, in 
commons spaces, or in parks and public spaces outside of the encampment altogether. Before 
sitting for an interview, I had residents suggest where they felt most comfortable talking about 
their experiences. As Elwood & Martin (2000) note, certain “micro-geographies” comprising the 
siting of an interview effects what and how interview participants respond to interview questions. 
While most encampment residents appeared to feel comfortable speaking with me in commons 
spaces in and around the encampment sites, some would choose to be interviewed in their house 
or outside the encampment in a public space.  
It should also be noted here that my own position as a young white male researcher no 
doubt had baring not only on whether residents wanted to speak with me but what they chose to 
talk about when doing so. My own reflection on what were appropriate or sensitive research 
approaches were difficult to make throughout my fieldwork. For example, while encampment 
residents at HG were overwhelmingly open to me coming to a general meeting to introduce 
myself, I did not have such ease of access with KWV. After a while, HG residents okayed me to 
simply invite myself into the site to simply hang out. I never had such a relationship with KWV. 
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Although I went to volunteer at KWV for a work party early on in my fieldwork, I would not 
actually get back to KWV for interviews until a few months before leaving Portland. KWV, 
which is run by Catholic Charities, was clearly protective of their residents’ privacy. And I 
wanted to honor that. But after seeing the case manager of KWV at another houselessness event 
in town, I spoke with her about why I was interviewing residents throughout the city’s 
encampments. After exchanging a few emails with that case manager shortly thereafter, she 
invited me to a grill out to meet some of the village residents. There I was able to introduce 
myself and was able to setup interviews.    
Berger (2015) suggests that research positionality shapes the research in multiple ways. 
For one, it can shape access to “the field” because some respondents may feel more comfortable 
sharing their experiences than others. As noted, connecting with HG as well as R2DT was easier 
for me to do than with KWV.34 But research position also shapes the nature of the “researcher-
researched” relationship, as the researcher background affects how information is presented 
through wording of questions, for instance. This was notable when interviewing women at 
KWV. For instance, when I would ask questions about encampments rights to property, many 
respondents had little or nothing to say about it. Or when I would ask about the political nature 
of the encampments or about citizenship KWV respondents would talk about their community of 
support within the village, not so much about active citizenship as HG residents did. KWV were 
more prone to discussing how living in a women’s village helped them escape domestic violence 
in response to questions about citizenship. These were difficult conversations to have. And I was 
not trained or prepared for some of the stories these respondents shared with me. As such, I did 
 
34 I had previously worked with R2DT during my master’s fieldwork. 
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not attempt to steer conversations back to matters of property rights or self-governance when 
respondents did open-up to me in such ways.   
Early on during fieldwork, my position as a researcher may have also led interview 
respondents to limit what information they shared with me. After looking through early interview 
transcripts, I realized I was not getting “full” responses about topics, topics that I was hearing 
those same residents discussing openly at meetings, with their peers, and even informally with 
me at times. I sensed that some individuals who did not know me were just being nice and 
agreeing to be interviewed. But in appeasing me as such, sometimes answers were very short. 
Thus I asked to re-interview encampment residents who were still living in the encampment near 
the end of my fieldwork period.  
Re-interviewing allowed me to get richer responses from individuals who had much to 
say about the themes I was interested in talking about, but who had shared little with me 
originally. When I re-interviewed someone, I would read their original response to my question 
and then ask them to reflect on whether they thought differently or still the same about what they 
had originally told me. Often this would generate new insights. For instance, the responses from 
one member of R2DT showed significant differences from an interview in November 2017 to his 
second interview in July 2018. I sensed during our original interview that he was just going 
through the motions, perhaps just appeasing me by agreeing to be interviewed. For, our original 
interview took around 5 minutes, whereas my average interview lasted around 45 minutes. Our 
second interview was different. He was more excited about talking through his new political 
commitments that he attributed to staying in the encampment. As Ryan et. al (2016) found when 
re-interviewing, rather than “validating” original responses from participants, re-interviewing 
can help identify the “complexity and multi-dimensionality of personal narratives within 
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changing temporal and spatial context… [attesting] to the contingency of data and the non-
linearity of life stories told over different interview encounters” (p. 53). I found this present 
within a few residents I re-interviewed. Not only did they share much more with me the second 
time around, perhaps because they knew more about my research by seeing me around, I also 
knew more about them. This made interviewing certain individuals easier as there was some 
established connection between us.  
Informal discussions also provided me a rich source of observations and experiences 
from people in addition to formal interviews. In fact, many encampment residents who I saw on 
a weekly basis never agreed to sit for a formal interview with me. Yet, these residents were often 
happy to speak with me about how their general meetings went or about their lives in the 
encampment. Volunteering was one such form of “informal” interviewing. Throughout 
fieldwork, I worked security shifts at R2DT, for instance. On any given shift there, one or two 
residents were always on shift with me. I got to know individuals quite well this way, so much so 
that I never felt compelled to interview some residents formally, as they already had expressed 
their thoughts about my research when we were working together. Informal interviews were 
therefore crucial for me to further develop my research themes by having extensive 
conversations on the topics of politics, self-governance, and so much more when working around 
encampment residents.  
The experiences of conducting interviews with neighbors of encampments and City and 
County staff were different than those with encampment residents. Most apparently, I was not 
asking government staff or neighbors of encampments about their experiences being houseless or 
about living in encampments. Instead, my focus with these interviews were about their 
relationships with and thoughts about the encampments.  
207 
 
I conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with neighbors of encampments. All but one 
was a neighbor of HG, the remaining was a neighbor to KWV. To find interview participants, I 
attended neighborhood association meetings for the neighborhood in which HG and KWV were 
located, the Overlook Neighborhood Association and the Kenton Neighborhood Association 
respectively.35 I went to association meetings when encampment discussions were on the agenda. 
During the open question period of these meetings, I introduced my research and asked whether 
homeowners or renters in the neighborhood wanted to sit for an interview with me. This helped 
me get started in interviewing neighbors. I used snowball sampling to find other neighbors to 
speak with me after a few early interviews. My interview questions for homeowners neighboring 
encampments inquired about their experiences with the encampment, their thoughts about the 
location of the encampment, their thoughts on encampment residents participating within the 
association, and about the City’s response to the houselessness crisis in general. My goal in 
interviewing homeowners was to get insights from housed people about the houselessness crisis 
and what impact if any encampments may have to limit the crisis. Interviewing homeowners was 
important for this project in that it expanded the social, economic, and political perspectives 
about encampments and their residents from individuals who have not experienced houselessness 
or who have not lived in encampments.   
Finally, I conducted three interviews with government staff who worked directly with 
houseless encampments. One was the executive director for the Joint Office of Homeless 
Services, two were senior policy advisors for the mayor of Portland that I interviewed together, 
and the third was a County staff member for Clackamas County (contiguous with Multnomah 
 
35 DV and R2DT are located in industrial areas. While the two encampments technically have neighborhood and 




County, where Portland is located) who was in the process of developing a Veteran’s village in 
that county. As opposed to interviews with encampment residents and with neighbors of 
encampments, my conversations with these staff members were quite formal. Staff spoke from 
their positions as public officials, not as private citizens. Our conversations took place in their 
respective offices.  
It is a common assumption that the position of “elite” interview respondents is more 
powerful than that of the interviewer (Mikecz 2012, Cochrane 1998). As McDowell (1998) has 
suggested, sometimes when interviewing people in positions of power, the researcher can 
become somewhat powerless, a reversal of the researcher-researched relationship which can be 
felt when interviewing houseless populations, for example. She suggests that elites can be 
“powerful and usually knowledgeable, often on their guard, sometimes keen to demonstrate their 
relative power and knowledge and your relative powerlessness and ignorance” (p. 2137). While I 
did not necessarily experience a sense of powerlessness when interviewing government staff, I 
did perceive their desire to demonstrate their knowledge over government authority in justifying 
why the City or County was already taking the right approach to managing houseless 
encampment issues. If I were to bring up the benefits of self-governance, for instance, they 
would accede that such a process was nice, but that encampments would not be able to self-
govern without government. I took this to mean that there were few options willing to be 
explored by government in the realm of alternative shelter types like houseless encampments. 
But also that government has its natural limits of what it can support.  
My goal for interviewing government staff therefore was to better understand how the 
City and County understood (and defined) the limits and benefits to self-governing 
encampments. As one of the few urban governments in the country providing municipally-
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owned property for self-governing encampments, I asked staff about why they endorsed 
encampments as a form of shelter and about the difficulties of working with and developing 
encampments in regard to land use issues and neighborhood pushback. This helped me develop 
upon the certain tensions between public and private that property relations so well illustrate.  
 
Participant Observation 
Formal and informal interviews were employed as one part of a multi-method approach. One-on-
one conversations with encampment residents in interview settings gave me direct insight into 
what residents were experiencing. But interviews in themselves can only provide so much 
information about an individuals’ experience. It was important to get the context of what 
encampments were collectively discussing and with what they were concerned. Thus, I 
supplemented my interviews by observing general assembly meetings at three of the 
encampments: HG, R2DT, and DV.36 Between the three encampments, I attended 80 general 
assembly meetings throughout my period of fieldwork.  
My goal during encampment meetings was simply to listen to group discussions and take 
notes about the content of the day’s topics. General assembly meetings for each of these three 
encampments were weekly or bi-weekly. The meetings covered a range of issues. Often 
mundane, the meetings talked about divisions of labor for the week, e.g. who was doing dishes in 
the kitchen, who was running security on which nights, etc. But frequently enough did meetings 
address major topics of concern. For instance, I attended meetings where a group made the 
decision to vote out a certain member, meetings that addressed and mediated conflicts among 
residents, and meetings that discussed relations with the City or JOHS. Being at these meetings 
 
36 Kenton Women’s Village did not have open-to-public meetings.  
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gave me insight into how the self-governance process worked for encampments, showing me 
how decisions were implemented despite members’ opposing views about how a certain process 
should be done. In this way, observing the meetings gave me another way of seeing how 
residents thought about the political situations in which they were embedded.  
 
Figure 10. General Assembly at Hazelnut Grove, summer 2018. 
 
About halfway through my fieldwork, I started attending meetings at the JOHS office 
regarding the relocation of HG. Both JOHS staff and HG members had invited me along and 
agreed that it was okay for me to be present in these meetings, which I attended on 6 different 
occasions. These meetings were initial conversations between JOHS and HG about what a 
potential site may look like, what HG wanted in a future site, and covered deadlines and logistics 
for a relocation. The meetings provided me unique access to see how government engages with 
and plans for self-governing encampments in Portland. From the meetings I gained a clearer 
picture of the constraints to establishing self-governing encampments as well as how houseless 
people were integrated into the planning of their own relocation. I found the City to be quite 
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responsive to HG resident’s suggestions (although I attended only the very early meetings which 
were mostly brainstorming sessions). Attending these meetings also allowed me to see how the 
residents of HG represented themselves to the government, as distinct from their own general 
assembly meetings or when talking with me informally.  
The line between participating and observing during ethnographic research can be blurry. 
As Cook (1997, 135) notes, participant observation can require “ethical, political, and practical” 
decisions to be made all at once about researcher roles. I originally set out in my research to stay 
neutral in my politics about the encampments. In attempting to hold true to this, I never spoke at 
encampment meetings. I just listened. As time went on, and as residents got to know me better, 
they would ask my opinion on certain issues. I found it hard not to ruminate with them about 
legal scenarios regarding the encampments or houseless rights in general. At a place like HG, I 
felt somewhat like an “insider.” That is, I felt I knew resident’s positions on just about 
everything it seemed. But as Mullings (1999) notes, there is no clear or fixed position of insider 
or thus outsider that the researcher embodies. Given the fluidity of researcher positions, Tarrant 
(2014, 494) suggests that the concept of “betweenness,” or a researchers acceptance of being 
both insider and outsider, may help to ease the tension over such distinctions by acknowledging 
the true incommensurability of one’s subject position. With this is mind, although I never 
intended to outwardly champion the positions of encampments and those of its residents, my 
close association with encampment residents no doubt implied my support for their struggles.      
Analyzing My Data 
Given the primacy of observation and interviewing for gathering data, note-taking was a 
significant aspect in ordering the data. During meetings and volunteer shifts, I took shorthand 
notes so that I could remain attentive to what was being said in the meetings and not to take too 
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much time away from the work I was supposed to be doing. Nor did I take notes during 
interviews, which were recorded on my phone and later transcribed. Only after leaving the sites 
where interviews, meetings, group projects, or security shifts took place did I fill out my notes 
more completely. My longform notes allowed me not only to more fully describe what was 
talked about in an earlier meeting, it also allowed me to develop upon ideas from past meetings, 
conversations, or interviews and to make links to topics that eventually would help in indexing 
my notes.    
My data analysis began by transcribing interview responses from recordings shortly after 
a given interview took place. Once interview data was typed and separated into individual 
documents, I coded the interview transcripts by tagging specific ideas from the texts that 
demarcated general topics mentioned by participants. After I coded primary data, I used a 
thematic approach organize my codes. Analyzing codes by grouping them thematically helped to 
identify and organize patterns of meaning (themes) across data sets to make sense of collective 
or shared experiences (Braun and Clarke 2012). For instance, a code that I marked as “voting” or 
“decision-making” could depict one or more themes relating to this project’s research goals, such 
as self-governance, citizenship, or democracy broadly, depending on the code’s context. 
Therefore, cross-comparison between original codes and newly identified themes helped me 
remain sensitive to idiosyncratic experiences presented in the data which did not immediately 
present themselves as connected to my primary research themes.  
In addition to transcribing and coding interviews, I also coded my field notes as well as 
annotations from secondary literature reviews. Like my interview transcripts, I read through my 
field notes and coded my observations. I coded my field notes initially for general themes like 
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“rights” or “property.” After coding my notes, I synthesized interview categories with codes 
from my notes to establish a larger data set of categories. I created a master list or index of all the 
different categories present. I indexed around thirty different categories from my primary data 
sources, such as “property rights,” “evictions,” “self-management,” “state of emergency,” and 
“active/passive citizenship.” From these categories, I narrowed down my data by collapsing the 
categories into more general themes by comparing my index with my main research themes. Any 
theme within my index that related to property, citizenship, rights, or self-governance was then 
identified with its original source to be used during writing.     
Methodological Approach 
Synthesizing my primary data with secondary literature allowed me to develop my analysis 
based on the project’s main research themes of liberal-democratic governance, property, and 
citizenship. I used an historical analysis to develop insights into why property matters for 
citizenship and particularly for the rights of houseless people. As laid out in Chapter 2, using a 
dialectical or relational approach helped me show how certain taken-for-granted aspects of 
political and economic life shape political relations for houseless people. Looking historically at 
how property has shaped citizenship was necessary to show how the appearance of full equal 
citizenship for houseless people today has been reinforced through particular values and rights 
relations over time.  
Particularly important for dialectical analysis in general is a need to illustrate the 
contradictions within processes and systems (Harvey 1996). In my case, I examined how 
property has historically constituted “proper” citizenship and used the contours of that 
relationship to illustrate how property-insecure people who hold political citizenship are not full 
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citizens. Examining the contradictory elements of property and personal rights was then 
important for showing how houseless encampment residents in Portland experience diminished 
citizenship as houseless people, which was detailed in the case studies of Chapters 3 and 4.  
Using historical analysis to develop a framework for the case studies in this dissertation 
helped show how liberal-democratic citizenship is shaped by capitalist property relations. My 
insistence that propertied-citizenship is necessarily maintained within liberal-democratic practice 
required me to engage with democratic theory in Chapter 5. In doing so, I embraced a critique of 
politics within liberal-democracy that is not prescriptive, but rather, open to the possibility of 
democracy as a practice of making equitable decisions. For lack of a better analytical term, I 
used reasoning to advance not prescriptive ontological positions about politics but, instead, I 
employed normative analysis of the social and political problems encampments and their 
residents face within democratic procedures. Doing so may have led me to somewhat of a 
“rational” analysis of the situations of houseless encampments within liberal-democracies. 
However, in doing so, and by not advancing determinative theories about the essence of politics, 
I was better able to show the utility of democratic theory as a mode of reasoning about politics 
and how democracy is still very present in the lives of houseless people.      
My overall objective throughout this research was to address the implications of the self-
governing houseless encampment phenomenon during a time of housing and houselessness 
crises in U.S. cities and to explain the political impact upon houseless encampment residents 
within liberal democracies. The manner in which I went about this may have certain limits to 
wider applicability. The case studies of Chapters 3 and 4, for example, focus particularly on 
policies and legal ordinances specific to Portland. Such context matters thus when attempting to 
understand the lack of or eradication of organized houseless encampments or governance 
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approaches to encampments in other places. Yet, by identifying the unique elements of 
Portland’s approach, the case studies can provide insights that may help inform other houseless 
movements or approaches to policy-making in other cities grappling with similar problems. My 
arguments about how property shapes liberal citizenship speak to more general problems of 
places organized by procedural democracy that is rooted within liberalism. The certain 
imbalance over property and citizenship within liberal-democracy can be seen not only in 
Portland, therefore, but in many places seeking to help houseless people realize their rights of 
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Przybylinski, S. (2020). Securing legal rights to place: Mobilizing around moral claims for a 




Przybylinski, S. (2015). The invisibility of homelessness. In Portlandness: A Cultural Atlas, D. 
Banis and H. Shobe. Seattle: Sasquatch Books.  
Book Reviews 
2018. Review of The priority of injustice: Locating democracy in critical theory, by Clive 
Barnett, The AAG Review of Books, 6(3): 173-175.   
 
2015. Review of Urban politics: Critical approaches, by Mark Davidson and Deborah Martin, 
Urban Studies 52(2): 396-399.  
2015. Review of Hell's Kitchen and the battle for urban space: Class struggle and urban reform 
in New York City, 1894–1914, Joseph Varga, Social and Cultural Geography 16(6): 714-
715. 
2014. Review of The down-deep delight of democracy, Mark Purcell, Urban Geography (35)3: 
473-474.  
2014. Finding meaning in alternative spaces, review of Paris–Amsterdam underground: Essays 
on cultural resistance, subversion, and diversion, edited by Christopher Lindner and 





Chair of Urban Environmental Justice Panel, Nature-Society Workshop. Syracuse University, 
October 2019. 
Session: “Human Rights, Property Rights, Squatting” at Power at the Margins: Mobilizing 
Across Housing Injustice, Minneapolis, MN. March 2018. 
Participatory research panelist for community-based research symposium. Portland State 
University, Portland, OR, April 2015 
Conference Papers 
“Properties of Liberal Democratic Citizenship: Constructing the Houseless as Secondary 
Citizens.” Properties of Democracy Session Organizer at American Association of Geographers 
Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C. April 2019.  
 
“Citizens Without Property: Realizing Citizenship for the Homeless.” American Association of 
Geographers Annual Meeting. New Orleans, LA. April 2018. 
 
“Replacing Rights to the City.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting. Boston, 
MA. April 2017.  
 
“Social Justice and the Tent City.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting. San 
Francisco, CA. March 2016. 
“What is a ‘Counter Movement?’: Embedding Polanyi in the Geographies of Homeless 
Resistance.” Critical Geographies Mini Conference. Vancouver, B.C. November 2014. 
“Occupying for Survival: Legitimating Homeless Space.” Relational Poverty Network Meeting. 
Seattle, WA. October 2014. 
“Not In Portland’s Backyard: The Production of a Self-Organized Rest Space.” Association of 
Pacific Coast Geographers Annual Meeting. Tucson, AZ. September 2014.   
 “A Critical Space for a Necessary Place: A Portland, Oregon Study of a Homeless Rest Space.” 
Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting. Tampa, FL. April 2014. 
“Right to Dream: A Portland, OR Case Study of a Contested Rest Space.” Association of Pacific 
Coast Geographers Annual Meeting. Lake Tahoe, CA. September 2013. (Received President’s 
Award for Outstanding Paper by a Masters Student) 
“Geographies of Inclusion: Claiming the Right to the City.” Portland State University Research 
Symposium. Portland, Oregon. April 2013. 
 
AWARDS/SCHOLARSHIPS 




Roscoe-Martin Fund for Research Support, Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse University 
(January 2018) 
  
Syracuse University Graduate Student Organization Travel Award (April 2016, April 2017) 
 
Portland State University Student Educational Travel Award (January 2014, September 2014) 
 
AAG Urban Geography Specialty Group Travel Award (March 2014, March 2016, April 2018) 
 
Department of Geography Professional Development Travel Award (February 2014) 
 
President’s Award for Outstanding Paper by a Master’s Student, Association of Pacific Coast 
Geographers, Tahoe, CA (September 2013) 
 
Association of Pacific Coast Geographers Travel Award (September 2013, September 2014) 
 
Dale and Coral Courtney Scholarship, Portland State Department of Geography (Academic Year 
2013-2014) 
 




Search Committee for Assistant Professor in Human Geography, Syracuse Dept. of Geography 
(Fall/Winter 2016-17) 
Graduate Representative for Geography Colloquium Series (2016-2017; 2019-2020) 
Search Committee for Assistant Professor in Human Geography, Portland State Dept. of 
Geography (Fall/Winter 2013-14) 






Site Suitability Analysis for Vacant Properties (with Krystle Harris) for City of Portland (Spring 
2018) [ https://arcg.is/1ryKjP ] 
Assistant for Center for Geography Education in Oregon- Working with Primary Sources 
Workshop with Library of Congress (July 2014) 
Assistant for Oregon Geographic Alliance Summer Institute- Bend, OR (June 2013) 
Volunteer at Right 2 Dream Too, houseless shelter in Portland, Oregon 
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Volunteer with Village Coalition, Portland, Oregon  
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
American Association of Geographers 




Future Professoriate Program, Syracuse University 2015-present 
 
 
